The Dull Knife Raid of 1878 : A Study of the Frontier by Powers, Ramon S.
Fort Hays State University 
FHSU Scholars Repository 
Master's Theses Graduate School 
Summer 1963 
The Dull Knife Raid of 1878 : A Study of the Frontier 
Ramon S. Powers 
Fort Hays Kansas State College 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.fhsu.edu/theses 
 Part of the History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Powers, Ramon S., "The Dull Knife Raid of 1878 : A Study of the Frontier" (1963). Master's Theses. 817. 
https://scholars.fhsu.edu/theses/817 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at FHSU Scholars Repository. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of FHSU Scholars Repository. 
THE DULL KNIFE RAID OF 1878: 
A STUDY OF THE FRONTIER 
being 
A Thesis Presented to the Graduate Faculty 
of t he Fort Hays Kansas State College in 
Partial Fulfillment of the .Requirement s for 
the Degree of Master of Arts 
by 
Ramon S. Powers, A. B. 
Fort Hays Kansas State College 
Hays, Kansas 
Approved W • Y 
~ j or Professor' 
ABSTRACT 
The Dull Knife outbreak of 1878 was one of the last Indian 
raids in the United States. It was part of the general conflict 
which plagued frontier America from its very genesis to the latter 
part of the nineteenth century. The frontiersman-Indian conflict 
can only be explained through a study of the actual confrontation 
of the Indians and the whites. 
The Indian and the frontiersman differed in their conception 
of land use. In the Northern Cheyenne's relationship with the 
United States government, that difference was manifested in the 
treaty which forced the northern tribe to th e southern agency, 
and the attempt of the agency to 11civilizett the Cheyenne. 
The conditions in Indian Territory were unbearable f or t he 
Northern Cheyenne who had been forced there by an illegal treaty . 
The annuities and rations guaranteed these Indians were not suppl ied 
in full measure showing the infidelity of the government in its 
role as benefactor of the red man. The outbreak from Darlington 
Agency, the raids in southwest Kansas, and the Sappa creek and 
Beaver creek massacres were defiant acts of revenge against t he 
whites who were taki ng over their count ry. 
Indian ingenuity and military failure characterize t his 
outbreak. Serious problems pl agued t he United States Army in 
protecting the frontier and the public was unwill i ng t o either 
give support to the army in suppressing the Indians or l eave t he 
red man to determine his own future in his own way . The settler 
demanded the services of the state and federal government to 
protect him in his exploitation of the earth's resources. The 
might of a new industrial nation was on his side and he won. 
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Indian-frontiersman relations are as familiar to Americans 
today as any other factor in their country 's history . This 
conflict is continually r ehearsed on the television and movie 
screens, and newspaper articles and books are produced in large 
volume f or the lucrative "western" market. 
This study is an examination of the Indian-white conflict 
in the light of one particular episode in the history of that conflict. 
To facilitate research an episode in area history, the Dull Knife 
Raid of 1878, was chosen. Through the use of numerous sources 
which have been overlooked by previous writers on this subject, 
this study attempts to present this episode in Indian history 
in the light of the greater movements then taking place in 
American society. 
Research has included taped inter views, personal r eminiscences , 
popular histories of the west , novels, etc. Senate Report No. 708, 
the Report of the Secretary of War, and the Annual Reports of the 
Connnissioner of Indian Affairs , are major government sources used 
in t his study. Other essential sources are the Collections of 
the Kansas State Historical Society, Qironicles of Oklahoma, and 
the Nebraska .History magazine. 
Acknowledgement must be made to those who made this study 
possible. I extend my thanks for help and encouragement during 
my graduate career to Gordon Davidson, my thesis advisor, also 
to the history faculty at Fort Hays Kansas State College for 
their patience through this ordeal. I , am indebted to the 
late George B. Nellans of Oberlin, Kansas, who had gathered 
some of the materials which made my task much easier. Mrs. 
Lawrence Claar, curator of the Oberlin Museum, was of great 
help in aiding my research. The staff at the Kansas State 
Historical Library must be given credit for helping locate 
many materials not available at Hays or ·Oberlin. A special 
thanks to Edward M. Beougher, Grinnell, Kansas, for some of 
the Fort Wallace -materials, and for l ending me a book which 
was unavailable elsewhere. 
The pressure of writing a master 1 s t hesis has been hard 
on me and those around me and without encouragement and help 
from my wife, Eva Powers, this thesis would never have been 
written. 
INTRODUCTION 
The American West has long been the subject of critical study 
by historians in an effort to determine the effect of the frontier 
on American life and charactero The most renowned scholar of the 
frontier was Frederick Jackson Turner who rejected the traditional 
concept that the American character was a reflection of its European 
progenitor 0 He insisted that the character of American civiliza-
tion could be ascribed to the continuous "evolution and adaption of 
organs in response to changed environment." "The e.x:istence of an 
area of free land," he wrote, "its continuous recession and the 
advance of American settlement westward, explain American develop-
ment.111 
But, the "frontier hypothesis" with its emphasis on free 
land forced Turner to place the highest social values in the rela-
tively primitive society just within the agricultural frontiero 
However, his insistence upon a theory of social stages placed 
the highest values in the urban industrial society which was in 
full development during Turner's lifeo The great historian 
wavered between two views 0 Henry Nash Smith states that: "The 
First World War had shaken Turner's agrarian code of values ••• 11 2 
Turner in his early career had considered the frontier not only 
lFrederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History 
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1920), p. 1. 
2Henry Nash Smith, Virgin Land: The American West~ Symbol 
and Myth (New York~ Vintage Books, 19'59Y, p. JOJ. 
as an area of free land but also as nature. Rebirth was the result 
of this "magic fountain of youth in which America continually bathed 
and was rejuvenated. 11:3 This transcendental optimism in American 
ideals founded in the forest and free land has proven inadequate for 
our new industrial age. Also Turner's insistence on the democratic 
influence of the frontier has resulted in a peculiar understanding 
of the conflict between the pioneer and the aborigines. In his 
famous paper presented to the American Historical Association in 
1893, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," he 
states that the Indian frontier was an important consolidating agent 
in. Arnerica.n History. 4 Relating particularly to the Great Plains 
Turner states that following the organization of Kansas and Nebraska 
in 1854, Indi~n hostility continued because "the savage lords of the 
boundless prairie instinctively f elt the significance of the entrance 
of the farmer into their empire. 11 5 
If the frontier was 11 the meeting point between savagery and 
civilization, 116 as Turner maintains, then the democracy which 
evolved at these outer limits of civilization might be more 
adequately explained through analyzing the Indian-frontiersman 
3Toid., p. 297 • 
4rurner, The Frontier in American History, p. 15. 
5Ibid., p. 144. 
~rederick Jackson Turner, Early Writings of Frederick Jackson 
Turner, comp. Everett E. Edwards (Madison, Wisconsin: The University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1938), p. 187. 
2 
3 
conflict and the reasons for the eventual elimination of the 
Indian control of the New World. This is the purpose for this 
study of one particular episode in frontier history, the Dull 
Knife outbreak of 1$78. 
The Great Plains was the last frontier for settlement 
though many trails traversed it and traders and hunters long 
had exploited its resources. But, it was not until the fanner 
had adapted himself to the rew environment through mechanical 
invention and technology that the Great Plains could be conquer-
ed and made productive for the rapidly industrializing nation. 
Railroads provided transportation; barbed wire was made available 
for fencing; deep-drilled wells and windmills supplied water; dry 
farming and irrigation partially solved the problem of inadequate 
7 
rainfall. · With the passage of the Homestead Act in 1862, the 
Government gave its support to western settlement al.though it was 
more than a decade before the new technology opened up the Great 
Plains frontier. 
Before the Plains could be completely safe for settlement 
the Indian population had to be shifted to areas less desirable 
to the white agriculturalists. This process of displacement and 
the resulting Indian uprisings were not unique to the Middle West. 
7 
Walter Prescott Webb, The Great Plains (New York and 
Dunlap, 1931) 9 passim . - --
Fl-o the very enesis of erica the Indian l ands ~ere u ·ect 
appropriation b the civilized technicians o -e e a rarianie • 
- illiam 1 . Hagan states t ha the r le t er ent 
in the Indian-front ·ersman conflict assume a efini e aracter 
even before the Revolution . I t ra asica na in t:::eating 
Indian probl ems, but "officials of the ce _ ral go rrnnen soon 
learned that when a conflict existed bet een the i nteres so~ e 
Indian and those of the frontie smen, that he Indian a to e 
sacrifice • n8 The Indians I predica ent ms s uccintly assessed 
by Alexis de Tocqueville who s tates i n __.:.. ___ :;.. in • erica that 
11 The .American government does not indee now r ob them (}he In ians] 
of their lands, but it allows perpetual encroachments on them . 
and as the limits of the earth 1rul at last fail th their nl 
refuge is the grave. "9 Our forefathers earl" loyed the ration-
al ization used extensively to justi fy white a gressi n: 11 d and 
reason both condemn the monopoly of land r t hose unpre are to 
cultivate it. 010 
This i nterpretation of Indian-white relations was first 
r ecognized by Secretary of War Henry Knox, one of the firs t ublic 
officials 11to emphasize private property as an instrum nt of 
civilization. n11 He employed the Lockean- t e argument that if 
~~illiam T. Hagan, American Indians (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1961), p . JO. 
9Alexis de Tocqueville , Democracy in America, ed . Philli s 
Bradley (New York: Vintage Books, 1958)-;J:, 366 . 
10 · · Hagan, American Indians, p. 39 . 
11Ibid., P• 43. 
ownership in fee simple were introduced among the Indians they 
would acquire the desire to follow the white man's techniques. 
But even Knox realized that the pioneers' invasion of the Indians' 
hunting ground and killing the game upon which he depended was 
the only way to insure a complete break from aboriginal life. The 
enfranchised frontiersmen had priority and 11 the reaction of a 
frontiersman to the sight of arable land in the possession of an 
Indian were as easy to predict as the reflex of Pavlov's dog 0 1112 
President Washington advised the tribesmen to adopt the 
farming and stock-raising techniques of thewhite man. Beginning 
in 1793 Congress authorized a yearly appropriation of $20,000 
for purchase of domestic animals and farming implements for the 
Indian nations. This expenditure was not always used for such 
projects, often being used by agents to purchase gifts to influence 
tribal leaders.13 
Professor William T. Hagan states that the character of 
Indian-American relations changed following the War of 1812. 
The decreasing threat of British intervention allo·wed the 
United States government to be much less conciliatory to the 
Indian nation, but there was official concern over Indians visit-
ing Canadian posts as late as the 1840•s. The premptory 
12Ibid. 
13Ibid., p. 45. 
5 
6 
demands made by the settlers on Indian lands reflected the 
weakened position of the tribes. By 1850 the tribes had 
14 
relinquished the bulk of their holdings east of the Mi ssissippi. 
In 1822 the government withdrew partially from Indian 
affairs by leaving Indian trade to free enterprise. The 
Bureau of Indian Affairs was created in 1824 as a subsidiary 
of the War Department, but it was not until 1832 that a 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs was formally designated. Two 
years later, in 1834, Congress passed two important laws deal-
ing with Indians. The Indian Trade and Intercourse Act re-
defined the Indian's territory and it strengthened the govern-
ment's hand in dealing with intruders. The Ind i an Reorganizat i on 
Act was designed to take care of the complaints of "expens i ve, 
15 
inefficient, and irresponsible" administrat i on of Indian af f airs . 
The House committee which recommended an Irrl i an appropr iat i on 
iil 1819, exemplified the government's posi tion in dealing with 
the Indians. Its program was to 11 Put into the hands of thei r 
children the primer and the hoe, and they will naturally, in t ime , 
take hold of the plough . . . 
16 
morality and industry ••• 11 
and they will grow up in habits of 
The extinction of the tribal system 
of communal ownership of land would follow. 
The failure of the government's policy was that it had to 
overcome the resistance of tribesmen, and also the government's 
14 
Ibid., P• 66. 
15 
Ibid·., P• 67. 16-
1Eif!., p. 8~. 
7 
operation of farms a.rrl mills whieh aimed at civilizing the 
Indians was handled by white men and seemed to profit them 
rather than the Indians. It was al.most essential that the 
elements that provided the tribesmen with a livmg would have 
te be destroyed before he would accept a new way of life. This 
was acc0mplished by forcing the tribes onto the plains and 
later the slaughter of buffalo herds. Ray Allen Billington 
states that "Once the buffalo vanished the Indian's livelihood 
17 
was gone and he had no choice but to accept federal bountyo 11 
The slaughter of the two giant herds which grazed the central 
plains was begun in 1867 and was nearly completed by 1883. 
When tm cultural values of the Iniians and Whites conflict-
ed, 11 the superiority of the Bible, the primer, and the plow were 
never questioned by tm whites and no attempt was made to compro-
18 
mise with Indian tradition, 11 states Hagan. Pushed into an 
agrarian way of life which they neither understood nor desired, 
the Indians resisted but to no avail. 
When an outbreak occurred, the Army accused the Indian 
Department officials of coddling the Indians and anning them 
with better weapons than. the troops used. The a:nny partisans in 
Congress denounced the "mawkish sentimentality" of humanitarians, 
l '/ 
Ray Allen Bill~ton, Westward Expansion: ! History of 
American Frontier (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949), p.b67. 
18 
Hagan, American Indians, p. 910 
8 
and frontiersmen displayed Indian skulls inscribed with, 11! am 
19 
on the reservation at Last" or 11Let Harpers Tell of My Virtues." 
The northern plains lured pioneers with hopes of mineral 
wealth and despite the treaties which forbade intrusion on Indian 
land the prospectors invaded the area in the 18701 s. A 'Wyoming 
newspaper expressed the frontiersmen's attitude in these words: 
n The same inscrutable Arbiter that decreed the down.fall of Rome, 
has pronounced the doom of extinction upon the red men of Americao 
To attempt to de.fer this result by mawkish sentimentalism o • • is 
20 
unworthy of the at;e. 11 And an army captain turned frontiersman 
states: "Some will say they Ghe Indians] are human beings, and 
( we] must treat them as such. My answer to this is they appear 
to be only human in fonn. ••• they will not be satisfied unless 
••• killing the white race ••• and it will never be got out of 
21 
them until they are made to cease to l!>reathe." 
The Indian wars closed the final chapter on one phase of 
American history. Professor William T. Hagan, states that the 
"Wars and rumors 0f wars had contributed much to the detennin-
ation of western persmality and political and social organizat-
ion. What unity there was on the frontier, together with the 
tendency to look to federal authority, was due in large part to 
22 
the Indian problem." 
19 
Ibid., P• 109. 
20--
Ibid., P• ll7. 
21--
Captain s. s. Van Sickel, ! Stery of Real Life the 
JU.a.ins. o. (n.d.: no pub.), PP• 31. --:a 
Thido 
9 
Many careers were made on the Indian frontier, and many 
lives lost. But the Indian wars were an economic boon to the 
frantiero An estimate in 1870 places the cost for each Indian 
23 
killed at $1,000,000 in government expenditure. 
The Northern Cheyenne tribesmen had been relocated in 
Indian Territory where their numbers were soon decimated by 
malarial fever. A shortage of medicine was combined with a 
meat ration which had been described by their agent, John D. 
24 
Miles, as "net grossly 'bad. 11 
After a year on the southern reservation a small band of the 
tribesmen decided to leave and their escape summoned thousands of 
troops from Fort 'Elliot, Te:xas, to Fort Meade, Dakota Territory, to 
capture them and preserve peace on the .frontier. The small band 
of less than three hundred Cheyenne was piloted by Dull Knife and 
Little Wolf across eight hundred miles of barren prairieo This 
band of Northern Cheyenne and their f~ht for freedom represent 
the dilemma of the American Indian. 
This study will attempt to analyze, in the context of the 




Senate Report No. 708, P• 760 
10 
I. THE NORTHERN CHEYENNE AND 'IEE U.S. GOVERNMENT 
"We are not living up to our obligations with the 
Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indians, and we should give them clear-
ly to know by our .future deal~s with them that we will do 
1 
them full and liberal justice. • • .!' Thia was the conclusion 
that a Senate investigating committee arrived at after extensive 
testimony and study of the Cheyenne outbreak from their aiency 
in Indian Territory. In a study of the Cheyenne outbreak it 
is essential first to present a background of the relations 
between the Cheyenne and the government. 
The Cheyenne Indians are of the Algonquian family and 
formerly lived either on the shores of the Great Lakes or the 
upper Mississippi river and its tributaries. They lived in 
villages and cultivated th soil, but by 1803 trey had moved 
west a.rrl southwest, to the edge of the Great Pl.a.ins. Here they 
acquired the horse and moved beyond the Missouri river to the 
North Platte river. They were a typical tribe of buffalo 
hunters, 11 •• • possessin,g energy and coura~e, and taking rank 




Report of Committees of the Senate !?1. United States 
for the First and Second Sessions of the Forty-Sixth Congress, 
1879-1880, Vol. 7, Nos. 671 to 725, and 693, Part l, (mashington: 
Government Printing Office, 1880), P• xxv. Hereinafter cited 
as Senate Report No. 708. 
2 
George Bird Grinnell, The Cheyenne Indians: Their Historf 
and Ways of Life (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1924 , 
I, l. 
ll 
One of the first accounts of white men e@mi.ng in contact 
with the Cheyenne Indians is in the Lewis and Clark Journals; 
they found the Cheyenne established in two places in 1804. 
They traded with t he Spanish and the French and also procured 
British and American goods at the Arikers and Mandan villages 
3 
on the Missouri . It was about 1830 that the· Cheyenne split 
into two bands, a northem and a southern groupo 
The first t~eaty between the Cheyenne and the United States 
government was in 1825. The place of' signing was the mouth of 
the Teton River; tribal recognition and provisions for trade 
were established, but no reservation was designated. When the 
tribe split into the northern and southern branches, the south-
ern group formed a confederacy with the Arapahoe along tm 
Arkansas River. In 1851, the Fort Laramie Treaty was signed by 
the Sioux, Assiniboin, Ar:i.kara, Grosventre, Crow, Arapahoe, 
Shoshone, and Cheyenne plains tribes. Congress was to pay 
annuities to several of the tribes and they, in turn, were to 
allow the government to build military posts and roads thro~h 
their country. F.a.ch tribe accepted a particular defined area for 
its roaming. The Cheyenne and Arapahoe were to occupy the area 
east of the Rocky Mountains and between the North Platte and the 
Arkansas Rivers. Undoubtedly the ~ommissioners, D. D. Mitchell 
and Thomas Fitzpatrick, who negotiated the treaty for the govern-
ment did not realize that the Cheyenne were divided, and the 
3 
Ibid. P• 40. 
l2 
Northern Cheyenne were to remain in the north though they 
maintained contact with their kindred in the south. The 1851 
Treaty v«>uld have given the Wians $50,000 annually for fifty 
years from the g<!>vemment, wt the U. S. Senate substi tuted 
11 ten years" for "fifty years" and authorized the presi dent to 
4 
continue payments for five years longer. All the Indian tribes 
did not give thei r approval to the change. 
Between 1851 and 1861 the white men discovered gold and 
silver in Colorado, and a stream of miners headed for the rich 
mountains in central Colorado where forts were built and trails 
le:i across the lands of the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indians. The 
Treaty of 1851 had guaranteed this land to them, but the whites 
were forc.ing them down upon the headwaters of the Arkansas River. 
This was in direct violation of the govenunent ~ promise to enforce 
the treaty provisions. 
To rectify the changes taking place on the Plains, the 
govenunent signed another treaty with the Arapahoe and Cheyenne 
Indians on February 18, 1861, at Fort Wise, Kansas. This treaty 
would give the Im:i.ans a smaller district 11beginn~ at the mouth 
of the Purgatory River to the northern boundary of the Territory 
of New Mexico; thence aleng said west boundary to the Sandy Folk 
5 
to the place of the beginning.'' The Indians' reservation 
4 
· Report of Indian Peace Commissioners," 40th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
House Executive Deeument No. 97 (January 14, 1868), p. 17; cited 
by Winston Crown, 11A Study of Indian Ra.ids in Northwest Kansas, 
1864-1878'' (unpublished Master's thesis, Fort Hays Kansas State 
College, Hays, Kansas, 1950), P• 7o 
5 
Ibid, P• 8. 
13 
was to include both sides of the Arkansas River, and the terri-
tory around Fort Lyon, Colorado. The U.S. government was to 
pay each tribe $30,000 per year for fifteen years and houses 
were to be built, lands broken up and fenced, and stock animals 
and agricultural tools furnished. 
Many of the chiefs and warriers withheld their consent of 
the new treaty and chided those who had accepted the white man's 
terms • War parties began to pillage settlements and kill 
settlers. The Overland. Mail route was suspended 'and immigrant 
trains were plunderedo In the midst of the Civil War the federal 
government could give little aid to the frontier defenses• Conse-
quentiy, on June 24, 1864, Governor Evans of Colorado ordered the 
friendly Arapahoe and Cheyenne on the Arkansas River to go to Fort 
Lyon for enrollment and protection and those who refused were to 
be hunted down and destroyed. Most of the roving bands refused., 
and the s~er of 18b4 saw the plains completely devestated by 
the Indians. Then the Governor called upon all citizens to "go in 
pursuit" of the Indians and 11 to kill · and destroy them. u Under 
Colonel Chi vington, the Third Colorado Cavalry., and part of the 
First, (900 to 1,000 men), attacked the Cheyenne camp of Black 
Kettle on Sand Creek on November 29, 1864. Chivington wired Gov-
erner Evans that he "killed 500 Indians; destroyeq 130 lodges; took 
6 
500 mules and ponies •• •" George Bird Grinnell states bha.t 
6 
LeRoy R. Hafen and Carl Coke Rister., Western America 
Second Edition (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950), P• 479. 
14 
"The soldiers scalped the dead, cut up and mutilated the bodies 
and took back to Denver over a hundred scalps, which were ex-
hibited in triumph between the acts of tm theatrical perform-
7 
ance one evening." The Sand Creek Massacre toucmd off one of 
the most bitter Indian wars in the West . 
The government tried to fight back, but this time the odds 
were not in their favor. The Indian warrior knew the terrain 
and had been trained from boyhood in the skill of horsemanship. 
And, of course, the Indian traders had equipped the Indians with 
equal or better arms than the a:nny provided its recruits. The 
situation was overcome by the army by resorting to w:inter campaigns. 
The Indians were at a disadvantage during that season as they were 
unable to move without leaving ,a trail. 
The federal government tried to appease the Indian when, in 
1865, they sent William s. Harney and John B. Sanborn to the 
mouth of the Arkansas river to conclude a treaty with the Arapahoe 
and Cheyenne. The terms provided for a new reservation to be 
partly in Kansas and partly in Indian Territory, but the tribes 
could continue to hwit on the fonner range as 1011g as the game last-
ed. But this treaty was never signed by the U.S. Senate and the 
Indians continued to occupy the central plains. 
The winter campaign became the major strategy of the army 
and with the arrival of Lt.-General George Ao Custer in the West 
7 
George Bird Grinnell, The Fighting Cheyennes (Normam, 
Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), P• 173. 
15 
the Indians were in for some serious reversals. The Washita 
Massacre in Indian Territory in 1868 was such a campaign. Custer 
completely destroyed th3 Cheyenne village of the old chief Black 
Kettle. The captured Indians were taken to Camp Supply and 
fighting between the Southern Cheyenne an:l whites ceased until 
1874. 
The hide hunters entroached upon the Indian's lands south 
of the Arkansas River, and in 1874 the Southern Cheyenne join-
ed the Commanche, Kiowas, and Apaches in the Fight at Adobe Walls 
in the Texas panhandle. Defeated by a handful of whites the 
8 
Indians then raided as far north as the Smoky Hill River. 
In September, 1874, Colonel R. S. Mackenzie and seven troops 
of the Fourth Cavalry captured the Kiowas, Commanche, and Southern 
Cheyenne villaies near the Red River of Texas. The tribes were 
placed on the Darlington Reservation in Indian Territory. They 
were placed in the charge of Agent John D. Miles, who had been 
appointed agent tmre in 1872. ~ere they lived peacefully with 
rations issued to them by tha govemment. 
The Northern Cheyenne were in perpetual warfare during the 
1860•s and the 1870•s. Their villages were filled with plunder 
from raiding the stage lines and settlements along tha Platte in 
1865. This led to the Powder River Expedition of 1865, initiated 
by General Grenville M.. Dodge to protect the .frontier from Indian 
8 
Grinnell, The Fighting Cheyennes, PP• 319-3~7. 
16 
depredations. The expedition was not successful, and the follow-
ing year the Indian menace was increased by the Fetterman Massacre 
and the army withdrawal from the Powder River country. 
General Hancock took a command into the field in the summer 
of 1867, but in his four months of active campa.ignir)8 killed only 
four Indians. The Indians, however, were more successful, massacr-
ing Lieutenant Kidder with ten soldiers on the plains north of 
Fort Wallace. 
The Year 1867 brought a peace commission to the Great Plains. 
After the Medicine Lodge Treaty was signed by the Kiowas, Commanch-
es, Arapahoes, Apaches, and Southern Cheyenne, the Commission went 
north to make a treaty with the Brule an:l Ogallala Sioux, the 
Northern Cheyenne, and tb:l Crow. But, as Grinnell states, "The 
giving of a few presents and the signing of treaties by a few chief s 
would not appease the Indians , whose livelihood, the buffalo, was 
10 
beir)8 destroyed or driven away. 11 
The Fort Laramie and Medicine Lodge treati es cleared the 
central Plains of Indians, and the white men surrendered the 
Powder River Road, and abandoned the three forts guarding that 
highway. The Fort Laramie Treaty, signed April 29, 1868, gave the 
Sioux a permanent reservation in Dakota Territory west of the 
Missouri River. They were allowed to use their old hunting ground 
until the government should need this land. Also the country just 
east of the Big Horn mountains was recognized as Indian Territory. 
10 
Ibid., P• 276. 
17 
On May 10, 1868, the Northern Cheyenne and Northern 
Arapahoe Indians concluded a treaty with the United States 
govenunent which was ratified on July 25, 1868. The Cheyenne 
and Arapahoe Indians were to tie themselves permanently to 
the Medicine Lodge Creek agency, the agency near Fort Randall, 
11 
or the Crow Agency near Otter C~ek, on the Yellowstone. It 
also provided that any individual who was head of a family, and 
who wanted to start farming should be given land not exceeding 
,320 acres which "shall cease to be held in common, but the same 
may be occupied and held in the exclusive possession of the 
]2 
person selecting it. 11 
Since a reservation was never assigned to them the Northern 
Cheyenne lived with the Brule Sioux during the succeeding years. 
For six years the two tribes lived in peace together, but in 1874 
the Black Hills explorations of Lieutenant-General George Custer 
brought in a horde of gold seekers. As frictions developed 
betweeih the whites and the Indians, the Cheyenne moved out of the 
Black Hills into the valleys of Montana, which they considered 
theirs by treaty right. The country was well watered, timbered, 
and stocked with buffalo, and for the next two years the entire 
group of northern Cheyenne lived well, moving from the Powder 
River to the Big Horn mountains during their big hunt• 
In 187.3 delegates of both the Northern and Southern Cheyenne 
11 
Senate Report . No. 708, P• 2.30. 
12 ~. 
18 
met in Washington to induce the Northern branch to accept the 
cordial invitation of the latter group to settle in Indian 
13 
Territory, but the Northern tribe refused. 
The Indian appropriations approved June 22, 1874, contained 
a clause that prohibited the Northern Cheyenne and Arapahoe from 
receiving supplies "until they should join the rest of their tribe 
in the south." But before the terms for their removal could be 
agreed upon, hostilities broke out in Indian Territory. The North-
ern Cheyenne and Arapahoe were then asked to enter into an agree-
ment to move to the Indian Territory, "whenever the government 
should see fit," before receiving any supplies or annuities. This 
agreement is dated November 12, 1874, and was from the Red Cloud 
15 
Agency in Nebraska. 
In the next appropriation act, approved March 3, 1875, the 
restrictive clause of the former act was altered to provide 
instead that 11 said Northern Cheyenne and Arapahoes shall, if requir-
ed by the Secretary of Interior, remove to their reservation in 
the Indian Territory before the delivery of said supplies appropri-
16 
ated for the foregoing ~lauses. 11 The Annual Report of the Uom-
missioner of Indian Affairs for 1875, states that "Such removal 
and division would tend greatly to good discipline, and enable the 
13 
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19 
17 
enforcement of compulsory labor by the Indians." 
The hostilities in Wia.n Territory ended in April, 1875, 
but the government feared that removal of the Northern Cheyenne 
and Arapahoe Indians would thwart the efforts of the Commission 
18 
negotiating with t he Sioux for cession of the Black Hills. 
The Indian office requested on October 16, 1875, that an 
order be issued direct:ing the removal of the Cheyenne and r e-
quested the Secretary of War to enforce the removal in case 
19 
the Indians refused to obey the orders of the department. 
On November 18, 1875, the Secretary of l iar stated that the 
matter "has been referred to the military authorities for 
infonnation, and that it is the op.ini on of General Sheridan the 
20 
change should not be made at this time. '' 
During this period the Sioux were leav:ing their reservation 
m Dakota and taking refuge wi th the Northern Cheyenne. Finally, 
in December, 1875, an order came from the government that all 
Indians not living on reservations-and this .included all of the 
Northern Cheyenne-should be at tmir agencies by January 31, 
1876, or the military would come after them. Because of the 
16 
Ibido, PP• 236-237• 
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severity of winter it was 1JI1possible for the Indians to 
comply even if they had wanted to; however, it seems none of 
them desired to leave their homes in the protected valleys. 
In a three-pronged attack planned by General Terry, commanding 
the Department of Dakota, to capture the "hostile" Indians, 
General Crook with fifteen troops of cavalry and five companies 
of infantry moved on a camp of Sioux and Cheyenne, June 17, 1876. 
The ill-fated Custer command had moved to a Sioux camp on the 
Little Big Horn. 
The Sioux War of 1876 found a portion of the still wild 
Northern Cheyenne and Arapahoe taking an active part. It 
culminated in the destruction of Dull Knn e's village by General 
Mackenzie on Nove:nber 26, 1876. This peaceful village hidden on 
the Crazy oman Creek in the Bighorn Mountains was found by 
Arapahoe scouts from the Red Cloud Agency. The surprise attack 
forced the Cheyenne out of their village but their retreat was 
successful and they were not captured. Captain Luther North and 
his Pawnee scouts, sent to burn the lodges and camp gear, found 
many articles which had belonged to members of the Seventh Cavalry. 
Dull Knife's band wintered with the Sioux under Crazy Horse. The 
war continued until spring when the main body of Cheyenne surren-
dered at Red Cloud Agency to United States troops. 
The Indian appropriation act of August 15, 1876, again had 
made delivery of supplies to the Northern Cheyenne contingent 
on their removal south. 
21 
The Act of August 15, 1876, mich resulted in the re-
moval of the Northern Cheyenne. to Indian Territory has been 
the center of considerable controversy. As passed by the 
Forty-fourth Congress February 28, 1887, it was 11 An Act to 
ratify an agreement with certain bands of the Sioux Nations 
of Indian, and also with the Northern Arapahoe and Cheyenne 
21 
Indians.'' The agreement was concluded. by George i . anypenny, 
Henry B. fuipple, Jared • Daniels, Albert C. Boone, Henry C. 
Bulis, Newton Edmnnds, and Augustine Gaylord, commissioners on 
the part of the United States. The controversial portion of 
the agreement was Article 4, which states: 
The government of the United States and the 
said Indians, being mutually desirous that the 
latter shall be located in a country where they 
may actually become self-supporting and acquire 
the arts of civilized life, it is therefore agreed 
that the said Indians shall select a delegation of 
five or more chiefs and principal men from each 
band, who shall, without delay, visit the Indi an 
Territory under the guidance and protection of sui t-
able persons, to be appointed for that purpose by 
the Department of the Interior, with a view to 
selecti ng therein a permanent home for the s aid 
Indians. If such delegat i on shall make a select-
ion which shall be satisfactory to themselves, t he 
people whom they represent, and to the United St ates, 
th en the said Indians agree that they will remove 
to the country so selected within one year from t his 
date. And the said Indians do further agree in all 
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as the Government may provide for them in the 
sel ection of a country suitable for a pennanent 
home, where they may live like white men. 22 
Of the seven tri bes that signed the treaty at the seven 
different agencies, five of the Sioux tribes placed a 
reservation on art i cle 4, but "in all other respects the 
22 
23 
said article rticle 4] remaining in full force and effect . " 
But , those tribes that signed the treaty wit hout reservations 
were the Ogallala Sioux, the Northern Arapahoe and Cheyenne 
who signed the treaty at Red Cloud Agency, Nebraska, September 
26, 1876, and the Brule Sioux at Spotted Tail Agency, Nebraska , 
24 
September 23, 1876 0 But when the treaty was printed in the 
appendix of Senate Report No. 708, the transcript of the inves-
tigation of Cheyenne removal, there is inserted a note trat 
25 
there was no record of Cheyenne signature of the treatyo 
The following Northern Cheyenne, however, did sign the 
treaty with the Sioux Commission : Living Bear, Spotted Elle, 
26 
Black Bear, Turkey Legs, and Calfskin Shirt . There is no 
22 
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23 
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Laws of the U.S. Relating to Indian Affairs, Compiled 
f rom the Revis ed Stat utes of the United States, Enacted June 22, 
1874,and from Statutes atLarge from tha t date t o March-x;-J.883 
••• 3rd Edition . ( ashingt on: Government Printing Office , 
1884) , P• 1690 
record that otaer leading chiefs of the Northern Cheyenne even 
knew of the neiotiations taking place in the fall of 1876. 
23 
At the meeting between t.h:l Sioux Commission and the Northern 
Cheyenne and Arapahoe, September, lf!'16, at Red Cloud Agency, 
these two tribes requested that they be incorporated into t he 
Sioux Nations. Manypenny states that the Commission rad no specifi c 
instructions to incorporate the trioes, but "it was apparent that 
the Cheyenne and Arapahoe had a right to a home on the Si oux rese:r-
vation (among others), guaranteed to than by the Treaty of May 10, 
27 
1868. 11 
The fourth arti cle of the agreement of 1876, stated that a 
delegation of Indians from each band would visit Indian TeITitory 
11with a view of selecting therein a permanent home for the said 
28 
Indians." The delegation from Red Cloud and Spotted Tail agencies 
and the delegates of the Cheyenne were selected and vi sited Indian 
TeITitory, and were generally pleased wi th ito These were t he only 
bands which agreed to send delegates to the southern country, and 
upon their return they were not permitted to report t o the Indians 
i~ 
they represented according to George w. Manypenny. Officer s of the 
anny were acting as Indian agents at the northern agenci es, and 
General Sheridan and ~neral McKenzie, in command at Fort Robinson, 
were opposed to sending delegates south, or the removal of t he 
30 
Indians to Indian Territoryo 
27 
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The agreement was ratified by Congress in February, 1887, 
by striking out the fourth article and part of the sixth article, 
which prohibited the removal of any portion of the Sioux Indians 
to Indian Territory ''until the same shall be authorized by an act 
31 
of Congress. u No mention is na de of the Northern Cheyenne or 
Arapahoe regarding removal and the latter tribe was allowed to 
remain in the north and the former was removed south. 
Thus the Sioux Indians and the Northern Cheyenne and Arapahoe 
were bound to receive their subsistence and supplies on their 
northern reservations. The third article of the agreement states 
as follows: 
The said Indians also agree that they will here-
after receive all annuities provided by the said 
treaty of 1868, and all subsistence and supplies 
which may be previded for them under the present 
or any future act of Congress, at such points and 
placed on the said reservation, and in the vicinity 
of the Missouri River, as the President of the 
United States shall designate. 32 
The removal of the Cheyenne to Indian Territory did not 
relieve the government of the obligation to provide these 
Indians with supplies. But, in the Indian appropriation of 
March 3, 1887, which provided annuities and subsistence for the 
Indian tribes for the y-ear ending June 30~: 1878, there was no 
appropriation for the Northern Cheyenne as was guaranteed by the 
a.g~ement of September 20, 1876. The Treaty of 1876 was to 
ttprovide all necessary aid to assist the said Indians in the work 
of civilization; 11 and "to furnish them schools and instruction 
31 





in mechanical and agricultural arts. 11 Also, the condition 
and morals and industrious habits of the Indians were to be im-
proved by having an agent, trader, farmer, carpenter, blacksmith, 
34 
and other artisans, living on the reservation. 
The provision in the agreement which stipulated the amount 
of weekly rations to be supplied was as follows: 
Also to provide the said Indians with subsistence 
consisting of a ration for each individual of a pound 
and a half of beef, (or in lieu thereof, one half 
pound of bacon,) one-half pound of flour, and one-half 
pound of corn; and for every one hundred rations, 
four pounds of coffee, eight pounds of sugar, and three 
pounds of beans, or in lieu of said articles the 
equivalent thereof, in the discretion of the Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs . Such rations or so much thereof 
as my be necessary, shall be continued until the Indians 
are able to support themselves. 35 
The question of treaty obligations relative to the amount 
of rations to be supplied was a major issue in the Senate investi-
gation of 1879-1880. This problem will be treated at length in 
the following chapter. Suffice it to say that though the govern-
ment did not provide for the Northern Cheyenne as a separate tribe 
for the year of 1887-1878, the Northern Cheyenne did receive 
rations on the Cheyenne and Arapahoe reservation in Indian Territory. 
The plan of removing the northern Indian tribes to Ind i an 








have been pleased to eliminate the Indian altogether) and also 
to the Eastern Christian and benevolent groups which meddled in 
Indian welfare work. The removal of the Cheyenne and, if possible, 
of the Sioux was the scheme of the eastern members of the Sioux 
Commission according to George F. Hyde. He states that the members 
of the commission "agreed among themselves on a new wildcat scheme 
for saving the Sioux (and incidentally the government) from the 
very troublous situation they were in, by removing the tribes to 
36 
Indian Territory. 11 
The Sioux tribes which signed the treaty without reservations 
on article four were the Ogallala Sioux a~ Red Cloud agency, and 
the Brule Sioux at Spotted Tail agency. The Indians were treated 
roughly and the chiefs who were insolent were deposed by the anny 
and cooperative chiefs were placed in their stead. George Hyde 
states that when the Ogallalas showed little eagerness to sign away 
their lams and freedom, Assistant Attorney General Gaylord, a 
member of the Black Hills Commission, n o • o spoke to them with a 
cwt.and almost brutal frankness which shocked them into a full 
comprehension of the fact that if they refused to sign the agree-
37 
ment they would find themselves in extremely serious trouble." 
3$ 
George F. Hyde, Spotted Tail ts Folk: ! History of the 
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27 
They were even told that if they resisted the government would 
starve than and their women and children, and might also "set 
38 
the troops on them. 11 
The Sioux Commission treated each of the tribes separately, 
depriving them of solidarity of numbers. It also took advantage 
of the fact that the hostile elements taking part in the Sioux War 
were still away from the agencies and could not create confusion. 
Some of the Indians later claimed that the government used whiskey, 
bribes, threats of loss of all rations and false interpretation of 
the terms of the treaty as methods of getting the Indians to sign 
the treaty. The treaty had provided that a specific proportion of 
signature was needed to validate aJ.l future treaties. The 1876 
treaty, however, contained the signature of only forty Indians at 
Red Cloud Agency, when it was later estimated that 2,267 signatures 
39 
were needed. 
James Warren Covington states that the negotiations of the 
Sioux Commission of 1876, indicated that the Cheyenne arrl Arapahoe 
wished to be incorporated into the Sioux Nation, rather than 
removed to Indian Territory or live on the Crow Reservation. They 
finally agreed to send a delegation to visit Indian Territory and 
look for a suitable location. Two delegations were pleased with 
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28 
permitting the Cheyennes to go south when it ratified the agreements 
40 
made by the Sioux Commission." 
Covington further states that after Dull Knife had been 
defeated in 1876, Generals McKenzie and Crook took them into 
council and Crook told them that they had three choices: 11 to go 
south, go to the agency at Fort Washaki, or stay at Fort Robin-
41 
son for a year. 11 If they choose the latter, the government 
officials would detennine where the Indians were to go at the end 
of the year's time. The Cheyenne, in choosing Standing Elk to 
speak for them, found themselves accepting the removal south which 
none of them wanted. 
George Bird Grinnell is the originator of the foregoing 
version of the story, and he states that the decision of Stand:mg 
Elk pleased the military and they urged the Indians to start 
south at once, 11 and so by mingl ing threate and persuasions the 
Cheyennes were ralf forced and half persuaded to leave their 
tt . country. They started South on May 1, states Grinnell. 
Mari Sandoz states, in her work Cheyenne Autumn, that the 
Northern Cheyenne surrendered in 1877 with the promise of ''food 
and shelter and an agency in their hunti~ region •••• But almost 
before the children were warmed on both sides, they were told 
· they must go to Indian Territory, the far south countr,y many 
43 
already lalew and hated.n She states that the two Old Man Chiefs 
listened to the command in silent refusal, but some lesser men 
4J. 
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shouted agreement, and these Indians were given horses , fine 
blue blankets, meat, coffee, and t obacco ttfor a big f east that 
would build their power and f ollowing in the tribe . 1144 
Quoting the chiefs , she states, 11It is a t r ick of the spider 
. • The veho [white mari) has long spun his web for the feet 
of those who have gins but are t oo f oolish to fly .n45 Even after 
the feasting the Indians refused t o go, so the Indian agent announced 
that he would i ssue no more rations to the Cheyenne . t'While the 
Sioux women moved in their long line, holding their blankets out 
to receive their goods, the Cheyennes were kept off on a l ittl e 
knoll, their r agged bl ankets empty in the wind, the children sil ent 
and big-eyed, watching. 1146 Finally through the coaxing interpreter's 
plea that officials wa nted them to ttJust go down t o see . If you 
don I t like it you can come back • • • n47 Dull Knife and Little Wolf 
agreed. The chiefs did so because of the atarving condition of 
their tribe. 
Mr . C. E. Campbell , an employee at Darlingt on Agency, Indian 
Territory, states that an order was issued, presumabl y by the 
Indian Office, to move the Indians south. It fell to the command-
ing officer of the department to execute the order. The I ndi ans 






according to the army account, fully explained to them. 
Protests were in vain as the Indians were told that they must 
prepare to live thereafter in Indian Territory. The Indian 
version was that 11 the commanding general assured them they were 
first to go down to that southern country, simply as visitors •• •" 
and if they did not like the country they could return north. 
Mr. Campbell suggests that the two accounts might be due tG the 
fear of the interpreter that a literal rendition would cause 
trouble with the ]niians, and he conveyed a version not intended 
49 
by the army officers. 
John D. Miles, agent for the Indians of the Cheyenne and 
Arapahoe Agency, Indian Territory, said in a letter to the 
Indian Office; dated November l, 1878: 
Not one of the chiefs who left the agency 
September 9, 1878, sig ed the treaty of September 
26, 1876, and on more than one occasion one of the 
chiefs who left infonned me in substance that they 
had never mde a treaty, and bad only come south 
on trial and un1er great pressure, and have continual-
ly talked of returning, and threatened to return 
when matters did not go to suit them. 50 
On May 17, 1877 the Indian Office received a copy of a 
dispatch of May 15 from General Sheridan to General Sherman, 
which stated that 1,400 Northern Cheyenne desired to go to 
48 
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Indian Territory, and he strongly urged their removal. The 
Indian Office telegraphed the Adjutant-General of the Army, 
May 18, giving its approval of the removal, and on May 29, a 
telegram. was received from Lieutenant H. W. Lawton that he was 
51 
enroute with 972 Cheyenne to Indian Territory as directed. 
During the first day of their march from tm Red Cloud 
Agency to Indian Territory, tm Cheyenne were escorted by 
troops unde1 Lteutenant Lawton. Tr.e Indians moving routh were 
described by a writer who had met them as travelling "quietly 
and mournfully, for events had forced them to this choice, and 
they had left home with the choice of the emigrant. The bucks 
were mostly mounted. Many of the squaws, however, carried their 
52 
papooses on their backs, and led ponies that hauled the travois. 11 
The Cheyenne arrived at Fort Reno, Indian Territory, August 
5, 1877, and the commander of Reno, Major Mizner, delivered them 
to Agent John D. Miles of the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Agency located 
at Darlington, Indian Territory. Nine hundred and thirty-seven 
Northern Cheyenne ani four Northern Arapahoe were counted. Thirty-
53 
five Indians had disappeared enroute from Nebraska. 
51 
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Senate Report No. 708, p . 2370 Covington states that 
nine hundred thirty-three Ir:rlians were taken to Indian Territory 
but he fails to give the source of the number. 
II. THE NORTHERN CHEYENNE IN INDIAN TERRITORY 
''We were sickly and dying here, and no one will speak our names 
when we are gone. We will go north at all hazards, and if we die in 
battle our names will be remembered and cherished by all our people. 11 
This was an oft heard complaint of the Northern Cheyenne as reported 
by Agent John D. Miles.l 
The treatment of the Northern Cheyenne in Indian Territory has 
been as much a point of controversy as the question of the treaty 
which forced them to the southern country. The acceptance of the 
northern tribe by the Southern Cheyenne and Arapahoe, fulfillment 
of treaty obligations concerning supplies, medicine and education 
of the Indians in agriculture were two of the main problems of the 
reservation. The conflicts at the agency were first brought out in 
t he Senate investigation into the r moval of the Northern Cheyenne to 
India,n Territory. It is the report of that investigation which will 
serve as the basis of this chapter. 
First, the manner in which the Southern Cheyenne accepted the 
Northern Cheyenne to live among them is a matter of debate. The 
testimony of a Southern Cheyenne states that they received their 
northern relatives with warm greeting and were glad that they had 
come to live among thern. 2 But the Northern Cheyenne chief, Wild 
Hog, declared that they were called Sioux (because of the inter-
marriage of many with Sioux) by the Southern Cheyenne and II no 
1senate Report No. 708, p. 278. 
2Ibid., p. 35. 
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attempt at friendship was made. 11 3 In test:i:mony before the Senate com-
mittee, Agent Miles stated that upon the arrival of the Northern 
Cheyenne at the agency, 
We let them divide right up among their friends--their rela~ 
tives among nhe southern people here~ At the first council I 
had with the southern Indians I encouraged them to feel, and urged 
them to act a.s if they felt, that these northern Indians were 
their friends, their relatives, a part of the same tribe, and to 
try and make them feel at home down here, and to realize that 
they were to have an equal show with the balance of the Indians, 
and were the brothers and sisters of those who were here before. 
I tried to show them how necessary it was that they should af-
filiate and live peaceably with each other. I think this advice 
of mine was pretty generally followed by the southern Indians, 
and was met in a similar friendly spirit by those who had come 
from the north; some of them became acquainted and seemed to feel 
at home here almost right away, others more gradually, until 
finally about six hundred of them became affiliated and thor-
oughly identified with the southern Indians 0 On the other hand, 
there was Dull Knife and Hog, and a few others, who separated 
themselves from the southern Indians, and from the Northern 
Cheyennes who had affiliated with the Southern Cheyennes, and 
camped by themselves, four or five miles r i ght northwest from 
the agency here. Being separa~ed, they became like two tribes-~ 
two distinct elements, I should say, the southern and northern-~ 
and then our Southern Cheyennes called those who had separated 
from them the Sioux Cheyennes. These Northern Cheyennes--those 
of them that I have mentioned~-separated themselves from the rest 
and seemed to be pretty generally dissatisfied with the country. 
The predisposition of the Northern Cheyenne under Dull Knife and 
Little Wolf to become dissatisfied with the Indian Territory has been 
described by Dennis Collins, a rancher in southwest Kansas, as fol-
lows: "The fact of the matter is that he Dull Knife was only a 
very short time at the Darlington agency before he began fermenting 
3James Warren Covington, "Causes of the Dull Knife Raid," Chroni-
cles of Oklahoma, XXVI (Spring, 1948), PP~ 15-16. 
4senate Report No. 708, pp. 55-56. 
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trouble. 11 .5 With a touch of humor the author continues: "He was not 
there very long until he discovered that the _whole scheme of creation 
seemed to be out of harmony with his needs and comfort. 11 6 · A contractor 
and employee at the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Agency, Mr . John H0 Seger 
noted the same intransigent attitude of Dull Knife and his band. 
He states that the Northern Cheyenne ~ere of the understanding _that if 
they did not like it in the South they could return North. Seger con-
tinues: · "But when they reached there instead of falling in with the 
agent's ideas · of farming and raising corn, they began to give dances 
and sing warsongs and tell of their exploits and battles, and soon had 
their southern brethern very -unse·ttled and dissatisfied. 11 7 When the 
Southern ·Cheyenne put the-ir children in school and allowed the young 
boys to be whipped by a white man the ·Northern Cheyenne made fun of 
and ridiculed the Southern Cheyenne parents. ''Will you let the white 
wolves whip your boys?" they chided, and the large boys, when they 
returned to camp; were called squaws and cowards for wearing short 
hair like the Negro. 8 
Another employee ofthe agency, Co E. Campbell expresses the 
same opinion of Dull Knife and his band of Northern Cheyenne when he 
states that: "They commenced even at this early period to demand 
Snennis Collins, The Indians Last Fight, or the Dull Knife RaidQ 
(Girard, Kansas: The Appeal to Reason Press, cl91~ p. 23~ --
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permission to return north, where the water was purer, the heat not so 
oppressive, the game plentiful and life worth living. 11 9 
The testimony of the Senate investigating committee was directed 
not only at the Dull Knife outbreak, but also at the removal of some 
Northern Cheyenne under Little Chief. In his testimony Little Chief 
stated that he and his band did not get along very pleasantly with the 
Southern Cheyenne, and there had been bad words between his band and 
the southern tribe.10 
A problem which became an issue of contention between the Northern 
Cheyenne and the Agent was the method of distributing rations. It had 
become a status symbol for the chiefs and young men to distribute the 
rations. They wanted the rations turned over to them in bulk and they 
would pour them out on the prairie and let the leading men do the dis-
tributing. Agent Miles complained that this method of distribution 
allowed the leading war element to take the lion's share of the rations.ll 
The Cheyenne and Arapahoe Agency had adopted a family ration check, 
upon which rations could be issued once a week. When the Northern 
Cheyenne first arrived at the agency, the young men gathered all the 
family ration tickets and presented them in bulk to the clerk. Agent 
Miles was absent at the time and to prevent trouble, the rations were 
9c. E. Campbell, "Down Among the Red Men," Collections of the 
Kansas State Historical Society, 1926-1928, XVII (Topeka; Kansas: 
State Printing Plant, 1928), p. 673. 
10senate Report No. 708, p. x. 
11Ibid., pp. 55-57. 
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issued on the checks presented. Miles returned before the rationing 
was completed and the clerk brought his attention to the matter. A 
protest was made by the Agent, but the issuing of rations was almost 
completed and it was allowed on that occasion. The leaders of the 
Northern Cheyenne stated that they "were going to do as they did up 
north. 1112 The articles were dumped on the plaza and the chiefs helped 
themselves and distributed the remaining portion to the rest of the 
tribe. 
Agent Miles, iIDmediately called the chiefs into his office and 
through his interpreter, George Bent, told them that rations were to 
be issued to the heads of families , The women were usually presented 
the family ticket, or ticket for a lodge, and the rations were issued 
to them for that family or lodge. Miles said that the government 
issued rations for the benefit of the poor as well as the rich, and 
his duty was to see to it that the rations were equally distributed. 
In reply the Indians said that their chiefs had to have something to 
do and some favor to grant which would distinguish them from the 
ordinary Indians. The chiefs said: "If you are going to do all that, 
what is there left for us to do? There is no object or advantage in 
being chief. 1113 
The method of issuing rations to families had been an instruction 
of the Indian department 0 Miles informed the chiefs that there was no 
12Toid., p. 58. 
l3Ibid. 
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use talking about the matter, that the rations would never be given to 
them in bulk to divide. He would obey the orders of the government. 
The chiefs held councils about the situation, but the Southern Cheyenne 
told the adament chiefs they should submit 0 This ended one particular 
incident between the Northern Cheyenne and the Agent. But the resent-
ment over being forced to remove to this southern country was certainly 
increased by this latest demand of their benefactor, the United States 
government. 
Complaints about the food issued at the agency resulted in an order 
by Colonel R. S. Mackenzie for Lieutenant H. W. Lawton to proceed to 
Fort Reno, Indian Territory "to inspect the condition of the Cheyenne 
Indians, and report to Headquarters at Fort Sill, I.T. 1114 This inspec-
tion was begun September 30, 1877, which was less than two months after 
the arrival of the Northern Cheyenne at the agency. Lieutenant Lawton 
found that sugar and coffee seeming_ly were weighed in fairness, but 
the flour was issued by guess and since the amount for each individual 
was small, a slight discrepancy which would not greatly affect the bulk 
of the issue, would make considerable difference to the individual. 
The sugar was of inferior quality, and was dark and very wet when re-
ceived at the agency. Lawton stated that it was an issue rt that would 
not have been received and issued to troops without the action of a 
board of survey. 1115 The Indians teld Lt. Lawton that the rations were 
much better at this particular rationing than they had been for some 
J.4Ibid., P• 268. 
l5Ibid., p. 269. 
time previous, and on that particular day they were getting more 
rations than at any time previouslyo 
The major complaint at the rationing observed by Lieutenant 
Lawton concerned the beef. Upon his visit to the beef pen the Lieu-
tenant found the beef to be of inferior quality. The animals were 
not weighed at the time of issuing, but rather, the issuing was based 
upon the weight of the animals when received from the contractor. 
The beef was irregular in size and age, rough and of poor quality, 
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and there were some bulls among them. Lieutenant Lawton was informed 
that the animals issued weighed on the average of seven hundred and 
fifty pounds, but he was convinced that the average would be from fifty 
to seventy-five pounds-per-head lesso Each issue of beef was made to 
a small band which was large enough to take one animal or more 0 Since 
the beef was not weighed, a band might receive a small animal weigh-
ing a hundred pounds or more, less than their entitled average, and 
another band might receive a large beef weighing more than the average 
which they should receive. Since the bands did not contain an even 
number of individuals, and ne allowance was made for that difference, 
a band of thirty-three could get one beef and so might a band of 
fifty. 16 
Proof of the deficiency in this particular rationing is the 
ration tickets which were checked against the amounts actually 
received: 
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Plenty Bear's ticket: 5 people, 7 days, 35 rations. Sugar 
and coffee, 3 pounds; defici ent 1 3/8 pounds. Flour, 16 pounds; 
deficient 1½ pounds 0 
Goes in the Willow's ticket: 2 people, 7 days, 14 rations. 
Sugar and coffee, 1 pound; deficient 3/4 pound0 Flour, 5 pounds; 
deficient 2 pounds. 
Walking Woman: 4 people, 7 days, 28 rations. Sugar and coffee, 
2 poundf~ deficient 1½ pounds. Flour, 8½ pounds; deficient 5½ 
pounds. 
Wild Hog, Northern Cheyenne chief, had been the spokesman in relating 
the problems to Lieutenant Lawton. The chief stated that the flour 
was black and would not rise, and that there was no issue of corn, 
hard bread, hominy, rice, beans, or salt, and only infrequent issues 
of soap and yeast powder. The sugar, coffee, and beef rati0n for the 
seven days was consumed in three days.18 
Having finished his investigation, Lieutenant Lawton concluded: 
11 I observed this issue with a great deal of care, noting the number of 
men in each band, and the number and size of the beeves given them, and 
found it to be, in my opinion, decidedly unsatisfactory and irregular. 1119 
He also reported "there is strong feeling among t hem {!,he Indians] 
of injury and injustice; that there are few who are evil-disposed and 
troublesome; and that no serious trouble need to be anticipated unless 
the Indians are driven to it as the alternative of starvation. 11 20 
17Ibid., p. 271. 
18Ibid., p. 276. 
l9Ibid., p. 273. 
20Ibid., p. 276. 
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When Agent John D. Miles testified before the Senate investigating 
com.mittee, he disclosed that the supply of rations for the year 1877~ 
78 were three quarters of the amount guaranteed by treaty.21 The 
treaty of 1876 which was the basis for the Cheyenne removal to Indian 
Territory stated: 
••• to provide the said Indians with subsistence consisting 
of a ration for each individual of a pound and a half of beef, 
(or in lieu thereof, one half pound of bacon,) one-half pound of 
flour, · and one-half pound of corn; and for every hundred rations, 
four pounds. of coffee, eight pounds sugar, and three pounds of 
beans, or in lieu of said articles the equivalent ~hereof, in the 
discretion of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. 2 
1tJhen questioned about the rationing Miles sti:i.ted that the Northern 
Cheyenne received the same rations as did the Southern Cheyenne. He 
said that his instructions from the department specified so many 
pounds of such and such articles--,11 if the supplies were on hand, 11 but 
if there was only one month's rations for two months, then half rations 
would be issued and the def iciency was to be made up in an extra issue 
of beer. 23 
There had always been complaints that the beef ration was insuf-
ficient, the Agent stated, but the established ration was three pounds 
gross, or a pound and a half net, and only on . occasion did the Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs increase the rations to four pounds. This was 
done in early 1877. 
When asked specifically if the full rations for the year were 
21Ibid., p. xvi. 
22charles J. Kappler, (ed.), Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 190/.J.), I, ---r5'9. 
23senate Report No. 708, p. 59. 
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ever supplied by the government, Miles replied, "No, sir. 11 24 He had 
understood that the rations were not supplied due to a lack of funds 0 
The shortage amounted to as much as three months per year on the aver-
age, and it was only because the Indians were absent for three to five 
months on the annual hunt that the deficiency could be overcome. Also, 
the sale of robes and hides helped bridge the deficiency.25 
There was no difficulty in procuring supplies of meat, flour, corn, 
bacon, etc., when funds were available. The problem was that the 
Agency did not purchase the supplies as these were supplied by the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs. 
Reliance could no longer be placed on the buffalo hunt as a means 
of food for the Indians. In the three years previous to 1879, the 
Indians returned frGm the hunt in worse condition than they left, be-
cause of loss of camp equipment, ponies, and wear and tear on lodges.26 
When Miles was asked if the Indians ever "received more than nine 
months rations out of the twelve?" he replied, "I think not. 112 7 But 
when asked more directly if full rations were issued in 1878, he re~ 
plied that full rations of beef had been issued but a shortage 
occurred in flour, coffee, etc.28 
The acting-Secretary of Indian Affairs, William M. Leeds, testi-
fyiag before the Senate committee January 24, 1880, presented the 
24 Ibid. 
25Ibid., pp. 63-64. 
26Ibid., p. 64. 
27Ibid. 
28Ibid 0 , p. 97. 
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correspondence of the Indian Office relative to rations dealt to the 
Indians at the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Agency. Commissioner Hayt, in a 
letter of November 16, 1878, transmitting to Secretary of Interior 
Schurz the letter of Agent John D. Miles, of November 1, 1878, admitted 
that a deficiency of supplies existed and the Northern Cheyenne were 
not dealt all the supplies they needed. The Commissioner stated that 
the amount of beef due for the year endi ng July 1, 1878 to be 914,256 
pounds, and the amount given was 1,151,088 pounds, but 0nly one-half was 
merchantable beef.29 
The report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs stated that the 
Indians had due them by treaty 1,420,589 pounds of subsistence supplies 
and there was dealt to them 1,475,320 pounds, or a surplus of 54, 731 
poundso30 
The report states that the amount of beef due the Indians was 
1,026,840 pounds and 1,242,208 pounds was dealt them. This is, accord• 
ing to Mr. Leeds, a miscalculation because there is no deduction of 
fifty per cent tare, which represents hides, horns, entrails, refuse, 
etc. Then the net weight of merchantable beef includes bones, gristle, 
and tendons. The president of a beef canaing company, a hotel pro• 
prietor, and a family butcher and dealer, confirmed Mr . Leeds' report 
that Texas steers will give only fifty percent merchantable beef and 
but twenty-five percent of fooa.31 
29Ibido, p. 16o. 
30Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the 
Secretary of the Interior, 1878 (Washington, D.C.: Government Print• 
ing Office, 1"8'7B), p. xxiiia 
31senate Report No. 708, p. 164. 
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Thus the figures of the Commissioner's report should be adjusted 
to be beef, merchantable, 513,420 pounds, entitled by treaty and of this 
256,710 pounds was consumable. Assuming this, then 621,104 pounds of 
merchantable beef was provided of which 310,552 was consumable. With 
this consideration the true picture of the supplies issued during the 
398 days the Northern Cheyenne were in Indian Territory emerges 0 The 
Indians were short 106,795 pounds without allowance for shrinkage, etc. 
This is revealed in the chart on page 44.32 
Mr. Leeds stated that he wrote portions of the report of the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and regarding the beef statement: 
I made up that statement in the Commissioner's report, so many 
pounds of beef, and put the pounds down net beef--net merchant-
able beef; that showed a deficit, that the Indians had not received 
the amount promised them by the treaty. It was discovered that by 
calling it gross beef, and doubling the figures, the doubling in-
creased one side a great many more pounds than it did the other 
side--as you will see by comparing the table of supplies which the 
Commissioner fixed up and had inserted in his report (and which I 
have already read to you~ wi th the correct statement which I fur-
nished you (Hear the beginning of the testimony), in order that 
you might compare it with that fixed up by the Commissioner 0 When 
the Commissione·r saw that by making it beef gross he could make it 
appear that these Indians had received their full supply, he dir ected 
that it should be made gross in that account; and it was made gross , 
and showed a surplus. But t hat surplus was in reality a sur plus of 
hides , horns, and refuse. In t his evasive way he furnishes a basis 
for his assertion that 'this statement disposes of all the clamor 
that has been current during the year that these I ndians did not 
receive rations to the amount to which they were entitled under t he 
treaty. ,33 
32Ibid., pp. 163-164. 
33senate Report No. 708, p. 174. 
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NORTHERN CREYENNE FOOD ESTIMATES 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs' Calculations: 
"They were entitled to the 
















Mr. Leed 1s Calculations: 
"They were entitled to the 
following quantities of 
supplies: 
Beef, merchantable '513,420 pounds 
that is--
Reef consumable 256, 710 II 
Flour 171,140 ti 
Corn 171,140 ti 
Coffee 13,725 II 
Sugar 27,)450 II 
Beans 10,294 II 
Total 650,459 II 
,3$, 
Senate Report No. 708, p. 163. 
-IH}Ib.d _i_., p. 164. 
"There was dealt out to them 
du.ring the time mentioned the 
following: 
Beef 1, 242, 208 pounds 
Bacon and lard 20,016 II 
Flour 157,060 II 
Corn 18,190 ti 
Coffee 10,425 11 
Sugar 20,9.50 II 
Salt 2,2 72 II 
Soap 2,297 II 
Hominy 14 II 
Tobacco 994 II 
Baking Powder 894 II 
Total 1,475,320 It * 
''There was dealt out to them 
the f ollowing quantities of 
supplies: 
Beef, merchantable 621,104 pounds 
that is--
Beef consumable 310, .552 II 
Bacon and lard 20,016 II 
Flour 157,060 II 
Corn 18,190 ti 
Coffee 10,425 II 
Sugar 20,950 ti 
Salt 2, 272 II 
Soap 2,297 II 
Hominy 14 II 
Tobacco 994 II 
Baking Powder 894 II 
Total 543,66~. II -IHI-
Also, for the period f rom July 1, 1878 to September 7, 1878 , there 
must have been a def icit of food to a money value of $352 0 The Com-
missioner of Indian Affairs, Mr . Hayt, stated: 
• in this connection i t would be fair to state that the 
rations for the year ending July ·l, 1878, were nearly 3,000 greater 
in money value than the Indians were entitled to by the treaty; 
and the small deficiency represented by the $352 was owi ng to the 
fact that the Indian appropriation bill was not passed by Congress 
until the 27th day of May, and the opening of bids for supplies 
for the new fiscal year took pla.ce on the 18th of June, and it 
was not absolutely impossible to make the purchase of supplies and 
transport them to the agency in season to be available as soon as 
the supplies were actually neededo Nevertheless the deficiency 
in amount was so slight that it was impossible to say that th3fle Indians left the reservation for the want of suffic ient food . 
Mr . Leeds suggested that the small deficiency of $352 would have 
paid for seven thousand pounds of flour, and t he outbreak of three hun-
dred Indians during this period could have been averted by this flour. 35 
In a report of Major J . K. Mizner, dated from 1'ort Reno, Indian 
Territory, September 30, 1878, w ich was contained in the r eport of 
A.gent Miles to the Indian Office, he stated that, 
During the latter part of t he , -winter and the early pRrt of the 
spring the beef was very poor, and was much complained of by all 
the Indians on all occasions, and i t was really very bad. From 
the 1st of July t o the 1st of September, the issue of rations was 
very unequal 0 The regul ar ration of flour was issued but twice, 
while beef was issued constantty; there was but little flonr, and 
sometimes no coffee or sugar .3 
At the issue of August 5, there was no flour issued, and nothing 
in lieu of it. The weekly issue of August 12, found 27,400 pounds of 
3liibid., p . 161 
35Ibid. 
36rbid., p. 162 . 
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beef (gross), and 4,522 pounds of corn issued in lieu of 35,000 pounds 
of flour and corn which was specified; no flour was issued. The 
27,400 pounds of additional beef was in reality 6,850 pounds of meat; 
and as the meat ration was sufficient, the additional 6,850 pounds of 
lean Texas beef was probably of less value than the same weight of 
flour. Thus, 4,522 pounds of corn and 6,850 pounds of beef, a total 
of 11,372 pounds, were issued in lieu of 35,000 pounds of corn and 
flour provided for by the treaty. An actual deficit of more than 
23,628 pounds, or about four and three-fourths pounds per Indian, 
was included in the August 12th issue. The 133,501 pounds of gross 
weight of beef was good for but 33,375 pounds of meat and the 4, 522 
pounds of corn, which was to supply 5,004 Indians at the Cheyenne and 
Arapahoe Agency for the one week. The 37,897 pounds was only seventeen 
ounces daily per Indian.37 
Neither corn nor flour were dealt at the August 19th issue, and 
the beef ration was not increased. With the usual scant rationing of 
coffee and sugar, the per diem of one and one-half pounds of mer-
chantable beef (or three-fourths pound of meat) was issued for the 
week from August 19th to August 26th.3B 
Again on the 26th of August, no flour or corn was issued, and 
only scant rations of sugar and coffee and 10,007 pounds of merchant-
able beef. This was only fourteen and one-fourths ounces of beef per 
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diem, ·which would provid~ only seven ounces of meat. 39 
September 2, 1878, saw the receiving of a full ration of beef, no 
corn, and the flour ration less than three-fourths. In the week pre-
ceeding the outbreak the Indians received eighteen ounces per diem of 
food against twenty-eight ounces guaranteed by treaty.40 
It would be beneficial to this study to record the Indian's anxiety 
over the food shortage, but, except for those sources previously men~ 
tioned, there are none which are dependable. The sentimental Mari Sandoz 
relates the embarrassment, of the great chiefs to eat from the kettles. of 
the hungry.41 
Annuity goods like the rations were guaranteed the Northern Cheyenne 
by treaty. They were issued to the families, and were consigned to the 
agency by the Indian Department, under the supervision of the Board of 
Indian Commissioners. These consignments were made on the estimates of 
the agent. 
In issuing the annuity goods, the commander a.t. Fort Reno furnished 
men to help, and each separate a~ticle, such as blankets, shoes, pants, 
hats, etc., had a man distributing them and checking the item off the 
rationing card for annuities. A surplus in goods for 1878 was issued 
in partial payment for those who worked, The agency was authorized 
39Ibid. 
4oibid. 
4¾1ari Sandoz, Cheyenne Autumn (New York: The Hastings House, 1953), pp. 7-8. This source is completely unreliable as a historical work. 
Her mention of Yellow Swallow as Custer's son by a Cheyenne woman, has 
been completely disproven. This information came from Edward Beougher, 
Grinnell, Kansas, ·who confronted Miss Sandoz about Custer's son and she 
was unable to answer his question. Also her mention of John Miles, one 
of Grant's Quaker agents, offering his daughter to Little Wolf, the 
Cheyenne chief, is completely ridiculous. 
to increase annuity rations to those who worked, not to exceed double 
the ordinary ratioas in amount. 
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For the year 1878, Agent John D. Miles' requisition f-or annuities 
was $47,194, and the Congressional appropriatioa was $14,500 0 Also a 
$20,000 beneficiary fund coald be used for annuity goods, which meant 
that $34,500 was available for those purposes. The agent was forced 
to make the $34,500 do the work of $47,0oo.42 
In particular, the issuing of annuities to the Northern Cheyenne 
was under a separate account until June 30, 1878, and Agent Miles 
stated that any complaints on their part could not be attributed to 
annuity goods.43 The deficient annuities were issued in October, 
1878, after the Northern Cheyenne had escaped. -
Bat, when asked if he issued the complete particulars of the 
treaty of 1868 which guaramteed the Indians a good suit of clothing, 
the Agent replied, 11 1 do not believe I have. 1144 When asked the reason 
for not issuing articles guaranteed by treaty, the Agent stated that 
the government had not sent him such articles. 
The Agent was also asked if the Northern Cheyenne had been pr o-
vided, "'in addition to the clothing previously named, the sum of 
$10 0 to each Indian roaming, and to each Indian engaged in agriculture 
in the purchase of such articles as, from time to time, the condition 
and necessities of the Indians may indicate to be proper," and for their 
42Senate Report No. 708, p. 73. 
43Ibid., pp. 73 ... 74. 
44Ibid., p. 77 o 
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personal benefit. Miles replied that if it had been expended it was 
done in a way unknown to him; possibly in the purchase of subsistence.45 
When asked if any Northern Cheyenne had been given a good cow and 
one well-breken pair of American oxen for removing to the reservation 
and starting to farm, Agent Miles said that the department had never 
advised him to do so.46 
Finally, Miles was asked if the issue of larger amounts of annuity 
goods (the tr~aty requirements including twenty dollars each if they 
started farming and an ox and cow) could have mitigated the discontent. 
The Agent replied: "It might, to some extent; but they are exceedingly 
dissatisfied with the country and affairs here, and I would not venture 
the statement that it would have mitigated it much.47 But when asked 
if full annuities and rations would have made them content, Miles 
stated that if furnished enough food and clothing he could keep the 
Indians peaceful and quiet all the time.48 
The question of medicine for the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Agency was 
complicated from the beginning. The Northern Cheyenne arrived in 
August, 1877, during the malarial season. There was but one physician 
at the agency and a constant shortage of medici ne. The agent felt 
that t he Northern Cheyenne suffered more sickness than the other 
Indi ans, "Their sickness was more severe and a greater number of them 
45Ibid., p. 78. 




died. 1149 L. A. E. Hodge, physician at the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Agency, 
stated that the greatest shortage of medicine. occurred during the fiscal 
year from July 1, 1878, to January 17, 1879, when drugs were r eceived 
which should have been received on July 1, 1878.50 
The contract for medicine was opened June 18, 1878, and it was not 
until August 24, that a contract was signed with a Mr. Jadwino The 
delivery was finally made January 17, 1879, seven months after the 
opening of the contract. On August 10, the Indian Office had author-
ized Mr. Kingsley to buy fifty ounces of quinine for the Cheyenne and 
Arapahoe. On August 14, the Indian Office ordered Mr. Nicholson, super-
intendent of Indian Affairs at Lawrence, Kansas , by telegraph to purchase 
ten ounces of quinine for the Cheyenne.51 
Agent John D. Miles acknowledged receipt of ten ounces of medicine 
on August?, which he stated would last only a week. Miles wrote the 
Indian Office, August 16, that he had no antimalarial remedies during 
that quarter, and he had borrowed all t hat Fort Reno could supply him. 
On October 10, Agent Miles sent a l etter from the agency physician which 
stated the need for medicines. Finally, on October 12, Miles was auth-
orized to purchase two hundred dollars' worth of medicines.52 
The contract medicines were shipped from New York on November 29, 
1878. On December 10th, c. E. Campbell, chief clerk at the agency, 
49Toid., p. 6o. 
50ibid., p . 95. 
51Ibid., pp. 191-19~ .• 
, .52Ibid. 
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telegraphed the Indian Off ice of the urgent need for medicine. The 
Indian Office telegraphed Agent Miles on December 14th1 that the medi-
cine would be at Wichita, but, if not, he was authorized to purchase a 
hundred dollars' worth. On December 19th, Miles telegraphed the of fice 
that the medicines were not at Wichita and that he had purchased the 
authorized amount 0 53 
It was uncovered in the Senate investigation that the authoriza-
tion of August 10, for the purchase of fifty ounces of medicine was to 
be split with the Quapaw Agency. When the chief clerk of the Indian 
Bureau, Edwin J. Brooks, was asked if the original contract stated that 
the medicine was to be shipped within thirty days, he conceded the 
fact 0 54 
Tracers were issued by the Indian Bureau to speed up delivery of 
the medicine. Mr . Brooks expressed the opinion that red tape was one 
of the causes of delay because the contract had to be approved by the 
Board of Indian Commissioners, the Secretary of Interior, and the 
Comptroller of the Currency.55 
In August, 1878, the sanitary condition of the Indians was descri-
bed by Agent Miles in his report to the Commissioner of Indian Af fairst 
The intense heat of the present summer has had the ef fect to 
increase the mortality, and it is no exaggerated estimate when the 
number of sick people on the reservation is placed at 2,000. Many 
deaths have occurred which might have been obviated had there been 
53Ibid. 
54Ibid., pp. 191-194. 
, 55Ib.d _i_., p. 198. 
a proper supply of anti-malarial remedies on hand. Ninety-five 
ounces of quinine were received in advange of the annual supply 
and was consumed in less than ten days.~ 
52 
Agency physician Dr. L.A. E. Hodge stated that five thousand 
people provided more work than one physician could handle. When he had 
remedies he was always busy, and it was not uncommon for him to dispense 
medicine for a hundred cases in a day. The doctor did not attribute the 
discontent among the Indians to lack of medicine, however, but said that 
it might have had something to do with it.57 
In particular the Northern Cheyenne must have suffered greatly 
from the southern diseases. They were not familiar with ague, and the 
heat was intolerable to people used to ·the cool mountain valley cli-
mate. One of the Indians testified to the Senate committee that he 
calculated fifty-eight Northern Cheyenne had died in the south.58 
Another Indian source states t hat the Northern Cheyenne were 
stricken with fever and ague soon after they arrived at the agency. 
Of the nearly one thousand in the Cheyenne camp, about two-thirds be-
came sick within two months after arrival. Forty-one died of sickness 
during -the winter.59 
The failure of the agency to get medicine even forced the agency 
doctor to leave the agency as he was unable to help those who caine to 
56Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1878, pp. 
56-57. 
57senate Report No. 708, pp. 97-99. 
5Bibid. , p. 10. 
59 George '.Bird Clri.nnell, . Th~~· Fighting Ch~ennes (Norman, 
Oklahoma: University ~f --Oklahm Press, 19.56~ P• 400. 
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him. Many who were refused treatment resorted to native medicine and 
"perpetuation of their superstitious rites. 11 60 
The desire of the government to civilize the Northern Cheyenne was 
early expressed in the 1868 treaty with the tribe. It specified the 
desirability of education, and the need for the Indians to begin culti-
vating the soil. The head of a family could select land, and show his 
intention of farming, and would receive one hundred dollars the first 
yea:r for seed. Instruction was to be provided in farming techniques.61 
The treaty of 1876 stated that "the United States does agree to 
provide all necessary aid to assist the said Indians in the work of 
civilization; to furnish to them schools and instruction in mechanical 
and agricultural arts, as provided for by the treaty of 1868. 11 62 
At the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Agency during the year of 1878-79 
there were between 140 and 150 children attending school. The school 
was contracted to Mr. John H. Seger at three dollars and a half per 
month per child0 The contract was for ten months, and the supplies 
were furnished by the government. 
The treaty of 1868 specified that for every thirty students there 
was to be one teacher, but the Agency school had only two teachers 
which did not include Mr . Seger who did no teaching. 
60J3ernice Norman Crockett, "Health Co'nditions in the Indian Terri-
tory from the Civil War to 1890, 11 The Chronicles of Oklahoma, XXXVI 
(.Spring:, 1958), p. 34. 
61Kappler, Indian Affairs, Laws~ Treaties, II, 1013. 
62Ibid., p. 169, 
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The benefit of the school as viewed by Agent John D. Miles, was 
to teach the children good habits. He states, "they are taught habits 
of industry, and that is the principal thing that needs t o be i ncul-
cated into the Indians. 11 63 The Indian must change his manner of l iving 
by adopting that of the white man. Properly guided and i nstructed t hey 
would be able to provide for themselves and not be dependent on the 
government . 64 
When Agent Miles was asked if there wa.s a need for less l earning 
and more labor, he replied that the best advantage to the government 
would be the use of three and a half dollars to put a couple of I ndian 
boys on the rolls of the contractor "and give them a day or t wo each 
week in the school, and have them spend the balance of their time in 
the shops . 11 6.5 
Agent Miles expressed himself more explicitly on the subj ect in 
his 1877 report t o the Commissioner of Indian Affairs: "Ei ght year s 
of experi ence in operating Indian schools has convinced me that a mere 
literary education, without the more important element of industry, 
is but time poorly spent. 11 66 
The Cheyenne and Arapahoe Agency at Darlington, Indian Territory, 
had one instructor in farming. The Indians showed little inter est i n 
farming, many regarded it as a woman's job. Mr . J. A. Covington, 
63senate Report No . 708, p . 90. 
64Ibid. 
6.5Ibid., p. 91. 
66Annual Report of the Commissioner of I ndian Affairs, 1877, 
p . 84 . 
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agency farmer, felt that the Indians would be much more able as herders 
than as farmers.~ To the Indian who was raised herding his father I s 
; 
ponies, it was natural. The herding of cattle would be less work than 
ordinary farming, and less strain on the body.67 
Considering the agricultural potential of Indian rerritory, the 
raising of corn and other farm products was precarious in that climate, 
while herding would be more certain. 
Major Mizner, at Fort Reno, also felt that stock-raising was much 
more natural for the Indians whose efforts at farming was the cultiva-
tion of small patches of corn, insufficient for sustaining a family 
more than thirty days. He said that, "By giving stock to certain 
Indians known to the agent ·as being provident and painstaking their 
success might induce other Indians to follow their example 0 1168 The 
problem of getting the Indians to develop separate interests in a herd, 
would require discriminating between individual Indians. 
The failure of the government to provide the annuities of twenty 
dollars and an American cow and oxen helped defeat the government 's 
plan to civilize the red man. 
The Northern Cheyenne chief, Wild Hog, stated that they received 
no agricultural implements when they arrived at the agency. The 
treaty of 1876 stated that the government was to supply such articles 
as the Indians required to become farmers. Wild Hog states that his 
67senate Report No. 708, p. 104. 
68To·d 119 _1_., p. • 
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tribe would have been willing to start farming at their old reservation 
in the north.69 
Little Chief, the Northern Cheyenne chief whose tribe was brought 
to Indian Territory after Dull Knife's Raid, wanted to return home. 
However, three or four families of his band had begun farming upon ar-
rival in the south and they did not want to return home. 
Although the question of becoming farmers was not a factor in the 
Northern Cheyenne's demand to return north, the withholding of certain 
rations when they refused to work caused dissatisfaction. Under 
direction of Circular No. 10, of the Indian Office dated March 1, 1878, 
entitled "Diminishing the rations of Indians who refuse to Work, " Agent 
Miles withheld sugar, coffee, and tobacco from the Indians. It seemed 
to have little effect and was soon withdrawn.70 
It is significant that the Ci r cular contained the f ollowing: 
Indians should also be informed that the issuance of r gular 
rations of flour and beef cannot long be continued by the govern-
ment, and should have impressed upon them the necessity of engag~ 
ing at once in some civilized occu2ation by which they may become 
independent of government support.'11 
The Circular was used to withhold rations around the first of May, 
1878, and a weekly labor and ration check was made. 
Almost all the Northern Cheyenne had their rations withheld and the 
Agent offered them agricultural implements. A number of Northern 
69Ib.d _i_., p. 7. 
?Oibid., p. 301. 
71Ibid. 
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Cheyenne subdivided a field and put in small patches of corn. Agent 
Miles felt that arbitrary enforcement of labor regulations was unwise. 
Ill wind and discontent arose and the enforcement of work was aban-
doned. 72 
When the Northern Cheyenne surrendered in the north, and before 
their removal to Indian Territory, there was an attempt to disarm them 
for the trip south. Government sources state that this attempt to 
disarm and dismount the Indians, was made by General Pope, commanding 
the Depar tment of the Missouri, "but it was found this could not be 
done without violation of the conditions of thei r surrender, so they 
were permitted to retain their arms and ponies. 11 73 Agent John D. Miles, 
in testimony before the Senate committee, stated that he was of the 
understanding that the Indians had been disarmed in the north, "but we 
soon afterward saw arms in their possession, ·which naturally l ed us to 
suppose they had not been thoroughly disarmedo 11 A portion of the horses 
were taken from them by General Mackenzie, who went to Fort Reno in 
person, and the horses were taken to Fort Sill and sold and cattle were 
purchased for the Indians.74 
The Commissioner of Indian Affairs Repor t of 1878, states: 
They should have been disarmed before leaving the north, and 
dismounted upon their arrival at the agency, while still i n the 
hands of the military. To the neglect which permitted t hem to 
retain the Springfield carbines captured by them in the Custer 
72Ibid., pp. 81-83. 
73Record of Engagement with Hostile Indians, p. 90. 
74senate Report,~. 708, pp. 54-55. 
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fight may be attributed the horrible atrocities perpetrated by 
the Northern Cheyennes. The trail of blood which they left behind 
them in Kansas could not have been made and the outrages could not 
have perpetrated but for the possession of these arms which not 
only enable them to defend themselves from attack, but to carry 
carnage and destruction among the settlers of Kansas.75 
A portion of the Cheyenne nation found itself in an alien country. 
The government's attempt at civilizing the Cheyenne was frustrated by 
its lack of resources; and the adamant stand of the two chiefs Little 
Wolf and Dull Knife was a constant threat to peace at the reservation. 
The split between the tribes caused resentment with ·such Indians as 
Standing Elk receiving extra supplies while such commoditi es as sugar, 
tobacco, and coffee were withheld from those who would not cooperate. 
Without the resources they once had in fighting the army and other 
tribes, the Northern Cheyenne were forced to steal horses, trade for 
weapons and try an escape across the flat prairie of the Great Plains, 
past six army posts. 
Their plight was typical of other Indian tribes, and their out -
break was one of the last flickers of light in an epic drawing to a 
close. The background of this outbreak was a treaty unsigned by the 
head chiefs, and life on an agency which found itself given the job 
of civilizing the Indians but at a minimum expense. The army, which 
would often compete with the Indian Office in exacting justice on the 
aborigines, was caught in the same conflict of limited funds for a job 
of protecting thousands of miles of frontier. Then there was the 
75Report of the Commissioners of Indian Affairs, 1878, p. xxx:iv., 
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settler whose ingenuity had made the barren prairie produce for the ex-
panding markets of the East. With the west~ard push, the Indian Office 
and War Department were to protect him from the red man who once roamed 
the vast. prairie as its complete lord and master. 
To ask "What was the cause of the Dull Knife outbreak:?11 · is perhaps 
to beg the question. The problem of rations, annuities, medicine, and 
treaty rights have been fully analyzed, but there still remains the fact 
that the Northern Cheyenne, at least a portion of them, were never inte-
grated into agency lifeo Perhaps they intended from the beginning t o 
return nor th. 
The fact is that they did return north and the mitigating causes 
at the agency are of importance not as individual instances of human 
frustration, but as contributory acts which sustained the righteous 
determination of the Indian to express hi s right to seek out his own 
fortune and future 0 Lacking free choice, his resistance was a r eac-
tionary protest brought on by the haphazard efforts of Industrial 
civilization to seek new resources in the West. The Pioneer was the 
tool of this effort of civilization to fulfill itself, but it was an 
incomplete civilization and this internal contradiction brought chaos 
in its wake. 
III. THE NORTHERN CHEYENNE ESCAPE NORTH 
The Northeru Cheyenne were brought to Indian Territory 
August 15, 1877, and left September 9, 1878. It is impossible 
te attribute the discontent in Indian Territory of the Nort hern 
Cheyenne to an exact cause, and equally difficult to determine 
when the decision to leave was made. It was only a few days before 
they left that Agent John D. Miles received any information about 
their intentionso On September 5th, the Southern Cheyenne and 
Araphahoe complained to the ag~nt that their best horses were being 
stolen by the Northern Cheyenne and then hidden five or six miles 
out. Also, Mr. Campbell, agency clerk, informed the agent and the 
commander at Fort Reno that a group of the Indians were trying to 
draw two weeks ration, instead of one, and they asked permission 
to remove to the Cimarron River, nd they failed to put their 
children in school.1 
Agent Miles called Dull Knife, Wild Hog, Old Crow, and Little 
Wolf into conference and asked them if any of their young men were 
absent from the agency or if any planned to leave. The chiefs 
said that none had left and that it was a "Southern Cheyenne and 
Arapahoe lie" that they had stolen any of their horses. But the 
Southern Cheyenne and Arapahee continued to lose horses and they 
explained that only the Northe~n Cheyenne would take pains to steal 
the best mounts, whereas white rustlers would round up a bunch and 
lsenate Report N0. 708, p. 112. 
run them off. They also told :he agent that the young men who were 
missing were keeping the horses in a camp somewhere on the Cimarron.2 
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The Northern Cheyenne chiefs were again asked if any of their 
young men had left, and they again denied it. To insure that the 
chiefs were telling the truth an enrollment of all the male adults 
was ordered. The Southern Cheyenne and Arapahoe complied im.~ediately, 
but the Northern Cheyenne made· excuses until they finally escaped. 
In his testimony to the Senate investigating committee, Agent 
Miles stated that the chiefs left his office with the idea of getting 
the young men to come in and have a count, but that the young soldier 
element refused to go along 0 "The older ones actually commenced, 
on one occasion, to tear down their lodges, preparatory to coming in 
and being counted, but the young men utterly refusea. 11 3 
Miles had a conference with the chiefs on September 7, and it 
was at this meeting that the Indians complained they were too ill 
to move their camp, so Miles sent the doctor and Mr. Covington, the 
agency farmer, up to the Northern Cheyenne camp on September 7, 1878. 
Mr. Covington and the doctor returned to say that a number of the 
tribe were sick, but all were well enough to come in for enrollment. 
The Indians were very excited overthewhole matter. Mr. C. E. Camp-
bell states that he accompanied the physician to the camp on Septem-
ber 8th, and they found an air of distrust and suspicion plainly 
2Ibid., pp. 60-61. 
3Ibid., p. 61 0 
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apparemt among the Indians. T~e agency clerk and physician were 
not allowed to roam about the camp as the Indians seemed to be con-
cealing something. The Indians had camped on a small level piece 
of bottom land which was encircled en three sides by sand hills, 
from one to two hundred feet high 0 On a subsequent trip to the camp, 
it was found that the Indians bad dug rifle pits on the sides of the 
sand bills which commanded every inch of the ground any troops sent 
against them would have to use 0 The strategic value of the position 
was enhanced by a draw which afforded protection for the stock.4 
September 8th (Sunday) was ration day and the Northern Cheyenne 
were informed that they would not be issued rations unless they com-
plied with the agent~ orders 0 5 
On the evening of September 5th, the post at Fort Reno had been 
informed that some of the Northern Cheyenne had left the reservation. 
They had been camped on the north fork of the Canadian River, and 
were under the leadership of Dull Knife and Little Wolf0 Within an 
hour a command of twenty pack mules for transportation and a force 
of eighty-seven enlisted men, companies G and H, 4th Cavalry and 
four commissioned officers, under the command of Captain Joseph 
Rendlebrock, started in pursuito6 The command travelled only a short 
4c. E. Campbell, "Down Among the Red Men, 11 Collections of the 
Kansas State Historical Societ~ 1926-1928, XVII (Topeka, Kansas: 
Kansas State Printing Plant, l '. 8), pp. 676-677. 
5senate Report No. 708, p. 112. 
6aeorge Nellans(ed.), "The Great Cheyenne Chase: A truthful 
.Account by a Dragoon who Participated in It. 11 Typed manuscript on 
file at the Oberlin Museum, Oberlin, Kansas. Hereinafter cited as 
Nellans, 11Dragoon. 11 
distance that night, and the next morning they marched on and 
found the Cheyenne camp which was located about ten or twelve miles 
fram Fort Reno. The command was then ordered to watch the movements 
of the Indians, and the troops went into camp about three or four 
miles from the Indian camp. The movements of the Cheyenne were ob-
served by the scouts. 
It was learned that the Indians had fortified themselves in 
some sand hills on the north banks of the Canadian, and Lieutenant 
w. E. Wilder was sent to the post to notify the commanding officer 
of the situation. Captain Rendlebrock requested artillery as the 
Indians would have to be shelled out 0 Lt. Wilder returned on the 
evening of the 8th of September without the artillery0 Many of the 
Northern Cheyenne went into the soldier's camp and all of them were 
well armed 0 7 
In the last interview on the evening of September 9th (Mon-
day) the agent asked the Northern Cheyenne to come in and be 
counted and promised that the troops would then be withdrawn. In 
the interview Old Crow, Wild Hog, and Little Wolf still insisted 
that sickness prevented them from moving down to be enrolled. 
7senate Report No. 708, pp. 147-148. Comparing this source 
with the sentimentalview of Mari Sandoz, we can better judge the 
unreliability of the latter source. Sandoz expresses pity over 
the agent who called for troops which took with them a howitzer and 
found the Indian "men trying to snare rabbits and gophers, and women 
digging roots." The h0witzer was set on the Indian camp and a "red" 
faced captain road down into the lodge circle. And on the 8th of 
September, the agency doctor went to the village, and his comment as 
· recorded by Miss Sandoz was: "This is a pest camp, a graveyard." 
Sandoz, Cheyenne Autumn, pp. 10-11. 
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Major Mizner was there on this occasion and he stated, "If you 
don't come up to be counted, I will see that you do. 11 8 
The interpreter on this occasion as well as at the earlier 
meetings was Edmond Guerrier. He recorded another story of the 
Indians leaving the agency. When the agent called in the chiefs he 
told them that he wanted ten young Cheyenne men for hostages 11 to 
hold as prisoners until I get back three that have gone off. 11 9 The 
troops would be sent out to bring in the renegade warriors and then 
the ten men would be set free 0 
Little Wolf refused to provide the hostages, and told the agent 
that the arrrry officers would not be able to find the three Cheyenne 
men0 At this, the agent threatened to cut off rations until the 
hostages were provided, 11 I will give you nothing to eat until I get 
them0 You shall starve until they are given to me 0 1110 
Little Wolf answered: 
My friends, I am now going to my ca.mp. I do not wish the 
ground about this agency to be made bloody, but now listen to 
what I say to you. I am going to leave here; I am going north 
to my own country. I do not want to see blood spilt about 
this agency. If you are going to send your soldiers after me, 
I wish that you would first let me get a little distance 
away from this agency. Then if you want to fight, I will fight 
you, and we can make the ground bloody at that place 0 ll 
8senate Report No. 708, pp. 62, ll2. 
9George Bird Grinnell, The Fighting Cheyenne (Norman, Oklahoma: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), p. 402. In the Senate Report, 
Agent Miles gives the name Edward G. Gerrier as the interpreter. 




The Indians returned to their camp on the Canadian River about 
twenty miles above the agency. Agent Miles then sent the interpreter 
Ed Guerrier to the Indian camp. He advised them not to go, but 
Little Wolf again announced their intentions of going north 0 Guer-
rier•s friends in the Indian camp advised him not to interpret for 
the Indians, as their temper was high and they might try to kill him.12 
Dennis Callins states that the two Northern Cheyenne Chiefs, Dull 
Knife and Wild Hog, made no secret of their attempts to procure arms. 
They were willing to trade anything to the cowboys and soldiers for 
arms or ammunition. A couple of ponies were traded for an old rusty 
sL~-shooter. James Smith, a teamster for the government, met Dull 
Knife on one of his hauling trips and the chief proposed a swap of 
his new government overcoat for ten cartridges, and the deal was made. 
Collins states that the old chief made a nuisance of himself in his 
continual proposals to make trades.13 
This episode lends some credibility to the story by c. E. Camp-
bell concerning an incident which occurred earlier in the year of 
18780 Permission had been given by the Indian Office upon discre-
tion of the agent, for a buffalo hunt that summer. The Northern 
Cheyenne upon hearing of this, proposed to leave on the hunt imme-
diately without considering the conditions for such a hunt. Mr. 
Campbell was temporarily in charge of the agency and it was his 
decision whether to allow the Indians to leave immediately, postpone 
12~., p. 404. 
l.Jnennis Collins, The Indians Last Fight, the Dull Knife 
Raid (Girard, Kansas: The Appeal to Reason Press, cl9l~p. 239. 
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the hunt or discontinue it. Through the Indian police it was learned 
that the Northern Cheyenne were going to take advantage of the extra 
two weeks issue which was given the Indians leaving on the hunt, and 
then slip away t0 the north 0 Since there were practically no buffalo 
within the limits allowed for the hunt it was postponea.14 
The acting-agent was visited by a delegation of Northern 
Cheyenne who were incensed by his refusal to issue the extra sub-
sistence and provide the military escort for the hunt. The request 
was again denied. At this moment Little Wolf spoke as follows: 
Look at me. I am Little Wolf. The whole of the Sioux nation 
open their ears when I speak, and I want you to open yours. We 
are going on this hunt, whether you have us rations and soldier 
escort or not. If you give us the subsistence we shall be glad 
but if you love the food and will not give us any, we will go 
just the same. Now we are going over to the soldier home and 
tell the soldier chief what we are going to do. 15 
The commanding officer at Fort Reno visited the agency and was 
excited over this visit by the Northern Cheyenne. He suggested that 
the Indians be allowed to go on the hunt because the command was not 
strong enough to protect the fort in case of an outbreak. But, 
Campbell was confident in the support of the Southern Cheyenne and 
Arapahoe and he insisted that no hunt would take place without re-
ports of sufficient numbers of buffalo to warrant it.16 Referring 
to this attempt of the Northern Cheyenne to leave the agency during 
the annual hunt of the winter of 1877-78, Major Mizner, commander 
14campbell, "Down Among the Red Men, 11 Collections, Po 675. 
15Ibid. 
16Toido, p. 676. 
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of Fort Reno, stated: "So much was that a part of the purpose of these 
Indians then, that Old Crow lingered after the return of the majority 
of the Cheyenne, and I saw that it was his intention to go north.1117 
Prior to the outbreak, the following episode occurred which, if 
true, probably means that the Northern Cheyenne chiefs gave Miles 
warning that their band was leaving the reservation. 
The Indian boys at the agency school were giving Mr. John Seger 
trouble and he decided to go and see Agent Miles 0 He found the agent 
suffering from an attack of neuralgia, and barely able to talk and 
completely unable to advise him on the situation0 Miles told Seger: 
I can't advise you. The Indians are on the point of breaking 
out alreadyo The Northern Cheyennes have worked our Indians up 
to a state of dangerous excitement and I don't know what to do. 
The military stands ready to take charge of them should they 
break out again, and in all probability the agency will be abol-
ished0 Under the circumstances I can give no advice 0 The 
Indians have probably instigated this insurrection of the large 
boys to afford an excuse for goi ng on the warpath again, and the 
troops we have are not sufficient to protect us from attack. 
I can't offer any suggestions or give any instructions in regard 
to what you are to do in this matter; use your own judgrnent.18 
Agent Miles stated in his testimony to the Senate investigation 
committee that the next information he received about the Northern 
Cheyenne came at three o'clock a. m. September 10 (Tuesday) when he 
was awakened by American Horse (a Northern Cheyenne member of the 
agency police) and another Indian. They said that the Northern 
17senate Report!!£. 708, p. 112. 
18 John Homer Seger, Earzy Days Among the Cheyenne and Arapahoe 
Indians~ed. Stanley Vestal (Norman Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1~34), p. 50. 
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Cheyenne had torn down their lodges and left a little before midnight 
(between ten and twelve o'clock). American Horse said that he had 
been trying to get away from the camp for two or three days, but he 
was not permitted to leave. When the camp moved out he left the rest 
of the band and came back to the Southern Cheyenne camp. Miles then 
wrote a note to Major Mizner, and sent Mr. Darlington, an employee at 
the agency, to deliver it. The note left the agent's house just after 
three o'clock in the morning.19 
Major Mizner reported that at about half past three September 10, 
a messenger had come from the agent telling him that the Indians had 
left, and that he had sent this message to the command under Captai n 
Rendlebrock, two companies of 4th Cavalry, which had been sent to 
·watch these Indians. He immediately ordered the troops in pursuit 
and his specific instructions were t o t~J to induce the Indians to 
come back without resort to force. Mizner told the Senate investi-
gating committee: "I wish to draw especial attention to this point--
that he {3aptain Rendlebrock] was particularly instructed to induce 
the Indians to come back without resorting to force, if he could 
possibly do so. 1120 
19senate Report No. 708, p. 62. Dennis Collins states t~at 
Agent Miles summoned Johnny Murphy, who had been General Sheridan's 
confidential ambulance driver during the campaign of the Washita 
to take the message of Dull Knife's departure to the Commander 
at Fort Reno. The commander at the f©rt asked Mr. Murphy to take 
the message up the river to the troops, who were found asleep while 
the "object of their tender care was on his way to the hunting 
grounds in the North." Collins, The Indians Last Fight, p. 240. 
20senate Report No. 708, p. 112. 
It was at 6:00 on September 10th, when Captain Rendelbrock 
started the command in pursuit of the Indians. 21 After a march of 
thirty miles it was discovered that they were heading northwest to-
ward the Dodge road, and a courier was sent to Camp Supply, Indian 
Territory, to inform the commander of the direction of the Indians' 
movement. The command marched fifty-four miles the first day out. 22 
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On September 11th, the command followed a winding trail and 
progressed about forty-four miles before camping. The next day, 
September 12th, the command marched forty-two miles. Finally on the 
13th, after marching thirteen miles, the Indians were seen about 
three miles in front of the command. The troops had been travelling 
through the brakes of the Kingfisher, a very rough country. Then 
they had crossed the prairie to the Cimarron. It was in a wooded 
area on the north side of the Cimarron, a place called Turkey Springs, 
that the Indians were found.23 
21As an interesting sidelight, Dennis Collins related the follow~ 
tng story: "The first evening of the march Major Ronderbrook l§i'21 made 
the startling discovery that, in the haste and bustle of preparation 
consequent upon the order to pursue the fleej_ng Indians, they ha.d for-
gotten to pack up his feather bed, his davenport, also his writing 
stand and wall tent. He felt that he could not make a successful jour-
ney without these necessary accessories to his personal comfort, and 
therefore, he detailed Peter F. Weasel, a member of the 16th Infantry 
••• to return to the fort. 11 Collins, The Indians Last Fight , p. 244 . 
22Nellans, "Dragoon." 
23Ibid. Grinnell states that the first battle took place on the 
Little Medicine Lodge Creek. Grinnell, The Fiihting Che}enne, p. 404. 
Collins states that it was in the Antelope Hil s north o the Cimarron 
River. Collins, The Indians Last Fight, p. 2430 One of the command 
testifying beforethe Senate coin'iiiittee states that the battle was on 
Turkey Creeki' Senate Report No. 708, !;>• 128. Butt he other, Captain 
Gunther,referred to Turkey Springso 
The command moved to within 800 hundred yards of the Indians, 
and the cavalry column advanced to within 400 hundred yards of the 
Indians, where they dismounted and formed skirmish order. As they 
were doing this the Indians rode back and forth in front of the com-
mand and some to within 200 yards of the soldiers. 
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It was 9:00 o'clock that morning when Captain Rendlebrock sent 
the two Arapahoe scouts to see if the Indians would surrender• The 
Captain ordered the sc0uts to urge the Indians to surrender and return 
peacefully to the reservation. 24 The Indians refused to return to 
the agency; they would rather fight than return. 
The troops were given the order to fire and G company, 4th 
Cavalry, commenced. It was soon apparent that the Indians has pre-
pared for the battle as the troops found themselves nearly surrounded. 
In the numerous assaults on the conunand's position, the Indians were 
unable to secure the advantage 0 Private Slader of H company was 
killed and an Arapahoe scout wounded. Corporal Lynch of G company was 
killed and Privates Burrows and Leonard of the same company were 
wounded.25 
The Indians had set the prairie afire on all sides of t he command, 
and as it was a warm day and they had no water the Indians were at a 
decided advantage. As it grew dark the conunand made an attempt to 
get water, but the Indians repulsed it. There was no medical off icer 
and the wounded were forced to suffer unaided. 
24Nellans, "Dragoon." 
25Ibid. 
On the following day a reconnaisance confirmed the fact that 
the command was completely surrounded0 Water was so low that the 
troopers were forced to drink the urine of the horses 0 To aggra-
vate the situation, the ammunition was running low. Finally, the 
command began to retreat towards the Cimarron River. One man was 
killed in this retreat, but water was reached at 9:00 o'clock the 
morning of the 14th. 26 
The command fell back five miles and fixed drags for the three 
wounded and 9n the 15th they started for Camp Supply which was 
reached at noon September 16. 
On the 17th, a detachment of forty men under Lieutenant Wood 
was sent out from Camp Supply to find Company I, 4th Cavalry, under 
Captain Hemphill which had been sent out on September 15 t o inter-
cept the Indians. This company could not be found, and the follow-
img day the balance of Captain Rendlebrock I s command was ordered 
to move up the Dodge road. The command which had been sent out 
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the previous day was reached at the Cimarron Rivero They report ed 
that they were unable to locate the still missing company.2 7 This 
detachment under Lieutenant Wood had marched some seventeen miles east 
in search of the Indians, but were unable to locate them. 
Captain Rendlebrock started his command toward Dodge when two 
couriers sent by Colonel Lewis, commander at Fort Dodge, arrived 
with word that the Indians were at the head of Sand Creek. The 
26Ibid. 
27senate Report No. 708, p. 149. 
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command went into camp and the next morning headed across country 
in a southerwesterly direction. 
The missing company under Captain Hemphill out of Camp Supply, 
had trailed the Indians through the southern part of Clark County. 
At the Driskill ranch they met with ten or t-welve cowboys and followed 
the Indians northwest and then west to the site of the present town of 
Ashland. There they were met by six more men with guns and ammunition. 
Heading west again they came upon the Indians in the hills east of 
Sand Creek 0 In a short battle some of the troop's horses were killed 
and several soldiers were wounded. Captain Hemphill, feeling that 
his command was insufficient for fighting three hundred Indians, rode 
with his men to Fort Dodge for reinforcements 0 28 
At F0rt Dodge Hemphill' s company was joined by a company of the 
16th Infantry from Fort Riley under Captain Morse 0 This command to-
gether with about fifty cowboys and ranch owners with horses, mules, 
wagons, and supplies formed a stock train and made ready to proceed 
to Cimarron, on the Sante Fe Railroad west of Dodge City then south 
te Sand Creek where the Indians were recently seen. This command 
moved down to the head of Crooked Creek, then to the Big Timbers in 
present day Mead county, on Sand Creek, where they camped. 29 
It was here that Captain Rendlebrock 1 s men found them and at 
about h:30 in the afternoon five or six cowboys began to scout 
28J. w. Berryman, "Early Settlement of So~-~hwest Kansas, 11 Collec-
tions of the Kansas State Historical Society, 1926-1928,XVII (Topeka, 
Kansas:Kansas State Printing Plant, 1928), p.· 569. 
29Ibid. 
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around t0 locate the Indians. ?hortly after the cowboys had left 
shots were heard; the Indians had been discovered 0 The cowboys were 
being driven from the field, so the military immediately moved in to 
support the civilians and drove the Indians into a ravine. This 
skirmish occurred on September 21st. At sundown the troops withdrew 
to the camp and remained there until the next morning when they took 
a circuit of about eight miles and again fought the Indians.JO That 
night a courier was sent to Fort Dodge for supplies and ammunition 
and during the night some forty citizens from Dodge arrived to rein-
force the command. These civilians were fired on by mistake when 
they camped near the army• 31 
The battle of Sand Creek occurred on September 22, as the com-
mand moved upon the heavily fortified position of the Indians. The 
Indians had moved into a canyon in which they had driven a number of 
cattle and sheep and their own horses. Around the ridges of t he 
canyon they had dug holes and piled up rocks and rifle pits commanded 
the front sides of be canyon.32 They ·were prepared to fight. The 
army command fired on the Indians and the battle lasted from nine 
o'clock in the morning until four in the afternoon, at which time the 
Indians had been driven into their main position within the canyon. 
At four, Lieutenant Widler was sent with ten men and forty citizens 
30senate Report No. 708, p. 129. 
31Nellans, "Dragoon." 
32Ibid. 
to complete a circuit of the Indian's position, and lost two horses 
in the process 0 
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To the disgust of the citizens, Captain Rendlebrock ordered the 
soldiers to retire. One of the party of cowboys, J 0 w. McNeal, stated 
that his party "returned to Barber county, thoroughly disgusted with 
the management of this campaign. 11 33 J • W0 Berryman states that the 
troops were within 300 to 400 yards of the Indians and anxious to 
charge into them and "endeavor to capture them," but the ranking 
captain forbid it, refused to put out guards and withdrew all the 
forces about a mile, where they went into camp 0 34 
The Indians evacuated during the night. Captain Rendlebrock 
kept bis men in camp as he had made arrangements for supplies and 
ammunition to be brought to that point. Many of the men also lacked 
horses having had their mounts shot during the fighting. 
On the 24th the command moved up the trail to Crooked Creek, 
where a citizen had been killed the previous day. On the 25th they 
reached the Arkansas River seven miles west of Cimarron Station, and 
telegraphed Fort Dodge of their arrival. By this time nearly all the 
citizens who had joined the command had returned to Dodge City. That 
evening Colonel w. H. Lewis, commander of Fort Dodge, took command, 
with one company of the 19th Infantry under Captain Bradford and two 
33r. o. Pickering, "The Administration of John P. St. John," 
Transactions of the Kansas State Historical Society, 1905-1906, IX 
(Tepeka, Kansas: State Printing Office, 1906), Po 389. 
34J. w. Berryman, "Early Settlement of Southwest Kansas," 
Collections, p. 570. 
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companies of Fourth Cavalry fr~m Fort Elliot, Texas 0 Captain Rendle-
brock was relieved of his command. The company of the Sixteenth 
Infantry was sent back to its post. 
Robert Wright, one of the men who reported to Colonel Lewis on 
the Battle of Sand Creek, later wrote that Colonel Lewis was extremely 
disgusted with the cowardly officers who had allowed the Indians to 
escape. He said, ''Wright, I am going to take the field myself and at 
once, and OR my return, you will hear a different story.n35 The 
Record of Engagements with Hostile Indians, states that all operations 
along the Arkansas were placed under the direction of Colonel Lewis, 
and on the 25th "Colonel Lewis in command of all the detachments of 
troops in the immediate neighborhood, started in pursuit 0 11 36 
As the military was attempting to catch up with the Indians and 
force them back to the reservation, the Indians began to plunder the 
countryside. There was fear that the news of an Indian uprising 
would halt immigration, which would hurt business and cut down 
traffic on the railroad. Some citizens even sent letters and telegrams 
East stating that there was no truth in the rumors of hostile Indians.37 
At first, one of the Dodge City newspapers declared the news of the 
35Robert M. Wright, Dodge City: The Cowboy Capital and The Great 
Southwest (Wichita, Kansas: Wichita Eagle Press, 1913), p.lTu. 
36Record of Engagements with Hostile Indians within the Military 
Division of theMissour.i from"""'IB'o8 to 1882, Lieutenant-General Ph. Sheri-
dan, Commanding. (Chicago: Headquarters of the Missouri, 1882), p. 91. 
37stanley Vestal, Dodge City: Queen of Cowtowns (New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 1952), p. 129. --
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outbreak a hoax.38 But as the_ Indians continued their migration, 
terr0r and stories spread. They killed Reuben Bristow and Fred Clark 
on the high divide between the Cimarron and Salt Fork watersheds. Four 
arrows were pulled out of Bristow•s heart and three or four out of 
Clark 's body. 39 
In Commanche County, Kansas, a young child was shot in the breast, 
another party was shot across the back of the head,but neither fatally.40 
Fearing for their lives the people of Medicine Lodge and Barber County 
formed a volunteer group for protecti on, and solicited aid from the 
governor. From Hutchinson, Kansas, was sent the following telegram 
from c. G. Coutant, dated September 21, 1878: 
Geo. T. Anthony, Charles Chambers has just returned from Sun 
City and Medicine Lodge. He reports settlers being murdered by 
small squads of Indians. He saw a young man who was shot in the 
leg, and one wounded in the neck; a child shot in the breast; 
one camp on Salt Fork where three men were killed. Armed squads 
of settlers were going round t hrough the country gathering up 
women and children, and bringing them to Sun City. :Mr. Chambers 
says the settlers are badly armed or not at all. The Indians 
are going around in squads of six and eight, getting such arms 
as they can from the homes of the settlers 0 41 
38nodge City Times, September 14, 1878. 
39charles F. Colcord, "Address," Chronicles of Oklahoma XII 
(March, 1934), pp. 1-10. Bristow and Clark were Colcord's nephews. 
He recorded their deaths as September 12 0 
_40Pickering, 11The Administration of John P. St . John," 
Transactions, p. 388. 
41Eighteenth Biennial Report of the Board of Directors of the 
Kansas State Historical Society, for the Biennial Period July 1, 1910, 
to June~l9l2 (Topeka, Kansas: State Printing Office,-i:9I3T, --
pp. 23-24. Hereinafter cited Eighteenth Biennial Report. 
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And the following telegram, da~ed September 21, 1878, was sent from 
Kingsley, Kansas, by J.E. McArthur, County Attorney of Edwards 
county. 
Gov. Anthony: J. D. Crank and Jard Spencer have just returned 
from their cattle camps, forty miles south of Kinsley. They re-
port that the Indians have been there and destroyed their camps, 
took all their ponies, and killed and stampeded their cattle 0 
The Indians are on their way southwest. Will you commission 
J. W. Fuller, Sheriff Edwards county, to raise a company here 
with my assistance? Four men from Kinsley are known to have 
been killed. Please answer imrnediately0 42 
The Kinsley Graphic, September 21, 1878, was most emphatic: 
As we write, the blood thirsty fiends are roaming at will, 
almost in sight of Kinsley, butchering the honest, unsuspecting 
pioneer, whose wreaking scalp is thonged to the belt of those 
satanic1.fiends who are armed today better than any army in 
Europe.1..i-3 
Also from Springvale, Post Off ice, Pratt County, September 25, 1878, 
Mr 0 A. J. Johnson telegraphed: 
Mr. Anthony, Dear Sir: I received a letter from you this 
morning handed to me by our friend Mr 0 Nelson. Was pleased to 
see the interest you take in our Indian scare, which is nmch 
smaller than reported0 Mr. Nelson and myself went to Sun City 
and found out all particulars in regard to Indian troubles. 
Mr. Nelson has the names of killed and wounded except two men. 
I consider no further trouble from Indians.44 
The following notation was written in pencil on the back of the letter: 
"Killed at Salt Fork, Reuben Brinston, Frank Dow, Fred Clark, on Big 
Mile Creek, Mr. Evans . "45 
42Ibid., p. 24. 
43Kinsley Graphic, September 21, 1878. 
44Eighteenth Biennial Report, pp. 24-25. 
45~., p. 25. 
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J. W. Berryman states that the Indians entered Kansas in Connnanche 
County, southeast of Protection, travelling west in the southern part of 
Clark Ceunty, where they killed one man and shot another0 46 
The Indians seemed prone to commit other acts of deviltry also, 
as they rounded up some sheep belonging to a Mr. Williams and drove 
them into a water hole where six hundred of them drowned. While in 
the Sand Hills the Indians came upon a man named Leforce who was employed 
at one of the local ranches. His remains were found some time later 
after the Indians had killed him and left him to the coyotes.47 
George Simmonds, a Negro cook of the cattle camp of Chapman and 
Tuttle, ''lost his life through his fidelity to his master's interests." 
Left at the camp with a team of mules he finally hitched up the team 
and headed for Dodge. The Indians intercepted him, shot and scalped 
Simmonds, and took the mules.48 
At Belle Meade (Meade, Kansas), t he Indians brought their entire 
camp to the edge of the small town. The chi e.fs,presumably Dull Knife 
er Little Wolf, met Captain A. J. French and asked for food. The 
settlers gave them two quarters of beef, a sack of flour, coffee, and 
some other provisions. After eating they raided a larder, took guns 
and other articles and left, except for a rear guard of fifteen 
Indians who overtook the wagon of Washington 0 1Conner, a mail carrier 
46:serryman, "Early Settlement of Southwest Kansas," Collections, 
p • .568. 
47collins, The Indians Last Fight, pp. 248-249. 
48Ibid., pp. 249-2.53. 
resident in the village, who was returning from Dodge City. As the 
settlers watched, the Indians killed O'Conner, cut his throat, and 
took his mules.49 
The following list of "Civilian Injuries and Losses Sustained 
South of Arkansas River" is given by Stanley Vestal in his -work on 
Dodge City:50 
Killed 10 ,,,r 
'ri.r~x ·;yv 
2 young men, nephews of VlI'. Colcord, Sept. 12, 1878. 
Dow, cattle herder for Mr. Kinsley 
John Evans, herder for Mr. Sheedy, Sept. 12, 1878 
Warren Richardson, Sept. 13, 1878 
George Simmonds, cook for Chapman and Tuttle, Sept. 18, 1878 
Con-Red, herder for W. c. Quinlan, Septo 21, 1878 
Thomas Murray, from Quinlan's Camp, Sept. 21, 1878 
Sanruel Leforce, from Quinlan's Camp, Sept. 21, 1878 
O'Con_ner, mail carrier, Sept. 24, 1878 
Wounded S 
Walter Payne, leg broken and thumb shot off, Sept. 13, 1878 
Charles Payne, 3 yrs. old, shot in ody, Sept. 13, 1878 
Nora Payne, 1 yr. old, shot through breast, breaking top cf 
left shoulder 
2 men, strangers, Sept. 13, 1878 




The Dodge City Times first recorded information about the Indian 
raid in an extra edition on September 14, 1878 which was reprinted in 
49vestal, Dodge City: Queen of Cowtowns, p. 133. 
SOibid., p. 136. The Eighteenth Biennial Report lists the fol-
lowing six names of those killed in southwest Kansas: 
Reuben Briston, Fred Clark, Frank T. Dow, John Evans, all of 
Salt Fork, Commanche county. 
George Simmons (colored), Barber or Commanche county0 
Washington O'Connor, Meade county. (pp. 30-31). 
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the regular edition of the Tim~s of the same day: 
News was received at this station this morning announcing 
that a majority of the Northern Cheyenne Indians, probably number-
ing a thousand, had broken away from Fort Reno, or Cheyenne Agency. 
Their first object is to get North to join the hostile Sioux0 The 
Indians are being pursued by two companies of cavalry from Fort 
Reno and one company from Camp Supply. It is stated that the 
Indians may pass either east or west of the Post. The commander 
of Fort Dodge, Col. Lewis, has received orders to watch the south 
side of the Arkansas river. Troops at Fort Leavenworth, Fort Hays 
and other posts have received marching orders 0 
It is presumed that the Indians were within one hundred miles 
of Dodge City.~l 
Though the editor of the paper was not yet certain of the validity of 
the rumours on the 14th, the regular edition of the following week 
contained an article on the Cheyenne with such sub-captions as: "The 
Red Devils," "The Wild and Hungry Cheyennes," 11Commit Murder and Arson," 
"Several Herders Murdered," "Straggling Bands of Indians Raiding Every-
·where, 11 "Immigrant Trains Robbed, 11 etc.52 
The paper went on to record: "There has been great excitement all 
week over news brought in almost hourly of murder and depredations by 
the straggling bands of Northern Cheyenne Indians. 11 53 
Bat Masterson was sheriff of Ford County at the time of the raid, 
but he had gone to Hot Springs, Arkansas, for rest and medical treat-
ment and returned in October long after the Indians had passed the 
city
0 
Another of Dodge City's famous citizens, Wyatt Earp, participated 
in the raid. When the Indians were raiding the Chapman and Tuttle Ranch 
51rtem reprinted in the regular edition of the Dodge City Times, 
September 14, 18780 
52nodge City Times, September 2l, 1878. 
SJibid. 
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0n Mulberry creek about eightee~ miles from Dodge, Earp headed a force 
of civilian volunteers to reinforce the cavalry. Upon his return to 
Dodge on September 24, he had a few Indian prisoners who were placed 
in the custody of the military authority.54 
Demand for security from the Indians was made upon the Governor, 
as the citizens were reluctant to place their complete trust in the 
military. The following telegrams express the demand of the frontiers-
men that they be armed for their protection: 
Dodge City, Kansas. Sept 0 18, 1878 
Geo. T. Anthony, Gov., Leavenworth, Kan.: Three hundred Indians 
are driving off stock and killing herders., They are no·w within six 
miles of our city. We are without arms, having equipped members 
who have gone south. Can you send us arms and ammunition. Situa-
tion alarming. We are powerless without arms and ammunition. 
James Kelley, Mayor 
C. W. Willett 
H. E. Gryden 
D. Sheedy.55 
This telegram was forwarded to General Pope and the answer from his 
Leavenworth headquarters is as follows: 
Gov. Anthony: Gen. Pope in town 0 Telegram just received from 
commanding officer, Fort Dodge, who has for a week had his orders 
a~o~t.the§g Indians, makes no mention of their being in the 
Vl.Cl.nJ.ty.~ 
Upon receiving the foregoing information from the governor the citizens 
of Dodge City responded with the following: 
54stuart N. Lake, hyatt Earp: Frontier Marshall (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1931), pp. 127-128. 
55Eighteenth Biennial Report, p. 23. 
56Toid. 
Dodge City, Kan., Sept. 18, 1878 
Gov. Anthony: No U. s. troops here, and no arms at post. 
The country filled with Indians. Send arms im..mediately. 
Breech-loaders. 
James H. Kelley, Mayor.57 
Dodge City, Kan., Sept. 18, 1878 
Gov. Anthony: Indians are murdering, and burning houses within 
three miles of town. All the arms we had have been sent. Can 
ypu send us arms and ammunition immediately? 
H. Shinn 
R. W. Evans 
C. W. Willett 
T. L. McCarty 
James c. Conner.SB 
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The governor answered by sending P. s. Noble, the Adjutant General, 
to Dodge City with two hundred stand of arms and ammunition on the train 
September 19, 1878. He was instructed to issue arms only upon receipt 
from the officers of the county or city and in the presence of five 
responsible citizeas. The Adjutant General sent the following message 
to the Governor on September 20, 1878: 
Gov. Geo. T. Anthony: Have issued one hundred stand of arms and 
seven thousand rounds of ammunition to Mayor of Dodge; forty stand 
and two thousand ammunition to citizens of Cimarron; sixty stand 
and ammunition to Capt. Friedly, upon urgent request. All quiet 
at Dodge now, and citizens feel confident that they can meet any 
emergency. Rumors that Indians are near Lakin, the United States 
troops concentrating at ohter points. Shall return, as nothing 
further can be accomplished staying. 59 P. S. Noble, Adjutant General 0 
' 7Ibid., p. 23. 
SBibid. 
59Ibid., p. 24. 
The Indians crossed the Sante Fe Railroad west of Dodge City 
near Pierceville. Near this spot they left the body of an old squaw 
wrapped in blankets and covered ·with a buffalo robe.60· This trail 
was found by the military on September 24 and on the morning of the 
25th Colonel Lewis started in pursuit with five companies of cavalry 
and one company of infantry. At Dodge the command had recruited the 
services of seven scouts, Amos Chatman (Chapman), Ben Jackson, Bill 
Combs, Levi Ritchison (Richardson), Ed Cooley, a man called "Kokomo, 11 
and George w. Brown.61 
The first day the connnand marched about forty miles and made 
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camp. The next day, September 27, they marched about ten miles to 
Beaver creek where they found signs of a recent Indian camp. Con-
tinuing down the creek the command halted about four o'clock in the 
afternoon to wait for the baggage wagon to catch up, and as the troops 
were relaxing the Indians fired on them from entrenched positions on 
the hilltops along Famished Woman's fork of the creek. This is present 
day Scott County near Scott county state lake. After momentary con-
fusion, Colonel Lewis formed the command into a skirmish line and the 
troops ascended the bluffs and forced the Indians back into their 
into their defensive fortifications, which were rifle pits that com-
manded the entire creek bed and also the surrounding bluffs. In driving 
the Indians from the hill to their entrenchments Colonel Lewis was shot 
6C\restal, Dodge City: Queen of Cowtowns, p. 134. 
6~eorge w. Brown, 11Kansas Indian Wars," ed. by William Connelley, 
Collections of the Kansas State Historical Societ~, 1926-1928, XVII 
(Topeka, Kansas: Kansas State Printing Plant, 192 ), p. 13.5. 
through the thigh, cutting th~ main artery. Also two men, one from G 
company and one from F company 4th Cavalry, were wounded.62 
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There are many stories of the gallantry of Colonel Lewis in at-
tacking the Indians, but the fact is that the Indians surprised the 
troops and if we can believe the scout George w. Brown, Colonel Lewis 
failed to put out flankers in the move down Beaver Creek. When the 
scout warned the Colonel of Indians in the vicinity, he only said that 
he believed the Indians had gone. 63 From the reports of the dragoons 
in the command it appears that the Colonel needlessl.J' exposed himself 
and was over anxious in attacking the Indians' position. Also, he 
fell before any real decisive action took place. Most popular accounts 
picture the Colonel pushing his troops up the side of the canyon and 
upon exposing himself he was finally hit and taken from the field which 
left the command in disorder without his guiding hand. 64 
That night the troops were withdrawn and at dawn they f ound that 
the Indians had again escaped. Fifty ponies belonging to the Indians 
had been captured the previous day and Captain Clarence Mauck, who 
was now in command, ordered them shot. They also had captured a great 
deal of the Indian's food in the form of dried beef. 65 One Indian 
was found killed; his body was out of reach of his friends. 
62Nellans, 11Dragoon. 11 Also Senate Report No. 708, pp. 129-130. 
63Brown, "Kansas Indian Wars," Collections, p. 136. 
64These sources include Robert Wright's Dodge City, also Edgar 
Beecher Bronson's Reminiscences of a Ranchrnan. Even""the Indian senti-
mentalist Mari Sandoz, in Cheyenne Autumn, states: "The man close to 
the soldier chief moti@ned him down too, but he just kept pointing 
toward the Indian position." 
65senate Report No. 708, p. 130. 
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At 7 o'clock the command moved out and the wounded Col. Lewis and 
the t~o privates were sent to Fort Wallace in the ambulance. The 
scout George Brown was sent along with the ambulance, as were a detail 
of twenty-five men under Lt. Cornelius Gardner. They arrived at Fort 
Wallace about eleven or twelve o'clock on that same night, but the 
Colonel had died about an hour earlier.66 
At Fort Wallace, Lieutenant Colonel J. A. Van Voast, of the 16th 
Infantry, Commanding, had been informed of the renegade Cheyenne on 
September 12, 1878, and he sent Captain w. E. Wedemeyer with thirty 
mounted men to Sheridan where Indians were reported to have attacked 
an immigrant train. This report turned out to be false, but Van Voast 
continued to send out scouting parties to seek out the Indians and 
warn settlers 0 67 
On the morning of September 28, the senior surviving officer of 
Colonel Lewis I command, Captain C. :Mauck, 4th Cavalry, moved in pur -
suit of the Indians. A march of forty miles was made that day and on 
the following day at about noon they reached the Kansas Pacific Rail-
road at Carlyle Statien. The Indians had crossed the track in the same 
vicinity the previous night.68 
66Brown, 11 Kansas Indian Wars, tr Collections, p. 137. 
67Records of the War Department. United States Army Commands. 
Fort Wallace, Kansas, Letters sent, Vol. 65, 1878-1880 (Washington: 
General Service Administration, National Archives, 1953). Hereinafter 
cited Fort Wallace Letters. 
6~ecord of Engagements with Hostile Indians, p. 91. 
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On the 30th, the comman~ marched thirty-five miles until they 
reached the Old Sheridan Cavalry Post Office en the Leatherman ranch, 
located about two and a half miles east of the present day town of 
Selden and south of the north fork of the Solomon0 69 Here the Indians 
had pillaged the ranch and post office and scattered effects across the 
prairie. They had also shot at two immigrant boys. Both the boys 
managed to escape, the injured one reached Prairie Dog Creek; the unin-
jured one reached Oberlin early the·morning of September 30 in search 
of a doctor, and he warned of the coming Indians but people refused to 
believe him. 70 
The Indians then moved up the Ogallala cattle trail, destroying 
property as they went 0 By October 1, the troops were closing in, 
but their horses were worn out, having had no forage in the previous 
twenty days, and the Indians had stolen at least two remounts 0 71 
On September 30, the Northern Cheyenne arrived at Sappa Creek 
in Decatur county, seven and one-half miles southwest of Oberlin, 
approaching the creek from the south. Presenting a friendly appear-
ance, they would ride out to meet the settlers working in the fields, 
usually to ask for tobacco, then one of the Indians would ride up be-
hind the white man and shoot him in the back 0 72 
69Nellans, "Dragoon." 
70Toid. 
71Glen Rogers, "An Early History of Decatur County, Kansas," 
(unpublished Master's thesis, Fort Hays Kansas State College, Hays, 
Kansas, 1932), p. 18. 
72nnecatur County now and then, 11 (Oberlin, Kansas: Pamphlet 
unpublished by the Oberlin Diamond Jubilee Inc., 1960). See also 
the Ellis County Star, October 10, 1878. 
One source states that the Indians appeared on the hill south of 
Oberlin, but when they saw large groups of men preparing to travel to 
Buffalo Park to meet their families to bring them to their newly 
claimed homesteads, they turned west 0 73 
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From a camp about nine miles southwest of Oberlin, small groups 
of braves attacked the scattered and unsuspecting settlers. About 9 
o'clock the mornipg of September 30, thirteen year old Harry Keefer 
saw the Indians shoot to death two men, James Smith and John Hudson. 
The young boy fled home to tell of the horrible scene; when his mother 
returned to check his story she saw the Indians ride up to the wagon 
carrying William Liang and his son William and two girls, Eve and Lou 
Van Cleave, enroute to Norton. The Indians killed Liang and his son 
and the two girls were ravished and released naked on the prairie.74 
The Indians then attacked the Keefer home, but with the aid of a 
cattleman named Pat Lynch and his helper, Jimmy Kelly, Mrs. Keefer 
and five children were kept safe in the dugout. One Indian was shot 
while trying to gain entrance into the house. It was estimated that 
there were around three hundred Indians on the Keefer property when 
this occurrea.75 
73Ibid. 
74Mr . and Mrs. Henry Anthony, 11Early Northwest Kansas Reminis-
censes, 11 typed interviews collected by Raymond L. Stacey, July 5, 1958. 
Folklore f ile, Forsyth Library, Hays, Kansas. 
75Ibid. This figure is highly doubtful, but it is possible that 
the entire camp came up at the same time. Most of the estimates of 
this kind are exaggerated, as were many other things about the 
frontier. 
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Moving west, the Indians killed Moses F. Abernathy, Marcellus 
Felt, George F. Walters, a Mr. Lull, Ferdinand Westphalen and his son, 
John Irwin, John Young, and E. o. Humphrey, and wounded John Humphrey 
in the shoulder, the latter dying a month later. All these murders 
occurred within a distance of two miles. 
The evening of September JO, the Indians crossed to the north 
ferk of the Sappa and killed Willian Liang, Jr., and his brother John, 
the sons of William Liang who had been killed earlier in the day on 
the south fork of the Sappa. The Liang homestead was ramsacked and 
Mrs. Liang and her two daughters were mistreated. The two girls were 
put in a bed of straw which was to be set afire, when an old chief 
interfered and took the mother and girls outside and told them to go. 
They travelled all night to reach shelter at the Keefer ranch nine 
miles southwest of their homestead.76 
A monument was erected in 1911 as a memorial to those who lost 
their lives in the Indian raid near Oberlin; the following names 
appear on it: 
E. o. Humphrey 
John Humphrey 
John C. Hutson 
Geo. F. Walters 






(correct name Fred K. Waltzer, 
according to Fred Bliss who helped 
to bury the dead) 
and son 
76Glen Rogers, "An Early History of Decatur County, Kansas," 
pp. 25-26. This epis0de is also related by Henry M. Anthony! in_his 
"Early Northwest Kansas Reminiscenses," who refers to the chief inter-






James G. Smith 
William Liang, Sr. 
William Liang, Jr. 
John G. Liang 
Freeman Liang 
(buried at Buffalo Park) 






Many attribute the great loss of ·11fe in the massacre on the 
Sappa Creek to revenge on the buffalo hunters destroying the village 
of the Cheyenne chief Bull Hump, three years previous, April 23, 18'/.S. 
In that fight a company of soldiers under Lieutenant A. Henely, and 
some buffalo hunters led by Hank Campbell surrounded Bull Hump's vil-
lage camped on the Sappa C eek. Twenty-two Indians were killed in 
the fight and only two soldiers were counted dead. 78 Many writers 
attempt to show that the number killed by the Northern Cheyenne in 
1878 was equal to the Cheyenne kill ed in 187.S. 79 The question then 
arises, whether the chiefs sanctioned the killings and raiding. 
Grinnell states that all the killing that took place was against the 
order of chief Little Wolr. 80 And the chief Wild Hog stated in his 
testimony to the Senate committee that: "I don ' t know what young men 
killed the settlers; all the fighting young men I knew of were 
killed."81 
77Glenn Rogers, 11An Early History of Decatur County, Kansas," p. 37. 
78Paul I. Wellman, The Indian Wars of the West (New York: Mcmillan 
Company, 1934), p. 165. _ 
79sandoz, Cheyenne Autumn, p. 104. 
80Grinnell, Th~ Fighting Cheyennes, p. 413. 
81senate Report No. 708, p. 21. 
At the Keefer ranch the settlers organized a company, elected 
Sol Rees captain and Lew Caley (or Kaley) lieutenant, and started 
after the Indians. 82 They headed for the north fork of the Sappa 
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and in a draw they discovered a dead cowboy, Ed Miskelly, who had been 
herding cattleo 
An another draw 0f the north Sappa, the settlers ran across three 
Indians, a warrior, squaw and young buck. The warrior was killed and 
the others set loose. This small civilian group split when the more 
adventurous joined two companies of u. s. Cavalry sent out from Fort 
Wallace to reinforce the captain, and the rest headed back to Oberlin. 
On their return they met a ''company of cavalry proceeding very leisurely 
after the Indians.1183 
In Rawlins County, west of Decatur Ceunty, the Indians trapped and 
killed a herd of cattle in a draw near Ludell, between Oberlin and 
Atwood. This place has since been known as "Hundred Head Canyon," and 
the ranch on which this occurred is called "Dead Man I s Ranch, 11 because 
one of the herders, Alex Foster, was killed by the Indians, and Charley 
George and Gus Cook barely escaped alive. Gus Cook started down the 
Sappa for help and finding a lone woman and baby on the trail, helped 
them to safety• He then met Captain Mauck and the soldiers from Camp 
82sol Rees's story is told in James R. Cook, The Border~ the 
Buffal0, an Untold story of the Southwest Plains (Topeka, Kansas: Crane 
and Company, 1907), pp. 297-'JIIi. 
83 
Rogers, 11An Early History of Decatur County, Kansas, 11 p. 31. 
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Supply, Indian Territory, "but did not think they were looking TOO hard 
for the Indians.11 84 
Also on the Beaver in Rawlins County, the Indians killed Pete 
Janousek, Ignac Janousek, and a Mr. Springer. They stayed in the Paul 
Janousek house for three days. 85 One of the troopers who testified 
at \he Senate investigation of the Removal of the Cheyenne told the 
following of this incident: 
In one place, in Kansas, I saw the bodies of three men about a 
hundred yards from the house which they had evidently occupied; 
the men were lying on the ground with their brains knocked out; 
two had apparently been running from the house when they received 
these blows from the Indians. The house, inside, was all torn 
to pieces; the feather beds were strewn all over the yard; the 
dogs, cats, geese, ducks, every living thing belonging there 
had been killed, and was lying there dead. Five or six hundred 
yards further I found four children, the oldest twelve years old, 
the youngest a mere babe, the child~en of Bohemian settlers--
the men who had been killed. These children were in a very desti-
tute §gndition. That was all I saw; but I heard of a great deal 
more. 
An immigrant girl was later found naked and alone on the prairie 
after the command had left the Beaver and headed over the divide north. 87 
Also on the Beaver, the Indians killed Frederick Hamper. A Mr. 
Sti&er and his son were killed on their homestead, Mrs. Stiner was abused, 
84Amy Lathrop, Tales of Western Kansas (Kansas City, Missouri: 
La Rue Printing Company, cI'948), pp. 73-74. 
85Mrs. Joe Janousek, "Happenings along the Beaver in Rawlins County, 
Kansas, during the Cheyenne Indian Raid of 1878, 11 Letter to George B. 
Nellans, April 16, 1955. Copy on file at Oberlin Museum, Oberlin, Kansas. 
86senate Report N0. 708, p. 131. 
87cook, The Border and the Buffalo, pp. 304-305. 
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as were most of the captured women, and has never been heard of sin e. 
At the Abbott homestead, a son was killed and seven beeves were 
slaughtered but the horses were l eft al.one. 88 
The Eighteenth Biennial. Report of the Kansas State Historical 
Society lists the following as killed in Rawlins ounty: 
George H. Abbott, Rev. George Fennberg, Alexander Foster, 
Hynek Janosek, Peter Janosek, Arnold Kubits, W. J . Marshall, 
Henry Shidler, Frank Sochor, Rudolph Springer, Antone Stenner. 89 
For the next two weeks the settlers rode over the prairie look-
ing for the dead. The bodies of G. F. Walters and John Wright w re 
found after much searching. 
The same plea for arms and ammunition that came from southwest 
Kansas when the Indians were raiding in that secti on of the state, now 
came from the settlers of western and northwestern Kansas . Most of 
the demands from the west were dated after the massacre at Sappa Creek 
and the demand for arms was based on fear t hat the Indians might r -
turn south. 
From Ellis, Kansas, Dave Rathbone sent a telegram, October 2, 1878, 
to GoverI?,or Anthony stating that "Reliable information has been re-
ceived that eighteen white men were killed this morning by Indians, 
near BuffaJ.0 0 Please send immediately one hundred guns and ammunition 
to Ellis. 11 90 
8811necatur County now and then. 11 
89Eighteenth Biennial Report, p. Jl . 
90Ib.d _i_., p. 25. 
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From Buffalo (Buffalo Park), Kansas, crune a telegram to the 
governor from J. c. Henry, which told of the "seventeen men known to 
be killed on Sappa,"; also sent October 2nd.91 
In answer to the two telegrams, Governor Anthony sent the follow-
ing reply: "Had interview with General Pope, who says: No hostile 
Indians in Kansas; no Cheyennes within a hundred miles of Buffalo to-
day. Have you confirmation of dispatches sent me? answer. 11 92 
A confirming telegram was sent by J. c. Henry and the Governor 
sent P. s. Noble again to the frontier with arms and ammuni t i on with 
the command to "Issue arms only to good bona. 11 93 
That little bit of humor incident even upon such occasions as an 
Indian raid is seen in the following telegram of October 3, 1878, 
from J. F. Keeney, Wakeeney, Kansas, which states, "Three Indians seen 
this morning eleven miles north of here by Clarke, whose word is as 
good as General Pope's. 11 94 
Jonathan Edwards wrote the governor a number of lengt hy letter s 
in the following tone: "Governor, this is a terrible thing, a small 
force of Indians leisurely making their way for nearly t wenty days 
across the country, and the troops as leisurel y following, and not 
even capturing or killing an Indian, and yet, as you are told by the 
9libid. 
92Toid. 
93Toid., p. 26. 
94Ibid. 
general commanding, not a hostile or Cheyenne Indian within a hundred 
miles. 11 95 
94 
In a letter of October 3, he -wrote, "I very much regret that this 
great commonwealth which you have the honor to govern could not have 
the power to protect its citizens from these hordes of savage murderers 
that have marched through western Kansas with perfect irnpunity.n96 
Als0, "I am very sorry to say you're censured very much throughout 
the west as it is not known whether you manifest any interest in be-
half of the frontier. 11 97 
The Indians continued to move; the troops camped two miles from 
the Beaver on October 1, and the 2nd they moved down to view the re-
mains of the three murdered Bohemians and pushed on to camp on the 
Republican River, across from the Circle ranch owned by the Wilson 
Bros. of Denver, Colorado. The Indians' camp fire was judged to be at 
about two or three miles distance from the troops. 98 
The Indians had stolen about forty horses in the area, while the 
cavalry mounts were f ast giving out. Thirty hcrses were abandoned by 
the cavalry, and the wagons were filled with dismounted troopers. The 
next day, the command saw the Indians about ten miles in front of them 
on Frenchman Creek, and picked up an old Indian left on the trail. 
95Ibid., pp. 26-28. 
96Ibid., pp. 28-29. 
97Ibid. , p. 29. 
98Nellans, "Dragoon." 
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On the morning of the 4th, they crone upon fifty abandoned horses 
and their packs. The ~rail was covered with articles stolen in the 
recent raids. That night, after marching fifty-two miles, the command 
reached the South Platte opposite Ogallala. Crossing the Union Pacific 
Railroad on the 5th they continued to the North Platte. When it had 
been learned that the Cheyenne were heading north from Indian terri-
tory, troops were put in readiness under the command of Major Thorn-
burgh, and the 5th Cavalry under General Wesley P. Merritt was ordered 
ta Fort Larainie, and Colonel Carlton, with the 3rd Cavalry was ordered 
to Fort Robinson.99 
Despite precautions, the Northern Cheyenne crossed the Union 
Pacific tracks, October 4, at Alkali Station, east of Sidney, Nebraska. 
Major Thornburgh with about one hundred forty men, three companies 
of 4th Infantry, and one company of 5th, and one of 7th Cavalry, fol-
lowed the Indianso 
The command from Fort Reno followed Thornburgh's command until 
they were ordered to Sidney Barracks, Nebraska, by General George 
Crook. One of the dragoon ·s expressed himself as follows: 
We arrived there on the 10th, completely worn out, not a man 
having had a chance to change clothes, or if he had he had non 
[§i~ to change wince [§:iQ) leaving Reno, having often but one 
meal a day, having lost 40 horses and five engagements with the 
enemy and marched 850 miles in 30 days, without forage, through 
Indi~n r100itory, Kansas and Nebraska. We were glad of a brief respite. 
99Record of Engagements with Hostile Indians, p. 92. 
lO)Nellans, "Dragoon. 11 
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Thornburgh and his command trailed the Indians through very diffi-
cult country; the wagons had , to be abandoned, thus from October 6 to 
October 10 the command was without rations. Finally, they joined with 
a column of troops of the 3rd Cavalry under Maj or Carlton, near the 
Niobrara River, and the commands marched to Camp Sheridan, Nebraska, 
having found pursuit through the sand hills i mpossible . 
After the Cheyenne crossed the South Platte some of them felt 
safe enough to stop and rest while others insisted on cont~nui ng the 
journey to Wyoming . In the Niobrara Hills the t ribe split; those 
who desired to stop stayed with the old chief, Dull Knife, and the 
others under the young chief, Little Wolf, went on. 
George Bird Grinnell related the story of this division as 
told to him by Little Wolf. Dull Knife had stated that 0 This is 
our own country. Nothing bad ever happened to us here . Let us 
rest. The soldiers will leave us alone, for lo, we are in our own 
land. 11101 · But Little Wolf responded, "You can go that way if you wish, 
but I intend to work my way up into the Powder River 'Country . I think 
it would be better for us all if t he party were not dividea . 11102 
During the .night the band which suppor ted Dull Knife moved a few 
yards away from Little Wolf 1 s camp. Some say that Little Wolf 1 s band 
left gifts before the tent of the old chief Dull Knife before they left. 
But, none of the sources record the date or exaet place of the departure . 




On October 15, the commanding officer at Fort Robi nson reported 
that Indians had been running off stock in t he vici nity , and the 3rd 
Cavalry under .· Carl ton was sent to check the report. Also, the command-
ing officer at Fort Sidney stated that two Cheyenne were captured in 
their attempt to join the Indians at Fort Keogh (Montana), where, if 
permitted to s ,tay, the 1Clleyenne would surrender, but, if not, t hey 
would join Sit ting Bull in Canada. Through Ben Clark, t he interpr et er, 
the prisoners also said that fifteen had been killed si nce leaving 
Indian Territory.l03 
To the forces of the Departments of the Misso uri and t he Pl at te 
were added t he troops of the Department of Dakota; October 17th 
Major Tilford and nine troops of 7th Cavalry, and four companies of 
infantry (430 enlis ted men) reached Camp Sheridan, from Bear Buttes 
(Fort Meade), Dakota •104 
The acting Indian Agent Tibbetts at Red Cloud Agency r eported 
that a party of the fugitive Cheyenne ha d been capt ur ed by the Si oux . 
On October 21st Major Carlton r eported t hat Agency I ndi ans knew where 
a portion of the Cheyenne Indians were and wa nted t o capture them f or 
their arms and horses. Carlton detached ·Captain J. B. J ohns on, com-
manding troops B and D of the 3rd Caval ry, and on October 23rd they 
captured one hundred and forty-nine of t he Nort hern Cheyenne and one 
hundred and forty head of stock. Dull Knife, Old Cr ow, and ~fil d Hog 
l03Record of Engagements with Host i l e Indians, pp . 92- 93. 
io4Ibid., P• 93. 
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were the chiefs taken, "but the prisoners said they would die, rather 
than be taken back to Indian Territory.ul05 When told that they would 
be sent to Fort Robinson as a step toward removal again to Indian 
Territory, the Indians began to dig rifle pits and construct breast-
works. Army reinforcements and artillery arrived and the officers were 
successful in getting the Indians to go to Fort Robinson without a 
fight. Their remaining arms were taken from them and they were con-
fined to an empty set of barracks. 
The remaining portion of the Northern Cheyenne under the leader-
ship of Little Wolf succeeded in escaping into the sand hills of 
western Nebraska. They intended to return to the Powder River country, 
but on March 25, 1879, near Box Elder Creek, in the Department of 
Dakota, Lieutenant w. P. Clark from Fort Keogh with the 2nd Cavalry 
persuaded Little Wolf to surrender. There were thirty-five lodges, 
two hundred fifty ponies, and 11The band numbered thirty-three men, 
forty-three squaws, and thirty-eight children. 11106 
105rbid. 
106 Ibid., pp. 96-97. 
IT. AFTERMATH, THE ~ORTHERN CHEYENNE IN THE NORTH 
A study of the Dull Knife Raid of 1878 can not end with the cap-
ture 0f the two Cheyenne bands of Dull Knife and Little Wolf. To 
complete the picture we must view its result0 
At Fort Robinson the Northern Cheyenne band under Dull Knife was 
confined in the log barracks at the southeast angle of the parade" 
ground. · The doors had not been locked nor the windows barred, but a 
small guard patrolled this barracks-prison. 
George Bird Grinnell states that a conference was held at Fort 
Robinson the day following the surrender of the Northern Cheyenne. 
As there was no Cheyenne interpreter at Fort Robi nson, a Sioux named 
Tangle Hair, who spoke Cheyenne and Sioux, translated to an i nter• 
preter who translated from Sioux to English for the connnanding of ficer, 
Captain Carlton.l 
In this fashion the commanding officer told Dull Knife: 
Now, the fighting is over. We are friendly with one another. 
You must stay here for three months before the government will 
decide whether to send you south or to send you to t he Sioux. 
While you are here, nothing bad will happen t0 you, but you must 
stay for three months. You will have the freedom of the post and 
may even go off into the mountains, but each night at supper t ime 
you must be here. If one man of you deserts or runs away, you 
will not be treated like this any longer. You will all be held 
responsible for him.2 
1George Bird Grinnell, The Fighting Cheyenne (Norman Okl8homa: 
University of Oklahoma Press-;-1956), p. 417. 
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Dull Knife then spoke and t9ld his people to do as they were commanded. 
''We are back on our own ground, and have stopped fighting. We have 
found the place we started to come to. 11 3 
Thus . the Northern Cheyenne came to enjoy the freedom of hunting 
and roaming in the near-by mountains. Dances were held in the bar-
racks and some of the soldiers bought food to be distributed at the 
dances and gave small amounts of money to the Indian girls they danced 
with for the purchase of ornaments and small gifts. This lasted about 
two months, until Bull Hump left for Pine Ridge Agency to join his 
wife who had escaped when the Cheyenne were captured. When the com-
manding officer found that he had gone, his absence not innnediately 
reported by the cook, the Indians were confined to the barracks, 
their liberties taken away. Bull Hump returned to find his companions 
locked in the building with sentries posted 0 4 
The states of Kansas and Nebraska were each demanding custody of 
the Indians for the purpose of identification, prosecution, and 
punishment of the individual members for the killings during the 
raids through their territory. 
Governor Anthony of Kansas, in a letter to the War Department 
dated November 11, 1878, demanded the surrender of the Cheyenne chiefs 
to his state: 
On mature reflection, and with reference to the demands of 
law and justice, I feel it an imperative duty to call upon you 
for a surrender to the proper officers of the civil court of 
p. 418. 
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Kansas, for trial and P,Unishment under its laws, the prin-
cipal chiefs, 'Dull Knife,' 101d Cro·w, 1 •Hog, 1 'Little Wolf,• 
and others, whose identity can be established as participants 
in the crimes of murder and woman ravishing. I believe there 
is a precedent for this demand, in the surrender to the civil 
courts of Texas of •Satanta, 1 and one other chief, in the year 
1872. But if there is no precedent, public necessity and 
simple justige would, I believe, be ample justification for 
this demand.-' 
In a letter from Secretary of the Interior Carl Schurz to the 
Secretary of War, dated November 22, 1878, it is disclosed: 
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter 
of the 11th instant, transmitting a copy of a telegram, dated 
Chicago, Nov. 8, 1878, from General Sheridan, urging that some 
disposition be made of the Cheyennes, prisoners at Camp Robin-
son: and I would respectfully state that the matter was duly 
referred to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for an expres-
sion of his opinion, and the officer in reply hereto, under 
date of 16th instant, recommends that all of the Cheyennes in 
the custody of the military, who were engaged in the recent 
hostilities, be taken to Fort Wallace, or some ether military 
post in Kansas, with a view to the identification of such as 
committed outrages in said state, and their delivery to the 
proper civil authorities for trial; and that the remainder of 
said Indians be returned tot eir agency in the Indian Terri-
toryo 
The recommendition of the Commissioner has the approval of 
this Department. 
The federal government decided to return the Northern Cheyenne to the 
reservation from which they had l eft in Septembero This was revealed 
in a memoranda dated November or December, 1878, from the Secretary 
of War, and signed W. T. s. (William Tecumseh Sherman): 
5Eighteenth Biennial Report, pp. 29-30. 
6senate Journal, Proceedings of the Senate of the State of 
Kansas. (Topeka, Kansas: George w. Mar.tin, Kansas Publishing House, 
1879), p. 302. 
Governor Anthony of K~sas in person asks for more troops to 
increase the security and property in south and western Kansas. 
Governor Anthony says that squads of Indians from Indian Terri-
tory eome into Kansas and make the settlers feel insecure. The 
military authorities make no reports to this effect, and I be-
lieve the Indian Bureaa contends that all the Indians are kept 
on their reservatien. The Northern Cheyennes who escaped from 
the reservation at Reno last summer, and were captured on the 
Upper Niobrara, are now prisoners and can be held if necessary. 
Existing orders are to surrender the murderers of the settlers 
on Sava creek to the civil authorities and the remainder to 
Reno. 
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General Phillip Sheridan, commanding the Military Division of the 
Missouri, stated his opinion regarding the Cheyenne prisoners: "• •• 
unless they are sent back to where they came f rom, the whole reserva-
tion system will receive a shock which will endanger its stability. 11 8 
The eormnanding of ficer at Fort Robinson, Captain H. w. Wessells, 
brought the Sioux chiefs, Red Cloud, American Horse, and No Flesh, 
from their agency to help convince the Norther n Cheyenne to abide by 
government policy. 
Red Cloud, the principal Sioux speaker, said the whit e 'man now 
filled the earth and was all powerful, the Sioux begged them to allow 
the Cheyenne to stay in the north, but whatever the whit e man di rected 
11you must do." The Sioux could not aid any resistance.9 
Dull Knife then rose to address the Sioux chiefs: 
~ari Sandoz, Cheyenne Autumn (New York: Hasti ngs House Publishers, 
1953), p. 173. 
9Edgar Beecher Bronson, Reminiscences of~ Ranchman (Lincoln, 
Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1962)", p. 167. 
We know you for our friends, whose words we may believe. 
We thank you for asking us to share your lands. We hope the 
Great Father will let us come to you. All we ask is to be 
allowed to live, and to live in peace. I seek no war with any 
one. An old man, my fighting days are done. We bowed to the 
will of the Great Father and went far into the south where he 
told us to go. There we found a Cheyenne cannot live. Sickness 
came among us that made mourning in every lodge. Then the 
treaty promises were broken, and our rations were short. Those 
not worn by disease were wasted by hunger. To stay there meant 
that all of us would die. Ollr petitioRs to the Great Father 
were unheeded0 We thought it better to die fighting to regain 
our old homes than to perish of sickness. Then our march began. 
The rest you know.10 
Then he turned to Captain Wessells and his officers: 
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Tell the Great Father Dull Knife and his people ask only to 
end their days here in the north where they were born. Tell him 
we want no more war. We cannot live in the south; there is no 
game 0 Here when rations a.re short, we can hunt. Tell him if he 
lets us stay here Dull Knife's people will hurt no one. Tell him 
if he tries to send us back we will butcher each other with our 
own knives. I have spoken.ll 
These a.re the words r ecorded by Edgar Beecher Bronson, who was 
present at the council. He states t hat all the Cheyenne sat silent 
throughout the council except Buffalo Hump, a son of Dull Knife, who 
paced from one end of the barrack to the other. Bronson expected him 
to leap on some member of the party "and try to rend him with his 
hands. 1112 Nothing came of the council as the War Department and 
Interior Department agreed that it would not be wise to merge the 
Cheyenne with the restless Sioux, and it had been decided to march 
them back to Fort Reno. 
10~., pp. 168-169. 
llibid., p. 169. 
12~., pp. 169-170. 
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Through James Rowland, ,who became interpreter for the Cheyenne 
at this time, the officers began to persuade the Indians to go south. 
Dull Knife, speaking for his people, again refused, saying: "We 
will not go there to live. That is not a healthful country, and if 
we should stay there, we would all die. 1113 He continued to resist: 
11 No, I am here on my own ground, and I will never go back0 You may 
kill me here; but you cannot make me go back. 1114 
Mari Sandoz states:that the Cheyenne were informed on the 3rd 
of January that they must prepare to go south. Wessells was ordered 
to start the Indians regardless of weather conditions, but he was to 
provide the best supplies possible for their comfort. In reply, he 
stated the Indians were resolved to die rather than to go. The fol-
lowing day General Crook telegraphed Washington for an agent of the 
Indian Bureau to superintend the move 0 "He was unwilling to let this 
responsibility rest on the military. 1115 
But, on Jan.uary 5th, 1879, Captain Wessells received orders from 
the War Department to start south immediately with Dull Knife's band. 
This was the decision of the Indian Bureau and it was requested that 
the Secretary of War enforce it immediately.16 
Captain Wessells brought Dull Knife, Old Crow, and Wild Hog to 
his headquarters to inform them of the order. Dull Knife replied that 
13Grinnell, The Fighting _Cheyenne, p. 418. 
14Ibid. 
15 Sandoz, Cheyenne Autumn, pp. 192-193. 
16 Bronson, Reminiscences of~ Ranchman, pp. 170-171. 
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he wished that they could dQ as the Great Father ordered for he knew 
that they were helpless in his hands, but they would not march to 
Indian Territory in such weather, for they would die on the way and 
fall victim to the fever againo "They would not return to the south, 
and they would not leave their barrack-prison. nl 7 Dull Knife, s long 
sp~ech concluded: "You are now the many and we are the few, but we 
know that it is better to die fighting on the way to our old home 
than to perish of the sickness ••• 11 18 
Captain Wessells had no choice; he told the interpreter to explain 
to Dull Knife that the Indians must obey the order. If they refused, 
then their food and fuel would be cut off until they would agree to go 
south peacefully. The commander next sent the interpreter to the 
barracks asking that the children be removed and fed, but the Indians 
refused. 
Grinnell states that food, water, and fuel were cut off; some of 
the Indians stated that for eight days they had neither food nor water, 
others said that they had no food for five days, and no water for 
three days.19 Snow was scraped from the window sill for water. The 
17Ibid., p. 172. 
18sandoz, Cheyenne Autumn, pp. 191-192. Mari Sandoz states that 
this is the conference in which the Sioux chief Red Cloud tells the 
Cheyenne "It is foolish to think of resisting. 11 She states that Row-
land was the interpreter, and a newspaper man was presento 
19Grinnell, The Fighting Cheyenne, p. 419. Last food and fuel, 
Saturday, JanuaryT, 1879; last water, January 8, Captain Wessells 
told Board of Proceedings. Sandoz, Cheyenne Autumn, p. 194. 
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starvation caused some of the Indians to act as drunken people, and a 
young man was reported to have said, nI want to jump out now and be 
killed. 1120 The interpreter was warned not to come inside with the 
Indians, and not to let anyone else in or they would be killed. 
According to Edgar Beecher Bronson, the barracks rang with death 
chants for five days and nights. On the morning of January 9, which 
was the fifth day without food Captain Wessells again summoned Dull 
Knife, Old Crow, and Wild Hog to a council~ The latter two went, and 
refusing to surrender the tribe, they were ordered seized and put in 
chains. Wild Hog was able to seriously wound Private Ferguson of 
Troop A, and let out a war-cry to alarm his people. The Indians 
immediately began barricading the windows and doors, the floors of 
the barracks were torn up and rifle-pits dug beneath it. There were 
twenty-odd rifles and pistols among the Cheyenne which had been smug-
gled into the barracks at the time of capture by concealing them 
beneath the squaws' skirts and beneath the blankets . 21 One version 
20Grinnell, The Fighting Cheyenne, p. 419. 
21Bronson, Reminiscences of a Ranchman, pp. 174-175. Grinnell 
states that five guns were bidden under the floor, and that they had 
eleven pistols with some ammunition. 
In a letter to E. A. Brininstool, Wessells explained: "I went 
to Camp Robinson, where Col. Carlton was in command, and the Cheyenne 
prisoners in an empty barracks building. In a few days, Col. Carlton 
left, and turned the post over to me. I as sumed that when those Indians 
were captured they had been disarmed, but it was not so. They had hid-
den their weapons, or some qf' them0 An order came to send them to the 
Indian Territory. I teld them of it, and said I would do all I could to 
make their journey comfortable. But they said that the country where 
they were was their home, and they would die before they would leave it •. 
They then barricaded the building from inside. To prevent their escape 
I increased the guard around the building; but that night they broke 
out, using their rifles in doing so. Their fuel and food were not cut 
off until they refused to surrender. All the fight was on their side. 
E. A. Brininstool, Fighting Indian Warriors (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: 
The Stackpole Company, 1953), p. I44. 
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is t hat many of the small arms were dissembled and the parts were 
distributed among the children as ornaments, and when they -were shut 
in the barracks the arms were put together and hidden in the floor. 22 
The command im.'llediately exp.ected an outbreak, however only seven-
teen men formed the guard that night when the break ca.me. Recording 
the episode, the Record of Engagements with Hostile Indians, states: 
"At 10 o'clock on Jan . 10, 1879, the Cheyennes tried their desperate 
escape from the barracks at Fort Robinson.'' 23 The ten o'clock r, al l's 
well'' was just being passed by the sentries when a shot was fired 
through the window of the barrack killing a soldier and an Indian 
sprang out of the window to relieve the dead man of his arms. The f i ght 
was on. A group of Indians rushed t hrough t he front door, shooting 
two more soldiers. All the Indians poured out through windows and 
doors; forming ·a line in front of the barracks and -firing on the 
troopers as they rushed to the scene. The women and children wer e 
sent ahead of the rest of the ban d. 
The Indians escaped across the saw-mill cr ossing of White River, 
which was only a few hundred yards from the barracks, heading south-
west toward the -ranches in the area to find horses. Five to six 
·inches of snow and a full moon made the escapees easy targets for the 
soldiers. Most of the fighting men of the Cheyenne were killed in t he 
first half mile of flight. In the confusion the soldier s could not 
22Grinnell, The Fighting Cheyenne, p. 420. 
23Record of Engagements ~ith Hostile Indians, p. 95. Both Bronson 
and Grinnell record the date of the Robinson outbreak as January 9th. 
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distinguish between men and women, a Lieutenant Cummings found himself 
attacked by two Indians armed with knives and after he had shot them 
he discovered they were squaws. 2h 
Grinnell relates the following story, told to him by an Indian 
$quaw: 
Some people who were ahead of me got to the top of the hill, 
but I get out of breath and stopped by a big tree with some other 
women. One of these was the wife of White Antelope 0 She was al-
ready wounded, and White Antelope was carrying the baby. When the 
soldiers got up close, White Antelope rushed back on them with his 
knife and fought for a little while and was killed. When the 
soldiers had come up close, I was shot in the back and in the side 
of the head and knocked senseless, 9nd knew nothing after thato 
Two other women were killed there. 2~ 
Four troops of 3rd Cavalry under Captain P. D. Vroon, at Camp 
Canby, one mile east of Fort Robinson, 26 upon hearing the shooting 
formed a skirmish line across the valley to prevent escape east. 
Vroon took one troop to the aid of the f0rt 0 He was the first to en-
gage the fleeing Cheyenne, who had selected a high bluff t we miles 
west of the post as their avenue of escape. The inaccessible cliff com-
manded by the Indians forced the troops to withdraw until daylight. 
In the morning a detail of soldiers was sent out to bring in the 
dead Indians. About forty frozen corpses were found and stacked like 
cord wood against the sawmill where they were later buried in a common 
24Bronson, Reminiscences of~ Ranchman, pp. 181-182. 
25Grinnell, The Fighting Cheyenne, p. 422. 
26These troops had been sent to reinforce Fort Robinsono Bronson, 
Reminiscences of~ Ranchman, p. 170. 
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trench. 27 The civilians ha~ begun to scavanger among the dead and 
rob them of trinkets, etc. 28 
Four troops of 3rd Cavalry under Captain Wessells started out 
after the Indians who had escaped the night before. The Indians had 
followed the high divide between the White River and Soldier Creek 
west of the fort . Their trail through the snow led down the narrow 
valley of Soldier Creek, and they had entrenched themselves on a high 
steep hill covered with fallen timber, which commanded the trail. 
The Cheyenne opened fire on a column of soldiers led by Vroon, but the 
command moved back, reassembled and soon surrounded the Indians strong-
hold -which was impregnable to a charge attack. The command having 
brought no packs or rations, Captain Wessells ordered decoy camp fires 
built around the Indians position and marched his men back to the 
garrison.29 
When Captain Wessells returned with his command on the 12th, he 
found the Cheyenne eccupying a strong position in the thick timb r 
along Soldier Creek at the foot of the hill on which they had been 
entrenched the day before . JO The troops and the Indians engaged in a 
battle of long-range firing . The Cheyenne were fortunate to kill a 
trooper I s horse, and when the command marched ba.ck to the garrison 
that night, the Indians ate their first food in seven days. The next 
27Ibid., p. 184. 
28sandoz, Cheyenne Autumn, p. 209. 
29Bronson, Reminiscences of! Ranchman, pp. 184-187. 
30Ibid., pp. 192-193. 
110 
day the Indians remained there eating and resting without the threat 
of troops. On the 14th the soldiers returned and found the Indians 
six miles further west entrenched on the Hat Creek Bluffs, and here 
the command was ambushed and two troopers wounded. The Captain and 
lieutenants Crawford and Hardie (Hardy) and the interpreter crawled 
near the Indians rifle-pits and called for the Cheyenne to allow the 
women and children to come out. But the only answer was a rifle 
volley. The command had brought along a twelve-pound Napoleon gun 
and forty rounds of shells were thrown in the Indians position with-
out dislodging them.31 
That night the command surrounded the Indians in hope of keeping 
them from food and water. But the next morning it was discovered that 
the Indians had slipped through the picket lines, and headed southwest 
along the high bluffs lining Hat Creek Basin.32 
The Indians continued to elude the troops. For the next six days 
the command would force a running fight., the Indians would s cure 
themselves in a strong defensive position, and with nightfall would 
slip away without notice.33 
Bronson states that Captain Wessell's command was joi n d by 
Lieutenant Dodd and a band of Sioux scouts on January 20, and on 
Tuesday th 21st the final battle took place.34 The government 
31Ibid., pp. 193-194. 
32~., p. 194. 
33Ibid. 
34~., pp. 194-195. 
111 
records state that on Januarr 20,Major Evans with Troops Band D of 
3rd Cavalry intercepted the Cheyenne on some cliffs but they escaped. 
Captain Wessels ~ith troops A, E, F, and Hof 3rd Cavalry overtook 
the Indians on January 22nd "near the telegraph line from Fort Robin-
son to Hat Creek, where they were entrenched in a gully. 11 35 The 
Cheyenne were found in a washout about fifty feet long, twelve feet 
wide, and five feet deep near the edge of the bluffs. After an inter• 
preter su;mmoned them to surrender and they refused, a skirmish line 
was formed and the troops charged to the edge of the pit emptied their 
carbines into it, sprang back to reload, and fired again. Captain 
Wessells and two men were wounded and three enlisted men were killed. 
Twenty-three Cheyenne were killed and nine captured of whom three were 
wounded.36 
The night of the outbreak from the barracks the soldiers killed 
thirty-two Cheyenne and seventy-one were captured, most of them being 
wounded. Dull Knife and his wife, his son and his son's wife and child, 
evaded capture by hiding in the hills fo r ten days, and then they 
travelled to Pine Ridge Agency where they confided in the interpreter 
William Rowland about-their plight.37 Grinnell states that of the 
nearly 150 Cheyenne confined at Fort Robinson, 64 were killed in the 
outbreak, about 58 were sent to Pine Ridge Agency, about 20 were 
sent to trial and south, and 8 or 10 were never heard of again. 38 
35Record of Engagements with Hostile Indians, p. 96. 
36Ibid. 
37Grinnell, The Fighting Cheyennes, p. 426. 
38Ibid. 
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Eleven soldiers were killed ~nd ten wounded along with the Sioux 
scout Woman's Dress. In the medical hist0ry of the Fort Robinson 
Post, Surgeon E. B. Mosely wrote: 
During this whole period the fighting was of the most des-
perate character being from a hand to hand struggle up to a 
range almost always inside of fifty yards. The great proportion 
of fatal wounds is remarkable and their concentratien on the 
trunk of the body shows a deliberation and skill in handling 
the improved breech-loading arms with which they were liberally 
supplied, a fact which explains why this particular tribe en-
joyed the reputation of being the best warriors on the plains. 
The conduct of the white troops is worthy of the greatest 
praise. Taken by surprise the first night, they rallied in 
the most prompt manner and followed the flying enemy even bare-
footed in the deep snow with thermometer at 10° F. until 
ordered back by their officers. 
In the final charge the men advanced under a heavy and fatal 
fire to the edge of the hole in which the enemy were hidden and 
in a few minutes of short work finished the affair. 
By an unfortunate fatality a large number of the killed 
were of the very best and most respected men of the commanct.39 
Although the affair seemed finished there were repercussions; a 
Deadwood dispatch to the New York T ibune stated, "Intense indignation 
is manifested throughout the whole country, even among the advocates of 
extermination, over the barbarous treatment of the Cheyenne prisoners 
at Camp Robinson near here, previous to the recent outbreak and 
slaughter. 11 4° 
And the Telegraph of Sidney, Nebraska, on January 25, 1879, stated 
that the Indians surrendered in the fall claimed that they were assured 
39"Record of the Medical History of Post Fort Robinson , Medical 
Department, u. s. Jl:rmyfl {Ms. copy), Tablet No. 31, Ricker Collection, 
Nebraska State Historical Society, cited by Roger T. Grange, Jr. "Fort 
Robinson: Outpost on the Plains," Nebraska History, XXXIX (September, 
1958), pp. 224-225. 
4°sandoz, Cheyenne Autumn, p. 226. 
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they would not be taken back, to Indian Territory. The editor had re-
ceived his information on a visit to Fort Robinson. After the Cheyenne 
had been at the Fort for two months, "it was agreed upon by the war 
and interior departments that the Indians should be returned south, to 
the end that such of them as committed the murder and other atrocities 
in Kansas might be identified, and put on tria1.41 
When the Secretary of Interior Carl Schurz was asked to express 
his opinion about the treatment of the Cheyenne prisoners at Camp 
Robinson and the outbreak, the Secretary replied that the Interior 
Department had no control over the Indians at that time. He stated 
that his opinion coincided with General Sheridan's that "unless they 
are sent back the whole reservation system will receive a shock which 
will endanger its stability. 11 42 It was still necessary to return the 
Indians to the reservation. 
General George Crook backed the connnander of Fort Robinson: 
••• having tried every means in his power and failed, and 
there being no change in the orders from Washington, Captain 
Wessells, the off icer in charge, had no alternative but a resort 
to harsh measures. He made overtu.res to the chiefs and head men 
to let the women and children come out from the building, so 
that they might not suffer in any conflict that might arise; but 
the Indians defiantly rejected every attempt at compromise, sc3-ing, 'We'll all die here together sooner than be sent south. 1 
4Iueorge w. Manypenny, Our Indian Wards (Cincinnati, Ohio: 
Robert Clarke and Company, 1'8'85), pp. 336-337. 
42 r Senate Report No. 708, p. 2~1. 
43Ibid., p. 242. 
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The General stated further ~hat, although Captain Wessells had no 
other alternative, "I have never known a band of Indians to make peace 
with our government and then break it, or leave their reservation, 
without some ground of complaint; but until their complaints are ex-
plained and adjusted, they will constantly give annoyance and trouble.1144 
To Crook it seemed that there had been an unnecessary exercise of power 
in Washington to force this .particular band of Cheyenne back to Indian 
Territory, while fragments of the band, which surrendered to troops 
on the Yellowstone, had escaped to the Pine Ridge and Spotted Tail 
Reservations and had been allowed to remain in the north.45 
The Omaha, Nebraska, Daily Herald, January 17, 1879, editorially 
reviewed the situation at Fort Robinson: 
These Cheyennes were surrounded in the sand hills of North West 
Nebraska in a severe snowstorm on the 20 October last by three com-
panies of the 3rd Cav. under Capt. Johnson. Their number was then 
officially given as 149. Then they said they would remain peace-
ably at Camp Robinson or live with Red Cloud's people (on the Sioux 
reservation in the north) but would die before they would return to 
their reservation in Indian Territory, where they had been starved. 
The commissioner did nothing in the case until Dec. 19, when he 
ordered their removal to Kansas. Temperature at Camp Robinson in-
dicated 30° below that day0 The commissioner must have known this. 
It was one of the items of news, current in all the journals of the 
country. The squaws and children hadn't a blanket that wasn't in 
rags. They did leave their reservation in the same clothing they 
now wear, but they left in August, and it is now January; besides, 
clothing often wears out in Nebraska as well as in Washington. 
The man who opened [sic] that telegram was a fool or a cold~ 
blooded scoundrel 0 Dec. 20, 1878, the commissioner was informed 
by wire that before these Indians could be moved, they must have 
clothing. He never answered that telegram until January 11, the 
very day of the outbreak. 
44Ibid., pp. 242-2L.3. 
45Ibid. 
The whole Cheyenne business is in keeping with the rest of 
the Indian Bureau management 0 It is a disgrace to the u. s. A. 
From Mr. Hayt we are prepared to hear anything. He displayed 
his incompetency so fully in his dealing with the Sioux as a 
'diplomatist• that we beg leave to suggest to him that as a 
private citipgn he might be more of a success than as the head 
of a bureau. 4 
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In the proceedings of the Board of Officers investigating the 
Cheyenne outbreak at Fort Robinson there appeared two main questions: 
"Could not identification of the guilty have been tried at Robinson 
as well as elsewhere, and did the dignity of the government require 
removal of the Indians back to Indian Territory without full investi-
gation into the merits of their complaints?114 7 
A few weeks after the massacre of the Northern Cheyenne at Hat 
Creek, wagons carrying about twenty Cheyenne as prisoners headed for 
Sidney where a special railroad car would take them to Leavenworth, 
Kansas. Among them were Wild Hog, still suffering from self-inflicted 
wounds, Tangle ijair, Left Hand, Old Crow, Porcupine, Blacksmith, and 
Noisy Walker with their relatives. 
Bevert Major General Jonathan Pope had informed Governor Anthony, 
of Kansas, on December 31, 1878, that the War Department had informed 
him that he was to turn over to the civil authorities in Kansas "such 
of the Cheyenne prisoners en route to this place as can be identified 
as the criminals who committed murders or other crimes during the raid 
of the Indians through Kansas in September last. 1148 
46Quoted in Howard Fast's, The Last Frontier (Ne~ York: The World 
Publishing Company, 1946), pp . 306-307. 
47sandoz, Cheyenne Autumn, p. 243. 
48:Eighteenth Biennial Report, p. 30. 
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On January 15, 1879, Fo~d County Attorney M. W. Sutton, sent a 
letter to the newly elected governor John P. St. John in which he en-
closed warrants for the arrest of Dull Knife and other Cheyenne Indians, 
and it is possibly because of this early request that the trial of the 
Indians was held in Dodge City. On February 6, 1879, the governor sent 
word to Sutton that 11All that is left of Cheyenne raiders will be at 
Leavenworth soon--What can be done from your section of the state to 
aid in Identifying them? 11 49 The county attorney sent Bat Masterson, 
sheriff of Fort County, with four witnesses to Leavenworth to identify 
the Indians and bring them to Dodge City for trial. The witnesses 
were Deputy Sheriff c. E. Bassett, James Masterson, Capt. A. J. French, 
and Kokomo Sullivan.SO 
The identification and transfer to civil authorities took place at 
Fort Leavenworth. The Leavenworth Times of February 16, 1879 reported: 
DUSKY DEMONS 
The Cheyenne Robµ,ers and Murderers Fall at Last into the 
hands of the Civil Authorities 
That they will Never Again Ravish Women and 
Kill Children is a Certainty. 
They Were Taken Away Yesterday to be Lodged 
in the Ford County Jail for Trial 
Yesterday morning there gathered a throng of people about the 
Union Depot whose faces were a study; they had heard 11IUch of the 
atrocities committed by the renegade Cheyennes in Meade, Ford and 
other counties, and many of them being old frontiersmen said little. 
Their eyes betokened curiosity to see the devils who had desolated 
so many homes, and the firm set lips of the 'old timers', when 
their names were mentioned, indicated anything but a friendly 
feeling.51 
49Nyle H. Miller and Joseph w. Snell, "Some Notes on Kansas Cowtown 
Police Officers and Gun Fighters, 11 . The Kansas Historical Quarterly 
XXVII (Autumn, 1961), 391-392. 
50Dodge City Times, February 15, 1879. 
511eavenworth Times, February 16, 1879, cited in Miller and Snell, 
"Some Notes on Kansas Cowtown Police Officers and Gun Fighters," pp. 393-
394. 
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And the Ford County Globe, ~ebruary 17, 1879 reported the arrival of 
the Indians in Dodge City. 
The sevea Cheyenne Indian prisoners arrived from Fort Leaven-
worth last Monday morning, in custody of w. B. Masterson, Sheriff 
of Ford County •••• The Indians were placed in the jail, where 
they still remain, their hands and feet closely shackled. They 
sit in a row upon the damp floor in the dim dungeon with sorrow 
and dispair deeply engraven upon their manly countenances. All 
hope of future happiness in this wicked world has forsaken their 
breasts. Death in any form would be welcomed by them as a heal-
ing balm to their bleeding hearts. In thi s desperate state of 
mind th~ would commit suicide if the least opportunity presented 
itself. 
The Dodge City Times, February 22, 1879, states: 
The names of these red gentlemen, who some months ago paid the 
environs of Dodge City a visit, and who threw the city and country 
into such a tremor of excitement, are given in English as follows: 
Crow, Wild Hog, Tall Man, Old Man, Run Fast, Young Man and Frizzle 
Head. They are fine specimens of the genus Indian-stalwart braves--
Qpparently comfortable under their distressing circumstances 0 
••• The preliminary trial of these prisoners will take place 
as soon as witnesses reach here. The examination will be conducted 
by County Attorney M. W. Sutton, whose recent successful prosecu-
tions have beeg the admiration of a law-abiding people and a terror 
to evil-doers.~3 
The trial at Dodge City was convened June 24, 18 79, with Judge 
Samuel R0 Peters, 9th Kansas Judicial District, presiding. Michael w. 
Sutton was prosecuting attorney, assisted by H.B. Johnson. H. E. 
Gryden, of Dodge City, was attorney for the defense, assisted by J. G. 
Mohler of Salina.54 
5;ord County Globe, Febru~ 17, 1~79, cited in Miller and Snell, 
"Some Notes on Kansas Cowtown Police Officers and Gun Fighters," pp. 397-
398. 
5Jnodge City Times, February 22, 1879. 
54"Indian Pamphlets," 1855--1885, I, clipping from Atchison, Kansas, 
Champion, June 29, 1879. 
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A change of venue was ~ranted the defense and the prisoners were 
taken to Lawrence, Kansas, where they were examined by a Senate investi-
gating committee on August 12, 1879. On February 12, 1879, Senator 
Allison had submitted a resolution to the United States Senate for ap-
pointing a select committee to examine the circumstances connected with 
the removal of the Cheyenne Indians from the Sioux reservation to the 
Indiaa Territory. The committee was composed of s. J. Kirkwood, Jno. 
T. Morgan, H. L. Dawe~, J. E. Bailey, and P. B. Plumb. The Indians, 
including their leading m~n, Wild Hog, were brought to the committee 
room accompanied by their attorney. Major Ben. Clarke, of Fort Reno, 
Indian Territory, was sworn in as interpreter.55 The particulars of 
the investigati0n were not made public at the time. 
The Lawrence Standard, October 16, 1879, stated that the Cheyenne 
were liberated, the case of State of Kansas~• Wild Hog~ al., was 
called and disposed of for want of evidence and absence of witnesses 0 56 
The Atchison, Kansas, Champion, stated that Old Crow was dischar-
ged from custody when the county attorney of Ford county entered a 
nolle prosequi in his case 0 He had served the Union A:rmy during the 
Civil War and claimed that he had been forced to go on the raict.57 
In a letter from Dodge City the explanation of the technicalities 
involved in trying the six remaining Indians is explained: 
55senate Report ~o 708, p. 1. 
5~ighteenth Biennial Report, p. JO • 
.5711Indian Pamphlets," 1855-188.5, I, clipping from Atchison, Kansas, 
Champion, June 29, 1879. 
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As the case of the C~eyenne prisoners now stands Wild Hog, 
Old Man, Left Hand, Frizzly Head, Porcupine, Blacksmith will be 
tried at Lawrence, Kansas, in October, 1879, or sooner, if order• 
ed, for the high crime and misdemeanor of murdering citizens of 
Kansas in Sept. and October 1878. The trick is one I think but 
little understoQd (jig] by the generality of the citizens of 
Kansas. The general understanding of the people of the country 
at large was, I think, that the trial of the Cheyenne Indian 
prisoners was for all the crimes, murders, etc. committed in the 
whole state in the late raid0 It now appears that each Judicial 
District, through the county attorney of each county in said 
Judicial District takes cognizance at law for the crimes committed 
in the several counties of each said Judicial District. This mode 
of judicial procedure in the case of the Cheyenne Indiag murderers 
is equivalent to a positive acquittal of the prisoners.~8 
Judge N. T. Stephens, of Douglas County, refused to continue the case and 
the Indians were turned over to Indian Agent John D. Miles, who conducted 
them back to the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Agency in Indian Territory.59 
The Ford County incarceration had an influence on the November election 
for sheriff 0 60 I t seems likely that pressure from the government after 
the testimony in August, 1879, led to the dismissal of the court case 
against the Northern Cheyenne chiefs. 
In his inaugural speech before a joint session of the Kansas House 
and Senate, January 16, 1879, the incoming Governo~ John P. St. John 
gave special attention to the recent Indian raid through the state. 
He stated that the Indians moved: 
58nindian Pamphlets," 185.5-1885, I, clipping from Atchison, Kansas, 
Champion, June 29, 1879 • 
.59Eighteenth Biennial Report, p. 30. 
6~ller and Snell, 11 Some Notes on Kansas Cowtown Police Offi cers 
and Gun Fighters," pp. 398-399. 
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••• in their line pf march northward along the western border 
of the frontier settlements, making incursions into sparsely-
settled districts, where the people were wholly unable to protect 
themselve~, killing as they did about forty citizens, destroying 
and carrying away large amounts of property, and committing out-
rages upon defenseless women and children, so brutal, heinous, 
and revolting in their nature as to never to be forgiven or for-
gotten. In declining to discuss the question touching the effort 
made by our ·State and National authorities to protect the settlers 
against the outrages committed by this lawless band of savages, I 
do not wt!h to be understood as casting any unjust reflection upon 
any one. 
To insure that such outrages would never occur again in the do-
minion which the governor ruled, the State would have to act to protect 
the lives and property of the citizens "against every invasion by 
predatory bands of lawless savages. 11 62 It -was much more essential sj_nce 
the "doors of Kansas have been thrown open wide, and a cordial invita-
tion extended to the industrious, la1-1-abiding people of all portions of 
-the civilized world to come among us and build for themselves homes. 1163 
By the then existing statutes the commander-in-chief had no power to act 
except in case of insurrection, invasion, or threatened invasion, and 
no money could be spent without the expenses having been incurred. The 
governor recommended that an appropriation be made for a military con-
tingent fund sufficient to uniform, mount, equip, and pay a number of 
men "whose duty it shall be, at such times and places as may be deemed 
advisable, to act as a patrol on the frontier, and promptly give warning 
6lsenate Journal, Proceedings of the Senate of the State of Kansas 
(Topeka, Kansas: George W. Martin, Kansas Publishing House, 1879), p. 18. 
62Ibid., pp . 18-19. 
63~., p. 18. 
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of every approach of danger; and thus the citizen, having due notice, 
aad promptly aided in his defense by the State, could be made secure 
in the enjoyment of his life and property.1164 
Governor St. John also recommended that a committee be appointed 
to investigate the extent of damages sustained by citizens from the 
Indian raid. 65 And by Senate Joint Resolution No. 1, "relating to 
losses sustained by citizens of Kansas by the invasion of Indians dur-
ing the year 1878, 11 a connnittee of three men appointed by the governor 
would hold meetings in Dodge City, Hays City, and Norton, to hear 
claims by those citizens who suffered losses in the raid and "audit 
and allow all or so much of said claims as they may deem just and 
right, and shall make report to the governor. 11 66 These claims ·were 
to be a~dited and transferred to the Secretary of the Interior of the 
United States, with a demand for the payment of damages by the federal 
government·. 6 7 
The governor appointed R. E. Stevenson, A. w. Mann, and W. R. 
Adams to the commission with Stevenson elected chairman, and James 
Clayton, selected as clerk. The Commission examined 116 claims which 
64Ibid., p. 19. 
65Ibid., p. 20. 
66state of Kansas: The Session Laws of 1879, and Memorials, Passed 
at the Eighteenth Regular Session of the Legislature, Convened at the 
State Ca~ital Tu~sd~y, January U, 1879 (Topeka, Kansas: George w. 
Martin, ansas Publishing House, 1979), pp. 217-218. 
67Ibid., p. 218. 
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totaled $182,646.13, and allowed $101,766.83. Twenty-six claims were 
rejected or disallowed for lack of evidence. The total expenses of the 
commission had been $1,197.80.68 
The counties which were raided were Barber, Cornmanche, Clark, 
Decatur, Ford, Foote (now Gary), Gove, Hodgeman, Meade, Rawlins, and 
Sheridan counties. The property loss to the individual chiments was 
greatest in Ford and Gove counties, with thethree highest claims being 
allowed to Evans, Hunter and Evans of Ford County, $17,760; to Smith 
and Savage, Gove County, $14,019; and to J. L. Driskill and Sons, 
Ford County, $13, 700. 69 
Some people remarked that: "Evan at a fancy five dollars a head 
for them Texas longhorns, the Indians oughta been fat as badgers--
around three hundred Indians eatin' bettern 1 ten thousand head in 
less •n a month. 11 70 In 1882, the government ordered $9,870.10 to be 
paid from the treaty funds of the Northern Cheyenne to claimants for 
damages in their flight through Kansas. 
John P. St 0 John had been elected governor in the electicn of N@vem-
ber, 1878, and the appropriation which he r ecornme~ded in his first mes-
sage, January 16, 1879, was promptly voted by the legislature. In his 
second biennial message to the l egislature, in 1881, he stated: 
68Indian Raid of 1878, The Report of Commission Appointed in Pur-
suance of the Privision of Senate JointResolution No.!, Relating to 
Losses Sustained by Citizens of Kaiisasby the Invasion of Indians During 
the Year 1878 (Topeka, Kansas:George w:-Martin, Kansas Publishing, 
I'879J,P. 7-10. 
69Eighteenth Biennial Report, p. 31. 
70sandoz, Cheyenne Autumn, p. 270. 
Under the act of March 12, 1879, $20,000 was appropriated to 
be used for the purpose, of protecting settlers on the frontier 
against Indian depredations. In April, 1879, by virtue of this 
act I organized and thoroughly equipped a patrol guard of about 
forty men, and kept them on the south-western border, patrolling 
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a line from Barber county west about 100 miles ••• thus render-
ing it impossible for any considerable number of hostile Indians 
to invade the state without notice thereof being promptly conveyed 
to not only the settlers exposed to such a danger, but to both 
state and national authorities, so that a sufficient additional 
force might be quickly added to the patrol guard to successfully 
resist a.ny such invasion, and furnish ample protection to the lives 
and property of the citizens. This guard was kept on the frontier 
until the 15th of November, when the men were relieved from duty 
and paid off• 71 
Governor St. John went on to state that a small appropriation of $1,000 
a year for the next two years would secure the services of an efficient 
and reliable detective 11 to remain in the territory among the Indians 
to give warning of any indication of danger from that direction. 11 72 
c. M. Scott, an experienced scout, was employed during the year of 
1881-1882 11 to spend his time on the plains watching the Indians. 11 73 
In recording the accomplishments of t he St. John administration, I. Q. 
Pickering, a former law partner, states that there was no further loss 
of life or property due to the thoroughness and efficiency of the mea-
sures recommended by the governor, and that the peace and security of 
settlers of western Kansas was insured. They were now permitted "to 
go forward in the prosecution of their business and the development 
711. o. Pickering, "The Administration of John P. St. John," 
Transactions of the Kansas State Historical Society, 1905~1906, IX 
(Topeka, Kansas: State Printing Office, 1906), p. 390. 
72Toid., pp. 390-391. 
73Toid. 
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of their country, not as formerly, with fear and trembling, but with 
confidence and hope. 11 74 
The migrations to western Kansas were just beginning in the 1870's, 
and the Indian raid of 1878 had temporarily halted immigration. Large 
caravans bound for western Kansas stopped, and fear of the Indians 
caused many families to decide to return home.75 In October, 1878, 
N. J. Gesmon l ed sixty families into Gove and Sheridan counties, and 
they settled near Grinnell and Grainfield, but the ne·ws of the Indian 
raid forced them to flee, although most returned shortly.76 The set-
tlers around Palco fled to Stockton, 77 and the small settlement on the 
Prairie Dog, east of Oberlin, evacuated to Almena and points east.78 
The Senate committee established to investigate the removal of 
the Northern Cheyenne, after its hearings in Lawrence, Kansas, moved 
to the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Agency, Indian Territory, where on August 
20, 1879, they examined John D. Miles, Agent at the time of the 
Cheyenne outbreak. Also examined were the agency physician, Dr. Hodge, 
and Major Mizner, commander at Fort Reno . J. A. Covington, head farmer 
at the Agency, and H. w. Lawton, from Fort Reno, were examined at the 
same time. Lieutenant Wilder, Thomas B. Chase, and Sebastian Gunther 
74Ibid., p. 391. 
75Roderick Cameron, Pioneer Days in Kansas (Belleville, Kansas: 
Cameron Book Company, c 1951), PP~ 23-24. 
76william Frank Zornow, Kansas:!_ History of the Jayhawk State 
(Norman, Oklahoma: Univer sity of Oklahoma Press, 1957), p. 183. 
77Myrtle D. Fesler, Pioneers of Western Kansas (New York: 
Carlton Press, 1962), pp. 98-99. 
78cameron, Pioneer Days in Kansas, p. 24. 
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were also examined while the committee was at the agency and Fort 
Reno.79 
William M. Leeds, acting Secretary of Indian Affairs, was ex-
amined January 24, 1880, at Washington, D. c., and Ezra A. Hayt, 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, was examined January 28, 1880. The 
Secretary of Interior, Carl Schurz, went before the Senate committee 
May 15, 1880. Also examined were General Nelson A. Miles, and 
General George Crook, on April 26, 1880. 80 
Senate Report No. 708, of the Forty-Sixty Congress, 1879-1880, 
is a 312 page document containing over two hundred pages of test imony, 
in addition to correspondence, reports, charts, treaties, etc., rela-
ting to the removal of the Northern Cheyenne Indians to Indian Terri-
tory. The recommendations of the committee which conducted the 
investigation were presented to the Senate June B, 1880, by Senator 
s. J 0 Kirkwood and were as follows: "Recommends that Little Chief's 
band be returned to Fort Keogh; that a reservation be established for 
the Cheyenne and Arapahoe tribes of Indians; that a cattle-herd be 
established for the tribes, or a separate herd for the bands, and an 
annual money investment by Government to increase or preserve the herds; 
that Indians be employed as herdsmen, and Indian police with white 
officers be employed as guards; that additional farmers be employed 
79senate Report No. 708, p. 1. 
SOibid. 
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to remain with the Indians; that in allotting lands in severalty 
attention be given to water privileges.1181 
When Wild Hog was acquitted in the courts of Kansas, he and the 
other chiefs and their families were again transported to Indian 
Territory. But the other members of the band, including Dull Knife, 
who had survived the Fort Robinson outbreak were allowed to go to 
the Sioux reservation at Pine Ridge. In 1880, the Agent at Pine 
Ridge, Major v. T. McGillycuddy, reported to the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs: "Up to the middle of last November, a group of 
Northern Cheyenne under Dull Knife were here 0 These people were a 
constant source of trouble as they were mourning continually for 
their relatives who were killed--and being of a more war-like nature 
than our Sioux--I was only too glad to accede to a request of General 
Miles and by authority of the Honorabl e Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
to transfer the party to Fort Keogh where they have since remained 
under the control of the military. 11 82 
The bands of Little Wolf which had surrendered to Lieutenant 
w. P. Clark, and those under Two Moons which had remained at Fort 
Keogh after the surrenderings in 1876~1877 and consented to become 
scouts for General Miles during the Nez Perces outbreak, and the 
81! Descriptive Catalofue of the Government Publications of.the 
United States, Sept. 2, 177 -March li, 18~1 •. Part ~I. comp. Ben. 
Perley Poore (Washington: Government Printing Off ice, 1885), p. 1219. 
82Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1880, p. 
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reminents of Dull Knife's band were now united at the Montana fort. 
Miles made provision for the growing band at Fort Keogh. 
It is not known exactly when the Cheyenne began slipping away 
from Keogh and returning to the Rosebud River, their native country, 
but a small band soon formed on the little creek called the Muddy of 
the Rosebud, about fifteen miles southwest of the present townsite 
of Lame Deer, Montana. One of the first to go there must have been 
the chief Little Wolf, who went into self-imposed exile during the 
winter of 1880 after killing Starving Elk who had been too attentive 
to Little Wolf's wives and daughter. 83 
This small migration of Cheyenne back to the Rosebud satisfied 
General Miles because it solved the problem of overcrowding at Fort 
Keogh. But others were not pleased as is noted in the Report of the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs of 1883, which states: 11 ••• allega-
tions have been made by cattlemen that they are killing st ock ••• o 
Special Agent Milburn was instructed to visit them and ascertain the 
conditions and the truth of the complaints ••• but he found that the 
complaints of the cattlemen were not well founded. 11 84 The report also 
stated that the military authorities at Fort Keogh felt that these 
Indians were deserving of assistance and should be allowed to remain 
where they were. In conclusion, he reconnnended "that a special agent 
be appointed to take charge of the Indians temporarily and distribute 
8Jverne Dusenberry, "The Northern Cheyenne: All They have asked 
is to Live in Montana, 11 Montana Magazine of History, XIII (Winter, 
1955), p. 30. 
84Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1883, p. 35. 
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to them such supplies as they are entitled to receive •••• Some of 
the Indians in the vicinity of Tongue River were held for a time under 
the surveillance of the military at Fort Keogh and during that time 
they were considered prisoners of war. 118.5 
By an Executive Order dated November 26, 1884, a tract of country 
east of the Crow Reservation was set up for the Northern Cheyenne 
"parties captured by the military in 1877 and 'hostiles' from the Pine 
Ridge Agency who have been permitted to settle in the vicinity of the 
Tongue and Rosebud rivers 0 11 86 The annual report of the Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs of 1885 noted that ''the creation of the new reserve 
created much excitement and opposition among the settlers. 11 87 
A special agent was sent to the newly created reservation to in-
vestigate whether the Northern Cheyenne were living on the lands pro-
vided by Executive Order. It was found that the Indians occupied lands 
on the Tongue River which was not on the r eservation, and settlers 
within the areas were living on the reservation because of rights ex-
isting prior to the date of the order. In his report, the agent 
recommended that the Executive Order be revoked and negotations opened 
with the Crow Indians for purchase of the northwest corner of their 
reservation for the Northern Cheyenne. This recommendation was not 
followed. This was the situation when R. L. Upshaw became agent for 
the Northern Cheyenne in 1886, He also found the local press hostile 
8.5nusenberry, 11The Northern Cheyenne," p. 31. 
8~eport of the Cormnissioner of Indian Affairs, 188.5, p. 40. 
87 Ibid., p. 41. 
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and the land office at Miles City uncooperative. BB He was unable to 
change t he situati on and, in 1889, wrote General Miles: 
For the past three and a half years I have been in charge 
of the Northern Cheyenne at this place. A st rong effort is being 
made by a large portion of people of this (Custer) county to have 
t hese Indians removed to some other place . The quality of land 
sui table for agricultural purposes on the r eservation is small 
and it may be that a move may in the end be advantageous to them. 
But I am preparing a report on the subject and desire to have all 
the information in regard to them that is possible to obtain, es-
pecially as to how they came to be here and what promises were 
made them as to their tenure. 
Two Moons, White Bull and others refer to you on every occasion 
and say that you put them on the Rosebud and Tongu~ rivers and 
told them that they were to stay here permanently. ~9 
General Miles' answer gives an insight into his attitude toward the 
Northern Cheyenne: 
••• in regard to the proposed removal of the Indians I would 
say that, in my judgement, there is no good reason or justice in 
doing so . 
These Indians surrendered in good faith in the spring of 1877 
•• • During the last twelve years they, Two Moon's band, have 
been killed while employed by the novernment 0 They have been a 
good part of the time self-sustaining; the Government has allowed 
them a little corner of territory upon which to live, and justice, 
humanity, and every other commendable reason demands that they 
should be allowed to live in peace in the vicinity in which they 
were . born. 
The congregating of great masses of Indians, as has been done 
in the Indian Territory and on the Great Sioux Reservation, is 
not only a blot upon our ci vi lization, but also a black mark upon 
the map of the United States , and I trust the Government will ex-
tend to those people the protecting hand which a peaceably disposed 
people are entitled to. 
They were told that if they remained at peace and did what they 
were directed to do the Government would treat them fairly and 
justly. They have fulfilled their part of the compact and it would 
88nusenberry, "The Northern Cheyenne," pp. 31-32. 
89Ibid., p. 33. 
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be but justice for the Government to allov1 them to remain where 
it has placed them during the past years. What is more, Indians 
who surrender their tribal relations, are, under the law of Con-
gress, entitled to take up land f or homes on the public domain 
and in this instance, they have undoubted right6 legally and ' morally, to remain where they are now locatea.9 
Another problem with which the Agent had to contend was the desire 
of a group of Northern Cheyenne under Little Chief to return to the 
Tongue River reservation and join their kinsmen. This group of 250 
Indians had been sent to Indian Territory from Fort Keogh at the time 
of the Dull Knife outbreak from Indian Territory in 1878. The Senate 
committee which investigated the removal of the Norther n Cheyenne to 
Indian Territory recommended that this band under Little Chief be 
allowed to return 11 to the vicinity of Fort Keogh and be put on a 
reservation with the Northern Cheyennes in that vicinity. 11 91 They 
were given permission to r eturn in 1881 and Captain W. A. Thompson 
of the 4th Cavalry escorted the band t o Pine Ridge Agencyo Agent 
Miles of the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Agency in Indian Territory said of 
this band: "Little Chief, although very unhappy, has always behaved 
himself well, and held his people under good control at this agency. 11 92 
But the Agent at Pine Ridge, T. v. McGillycuddy, wrote the Corrnnissioner 
of Indian Affairs in 1881, 11 I do not look with anticipation that the 
Cheyenne Indians will add to the peace and prosperity which this agency 
has enjoyed in the past three years. 11 93 This agent "fresh from the 
90Ibid. 
9~te Report No. 708, p. xvi. 
92nusenberry, "The Northern Cheyenne," P• 33. 
93Report of the Commission of Indian Affairs, 1881, pp. 45, 67. 
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scenes of fighting with the Cheyennes near Camp Robinson, Nebraska," 
had been placed over the Red Cloud Sioux by Secretary Schurz at the 
insistence of the military.94 
In the summer and autumn of 1882, McGillycuddy was engaged in a 
quarrel with Red Cloud and his people, the agent having a strong dis-
like for these Northern Cheyenne and especially for their holding Red 
Cloud in such high esteem0 
Little Chief's band wanted to camp ·with Red Cloud, but McGilly-
cuddy forced them to camp elsewhere and used police to keep them away 
from Red Cloud's camp. They then moved their camp to the Nebraska 
border, and the agent retaliated by cutting off rations. The hungry 
Cheyenne returned to the agency with 150 armed warriors "demanding full 
rations for their families at once.u95 McGillycuddy met them with fifty 
armed police and forced the Indians to back down. 
On September 23, 1882, two hundred Cheyenne led by Chief Black 
Wolf slipped away determined to return to the Tongue River Reservation 
in Montana0 Agent McGillycuddy issued arms and ammunition to his 
police and started after the f ugitives when he received telegr aphed 
orders from the Indian Office to desist. In his report t o the Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs he states: 
The transfer of the .Northern Cheyenne to this agency . •• 
has in no way assisted our people toward civilization or prog-
ress. They are an insubordinate, uncontrollable and migratory 
94aeorge E. Hyde, A Sioux Chronicle (Norman, Oklahoma: University 
of Oklahoma Press, 1956T,J>.27o 
95Ibid., p. 930 
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lot of aborigines. They spend most of their time finding 
fault, loafing and dancing •••• The more discontented of the 
party, some two hundred, under the sub-chief, Black Wolf, left 
this agency on the 23rd of September without a pass or authority, 
for Fort Keogh, Montana, and contrary to the wishes and authority 
of the department. As your office instructed me to us~ no force 
to restrain them they were allowed to depart in peace.~6 
In his next annual report McGillycuddy again lamented: 
These Bedouins of the Desert have remained in their normal con-
dition of general worthlessness under their officially recognized 
chief, Little Chief; some have gone north to the Big Horn country, 
some have returned, none have engaged in freighting, but have 
passed their time in dancing, wandering around the country, and 
occasionally making a raid on the agent's off ice to inform him 
that they are guiless children of nature, etc., etc.97 
In 1884, the last remnant of the Northern Cheyenne which had been 
transfered to Indian Territory in 1877 was returned north. This new 
influx of five hundred Cheyenne was described by McGillcuddy as "a 
floating population" which was 11here today and off for the Yellowstone 
tomorrow where, after a while, tiring of the precarious living to be 
picked up hunting or stealing cattle, they will return for a time to 
their Great Father's storehouses at the ag.ency. "98 
The following year the agent was still displeased with his new 
charges, but he did admit that about one hundred fifty of them under 
Standing Elk had split off and started building houses and farming 
and doing a little freighting. But the other, under Little Chief and 
Wild Hog, "Not one of them will live in a house, dress in civilian 
garb, engage in freighting or farming ••• in fact, do nothing but sit 
96Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1882, P• 350 
97Ibid., 1883, p. 34. 
98Ibid., 1884, pp. 36-37. 
around in their picturesque canvas village waiting for the Indian 
millenium, i. e. the return of the buffalo, a new agent, and the 
supremacy of the chiefs.1199 
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In 1887, about two hundred Northern Cheyenne ran away from Pine 
Ridge Agency to the Tongue and Rosebud country, but Agent Upshaw at 
Tongue River Agency, knowing that he was unable to provide for them 
there, called on the army which escorted the Indians back to Pine 
Ridge. "They made great complaints of their treatment at the hands 
of the Sioux and expressed a determination to live and die with their 
kinfolks here," Upshaw wrote the Commissioner.100 The following year, 
the new Agent at the Pine Ridge Agency, H. D. Gallagher, wrote the 
Commissioner that "so long as they are separated they will do nothing 
but travel back and forth between the agencies ~isiting each other 
. . • this occupies all their time and keeps them poor, preventing 
them from raising anything. 11101 
Even some of the Northern Cheyenne on the Tongue River agency, 
expressed doubt whether their Pine Ridge relatives should join them. 
One of the Indians stated that the Commissioner of I ndian Affairs had 
told him that the Cheyenne had made a treaty for the land at Pine 
Ridge fifteen years earlier, and that chiefs Dull Knife, Little Wolf, 
Turkey Legs, Spotted Elk, Calf Shirt, Big Wolf, and Short Hair had 
signed the treaty.102 But this advise did not keep the Cheyenne 
99Ibid., 1885, pp. 33-34. 
lOOibid., 1887, P• 149. 
lOlibid., 1888, p. 47. 
10201d Letter File, Northern Cheyenne Agency, Lame Deer, Montana, 
cited in Dusenberry, "The Northern Cheyenne," pp. 35-36. 
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from their visits which had become such a problem for their Pine 
Ridge Agent. 
In 1890, the Messiah craze swept across the Indian reservations, 
and the Sioux at the Pine Ridge Agency embraced the new belief. With 
Gallagher's resignation a new agent wa.s appointed, D. F. Royer, who 
was unable to control the Indians. To prevent the outbreak of new 
hostilities, the remaining Northern Cheyenne at Pine Ridge were given 
a pass to Fort Keogh, and under Little Chief, they began the four-
hundred mile trek in mid-winter. General Miles assumed command in 
the Sioux country during the Messiah craze, and it is likely that he 
was responsible for granting the long disregarded desire of the 
Cheyenne.103 
After two months travel, Little Chief and his band of about 275 
people reached Fort Keogh. Theirs was the last band of Cheyenne to 
return to Montana from exile. But the efforts at union were again 
frustrated when it was discovered that the passes for these Cheyenne 
read "Fort Keogh" and it was interpreted that they might have to stay 
there and receive lands on the military reservation. The new agent 
at Tongue River came to their support as his Indians were constantly 
going to visit Fort Keogho 
In July, 1891, Little Chief and his band went to Tongue River 
Agency, with some passes for only twenty days and most with no passes 
at all, and the agent fearing that they would be forced to live off 
the other Indians at Tongue River, asked permission for them to form 
l03~., pp. 37-38. 
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a permanent settlement. Finally, on October 5, 1891, Agent Tully 
was able to write to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs that the 
"Pine Ridge Cheyenne Indians in number 276 were received from Capt 0 
Ewers, Special Agent at Fort Keogh, on the 3rd of October 0 They have 
located on different parts of the reservation and many of them are 
ready to build houses 0 11104 
The few Northern Cheyenne who remained of the once great and 
powerful tribe, looking back in time, believed, in their primitive 
fashion, that their misfortune had been preordained by the capture 
of their medicine arrows by the Pawnee in 1830, and by the desecra-
tion of the buffalo hat through the removal of one of the hat's 
horns.105 
10401d Letter File, Northern Cheyenne Agency, Lame Deer, Montan~ 
cited in i bid., Po 40. 
105Donald J. Berthrong, The Southern Cheyennes (Norman, Oklahoma: 
University of Oklahoma Press,7:963), PP• 58-61. 
V • CON CL US ION 
Professor William T. ,Hagan states that: "If a society's 
treatment of its minorities is an index of its character, 
Indian-United States relations are a gold mine for the social 
1 
historian . 11 ' This thesis, a study of the Dull Knife Raid of 
1878 as it relates to the frontier, does not claim to have 
interpreted the American character in an adequate fashion, but 
it has attempted to show how frontiersmen-Indian relations were 
distinctly representative of certain general characteristics of 
nineteenth-century .America. 
The rising tide of i mmigration of the seventies and eighties , 
necessitated guarding the i mmi grant trails and the advancing 
railroads, and protecting the new settlements which sprang into 
existence with each passing day . The cattleman, railroad builder, 
and farmer, demanded the services of the ar wJ (both regular and 
volunteer) which was completely disorganized and ill-fitted for 
the task. In a study of the Army during this period, Richard 
Marcus states that: "From 1866 to 1897 the United States Army 
almost died of neglect. The public, war weary after four years 
of fratricidal conflict, had forgot ten it; and Congress, af ter 
reducing it to a minimum strength of 25,000 men, remembered it 
only to i gnore its requests, and further slash the already in-
. 2 
adequate appropriations. 11 
¾rilliam T. Hagan, American Indians (Olicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1962), P• 170 . 
2ru.chard Marcus, 11.1n Administrative History of the United 
States Army: The Years of Neglect, 1866-189711 (unpublished master 's 
thesis, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado, 1955), P• 117 . 
The troops were too few and scattered along the f rontier 
which marked the outer l imits of civilization. The status 
of the enlisted man was appalling; t he base pay for a private 
in the United States Army was thirteen doii-ars a month, and 
3 
a first ser geant received only t wenty-two dollars . 
The year of the Dull Knife outbreak, 1878, legislation wa s 
presented to eliminate ten regiments of infantry, four of cavalry, 
two of artill e ry, and thus reduce the enlisted men f rom 25,000 
4 
to 20,000 and muster out 835 off icers . Those wh o foll owed the 
137 
Northern Cheyenne felt the pres sure of insuff icient supplies and 
men . "When Captain Rendlebrock was ordered in pursuit of th e 
Indians he to ok two compani es , the only mounted troops available 
for fighting. In the first two fights the troops were out-numbered 
· by the I ndians, with no more than f ifty sol diers available f or 
5 
combat. Most of the f i ghting was done on foot and the cavalry 
had to dismount in order to engage i n fi ghting and a large detail 
6 
of men were r equired to hold t he horses for the command. 
In his report to t he division commander, on October 7, 1878, 
General Pope stated t ha t "The absence of cavalry i n the depa rtment 
is severly felt, and may make it impracticable to i ntercept t hose 
3 . 
Ibid., PP • 43- 44. 
4John A. · Garfield, "The .Army of the United St ates ," The 
North .American Review, CXXVI (Jan.-June, 1878) , 464, as cited 
by Marcus, ''An Administrative History of the United States Ar my, 11 
PP• lrJ-44 . 
5senate Report No. 708, p ~ 13~• Lt . Wilder states t ha~ the 
smallest force available f or fighting purposes was t went y five 




The troops had better horses t han the Indians but the latter 
engaged in plundering the countr,Jside for new mounts when their I s 
tired. The Cheyenne were well supplied wit h arms and annnunition; 
they had Spr ingfield rifles , Sharps carbines , and one gun, probably 
a buffalo rifle or hunting gun, which "carried a very large ball, 
8 
as i ndicated b,r the sound, and had a very long range . 11 One of 
the s couts, Thomas Donald stated t hat: "Take the Indians as these 
were and they had a great deal the advantage of the whi te soldier . 
They were better armed; they had the advantage of the ground; and 
9 
they were l ying for the troops . " Under these circumstances the 
troops felt that they should have greatly outnumbered the Indians . 
They felt t hat extermination was necessary if the Indian threat 
10 
was to be eliminated . 
Many of · t he army personal sympathized with th e Indians but 
professionally they were the clean- up cmp,s which preceded the 
s ettlements . The Secretary of War, General Tilliam Tecumseh 
Sher man,as sured the i ncoming whit e man of his support . The Indians 
were shoved aside, some to the north, some to the south, and 
some ''into the ground. n The sett lers, Sherman said , 11built up 
?Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1878-1879 _ (House 
Executiv e Documents , 46th Congress, Third Session, Serial 1843)., 
pp. 63-66, as cited by Mrs . Frank Nontgomery~ Fort ~allace and . 
Its Rel ation t o the Frontier (Wallace, Kansas: Fort \l':allace Memorial 
Assn ., 1955),p.~. 
8 
Senate Report No. 708, P• 130. 
9Ibid., p. 138. 
lOibid., p . 136 . 
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here what the Indians could not have done in ten thousand yea rs. 
You have corn growing where the Indians never made corn grow; 
you have made wheat grow where wheat never rew before . If the 
Indian had remained here to the end of time he would never have 
11 
accomplished this. 11 
General Nelson A. Miles , however, was one of the ardent 
supporters of the Cheyenne cause . He had opposed sending them 
to Indian Territory; ttThose of the same tribe that remained north 
have for more than two years supported themselves, without receiving 
12 
any aid from the government except for what they earned. 11 He 
felt if the Indians had to come in contact with the roughest 
elements on the frontier , they would regard this as the natural 
condition of the white man, and oppose assimilation . But if they 
were allowed to come in contact with the civi lized communities 
ar:rl see the advan:tages of education and civilization, t hey would 
13 
not be so resistent to change . 
vJhil e in Indian Territory the Northern Qieyenne were not 
in a situation to acquire the civilized habits which could 
eventually make them self-supporting. The country which they 
were sent to was not fertile and had little good timber . It 
was sui ted for grazing rather than agriculture, but the entire 
efforts of the agency was to make farmers of the Indj_ans rather 
than herders to which they would be more easily adapted . To 
11 Robert G. Athearn, William Tecumseh Sherman and the Settle-
ment of the West (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press , 
19$b)~pp:-336-337. 
12 
Senate Report No. 708, p . xii. 
lJibid., p . 212. 
make the Indian Terri tory productive for agricultural purposes, 
extensiv e irrigation would have been necessary . This would have 
been expensive and would have required skills which the Indians 
did not possess . To i nduce the Indians to greater indust ry, it 
was suggested that t he numerous bands be separated and each 
given a grazing territory under its control, so that each family 
14 
could own cattle as separate property. 
One of the basic conflicts between t he Federal government 
and the Cheyenne was the ~uestion of land ownership and use. 
"It was admitted by most Whites that the Indian was the rightful 
oc cupant of the land and was entitled to possession of as much 
as was necessary for his use . But the difference in land use 
between the Indian and the White was such that one or the other 
15 
had to go . 11 
The philosophy of the frontiersmen is best expressed by 
Adolph Roenigh, who states: 0 The f rmer must always have right 
of way against the hunter; and the trader against the pilferer . 
In the end, by whatever route, the Indian must have given up his 
hunting grounds and contented himself with progress into civilized 
life. The route was not one which he would have determined for 
16 
himself; the stronger race had to det ermine for him . 11 The 
beautiful country could not have been left to a people knowing 
14 Ibid., p. xxiv . 
15Eugene R. Craine, 11The Indians in Kansas," Kansas: The 
First Century ed . by John D. Bright (New York: Lewis Historical 
Publishing Co ., Inc., 1956), I , 79 . 
16Adol ph Roeni gh , Pioneer History of Ka nsas (Lincoln, Kans as: 
A. Roenigh, 1928), pp . 357-358 . 
lLtl 
nothing of agriculture, manufacture, or trade "having no conception 
of private ownership of land, possessing social ideals and standards 
of life based on the chase, could not and should have remained un-
17 
altered at the expense of a higher form of life. 1• · To the pioneer 
the process of extinguishing the Indians was the simpl e working 
of evolution. 
In the variou.s treaties between the United States and t he 
Northern Cheyenne there was evident the desire of the government 
to initiate private ownership of property among the individuals 
of the tribe . The treaty of 1868 stated that "If any individual 
belonging to said tribes of Indians, or legally incorporated with 
them, being the head of a family, shall desire to commence farming, 
he shall have the privilege to select ••• a tract of. land within 
said r eservation not exceeding three hundred and twenty acres i n 
extent •• and it shall cease to be held in common, but the 
same may be occupied and held in the exclusive possession of the 
pers on selecting it, and of his family, so long as he or they 
18 
may continue to cultivate it. 11 And the t reaty of 1876 which 
led to the removal of the Cheyenne to Indian Territory contained 
the following: "Whenever the head of a family shall, in good faith, 
select an allotment of said land upon such reservation and engage 
in the cultivation thereof, the Government shall , with his aid, 
19 
erect a comfortable house on s uch allotment . 11 
17Ibid., p . 357. 
18Charles J. Kappler (ed .), 
(Washington : Government Pr inting 
19Toid., I, 170. 
Indian Affairs , Laws and Treaties 
Office, 1904), II~6-. -
The treaties between the government and the Cheyenne and 
other -Indian tribes were means of opening western resources to 
the white man and making 'the Indians 11live like white men . 11 
20 
This was accompli shed by confining the tribes on r eservations 
in Indian Territory and educating them in t he virtue of private 
ownership of property and the techniques of the agrarian way . 
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But in order to accomplish this the Indians should have been 
integrated into white communities and not isolated on reservations . 
This was recognized by the Senate committee investigating the 
removal of the Cheyenne which felt that 11 ••• the time is near 
at hand when t hey i he Cheyenn~ must become members of the same 
21 
communities with the white people," but their recommendations 
did not lead to assimilation; but only to an increased ef fort to 
impose the whit e man ' s system on the Indians . 
The treaties pr ovided the Cheyenne with rations , annuities, 
and other goods for the purpose of ecoming civilized, in r eturn 
for the lands taken from them, but the rations were poor and 
t reaty obligations disregarded . But, most incongruous , the 
government subsidy granted the Indians was considered as temporary 
and the distributing of good s was used to coerce the I ndians 
into adopting the white man ' s way . 
The outbreak of the Northern Cheyenne from Indian Territory 
in September, 1878, the massacre on the Sappa Creek, and the 
20 
Ibid. 
21 8 Senate Report No . 70, P• xxi . 
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subsequent outbreak from Fort Robinson were expressions of 
defiance agai nst the reality of nineteenth-centur-J America. 
And the internal conflicts within the United States government 
made subduing these Indians a difficult task . 
The free land of the frontier was taken from the Indians 
by the government, someti mes through legal treaties and sometimes 
by illegal methods, or both, as in the case of the Northern 
Cheyenne . The government, thus, became the agent of the frontiers-
man in opening the vast prairie to homesteaders . The Indian was 
considered as an inferior race and subject to the rights of the 
people who knew the proper use of the land. 
If democracy originated on the frontier then it must be 
considered as "white agriculturalist" democracy. 
VI. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY 
The source mate'r ial ior a study of the Dull Knife Raid of 
1878 includes historical studies, government and state documents, 
personal reminiscences, publications of the state historical 
societies, popular histories of the Indian wars, and novels. 
The classic work on the Cheyenne Indians, The Cheyenne Indians: 
Their History ~ Ways of Life, was written by Geor ge Bird 
Grinnell in 192h, in two volumes. It is primarily an anthropological 
study of the Cheyenne and is a standard work for the study of Indian 
culture. Grinnell had written an earlier historical study of the 
Cheyenne in 1915 entitled The Fighting Cheyenne. This sympat hetic 
account used primarily Indian sources, as the author spent many 
years among the Plains Indians and gained the confidence of the 
chiefs and wa rriors of the several tribes he studied. The Dull 
Knife Ra id is -treated in one chapter of the latter book, and the 
author cites Senate Report No. 708, in his tribute to the Indian 
courage in defying the U. S. Army. 
Also written in 1915 was The Indians'· 'Last · Figlnt ~~:.~_:(tlie,· DuJ..l 
Knife. Ra,id, by Dennis Collins. The r eminiscences of a fr ontiers---- --- ' . 
man living in sout hern Meade county , Kansas, at the time of the 
raid, his account presents 'an excellent view of t he frontier 
attitude towards the Indians . Collins frequently uses the term 
savages to denote Indians, but he realizes the pe~1u'.1ia~rHy~of: -'bhe 
cultural conf lict that doomed the Indian civilization. This work 
is a major source which has been frequently overlooked by reseBrchers 
lh5 
of t he Dull Knife episode . 
Equally penetrating in his analysis of the Indian-
frontiersman confl ict was Edgar Beecher Br onson in his 
Reminiscences of~ Ranchman written in 1908 and revised in 
1910 to include a chapter on the Dull Knife Raid of 1878. As 
a rancher near Fort Robinson he had first hand experience of the 
Indian raids in the area and the Dull Knife outbreak from Fort 
Robinson. His account expresses comp assion for the Indian's 
plight, but the author is also extremely realistic in his approach 
to the Indian problem. 
A general work on the Indian problem written soon after the 
Dull Knife Raid , was Ge orge W. VJanypenny 's Our Indian Wards (1880). 
Manypenny, an ex-Commissioner of Indian Affairs and member of the 
Sioux Commission of 1876, presents an extremely sympathetic account 
of the Cheyenne removal to Indian Territory, yet at the same time 
a good analysis of the cultural conf l ict involved in the Indian 
problem. This account is similar to another work written during the 
same period , Helen Hunt Jackson's Century of Dishonour (1881). 
Historians of the Indian Wars have varied little in their 
view of the Indian problem. Sympathetic and sentimental, they 
condemn the white intruders as the true savages . One of the more 
popular is Paul fellman ' s Death ~ the Prairies, which was written 
in 1934. Novelistic in his writing about the Dull Knife Raid , his 
enthusiasm leads him to blandly distort fact. But the introduction 
of Wellman ' s work, which analyzes the cause of Indian defeat before 
the superior industrial might of the white man, is excellent . 
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Wellman used Grinnell as one of his major sources, but lacked the 
deep understanding of the Indians that Grinnell had. 
Western historian Stanley Vestal (pseud. for W. S. Campbell) 
also presents a typically sympathetic account in his history of 
the Indian wars on the Plains . Warpath and Council Fire was 
written in 1948, and, though out of print, is a major source 
for the cursO!'"IJ view of the Indian wars . His treatment of the 
Dull Knife Raid is good and well documented . 
Two other contemporary historians of the American West, 
are Martin F. Schmitt and Dee Brown, and their Fighting Indians 
of the West is an excellent pictorial historv of the Indian wars. 
One chapter is devoted to the Dull f nife Raid of 1878, and contains 
numerous pictures of the chiefs involved, and also drawings from 
magazines that appeared at the time. Their account is ve!'"IJ 
sympathetic, and probably based on Schmitt's work on the auto-
biography of General George Crook, which was edited by him in 
1946. 
B. W. Allred, Ra nch Planning Specialist in the Washington 
office of the Soil Conservation Service, has contributed the 
chapter on "Massacre of the Dull Knife Band" in the work Great 
Western Indian Fights, which he also helped to edit. Using the 
forementioned works by Stanley Vestal, Dennis Collins, George 
Bird Grinnell , and M. F. Schmitt and Dee Brown, and also Mari 
Sandoz's Cheyenne Autumn, which will be discussed later, Mr. Allred 
has produced a short account which deals priMa•rily with the plight 
of Dull Knife at Fort Robinson. One significant error in this 
lh7 
work is the quote from Grinnell which he had taken from the 
Senate investigation committee, and Allred attributes the quote 
to Little Wolf when it sh~uld lll:e Little Chief. 
Earl .Alonzo Brininstool has written one of the better works 
on the Indian wars in his Fighting Indian Warriors (1953). The 
Indians relations with the government is analyzed and one chapter 
discusses the removal of the Indians from the Black Hills region. 
The Cheyenne removal to Indian Territory is also treated. The 
documentation of this work is adequate but limited. 
The Uni versity of Oklahoma published one of its "The Civilization 
of the American Indian Series" volumes in 1934, which dealt with the 
Cheyenne and their problems at the Darlington .Agency, Indian Territory. 
Written by a contractor at the agency, John Homer Seger, a jack-of-
all-trades , his Early Experiences Among the Cheyenne and .Arapahoe 
is an excellent account of the problems involved in civilizing the 
Indians. His account of Dull Kni fe's presence at the agency is 
sketchy, and he presents a sympathetic view of .Agent John D. Miles 
and his work with the Cheyenne. 
Using John H. Seger's work as her main source, Flora Seymour, 
in her Indian Agents 9E the Old Frontier, presents a chapter on 
John D. Miles. She also used the Annual Report of the Commissioner 
of Indian .Affairs; 1878, and is sympathetic in her estimate of Agent 
Miles and his predicament in being caught between the Indian Depart-
ment and the Indians whom he was earnestly trying to civilize. 
Seymour has made an error in giving the date of the Indian outbreak 
as September, 1879, instead of 1878, but it most likely a misprint. 
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The only complete historical account which deals exclusively 
with the Dull Knife Raid of 1878, is Mari Sandoz I s Oieyenne 
Autumn, written in 1955. Raised on the Upper Niobrara River in 
western Nebraska, M8ri Sandoz has written a vivid account from 
interviews with remaining Northern 'Cheyenne, and accounts related 
to her by her frontiersman father, Jules Sandoz. Her sympathy 
for the oppressed Indians is sentimental and her narrative is 
the dialogue of the Indians on their trek north and during their 
confinement in the north. The account ends rather abruptly with 
short sketches of the later lives of the chiefs involved, but 
nothing on what happened to the Northern Cheyenne. Through the 
use of "Reports from Agent John D. Miles to Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, 11 Records, Bureau of Indian Affairs, U. S. National Archives; 
The Records of Darlington Agency; the author presents her story, 
but her mairi source is "Old Cheyenne Woman and others 11 and the 
failure to use the Senate Report No. 708, has limited t he value 
of the work and leaves the topic open for further research. Miss 
Sandoz has also failed to make use of many sources which would 
have enhanced her insight into the character of the greater conflict 
in which the Cheyenne outbreak was but one small episode. 
The one source which makes extensive use of the Senate 
investigations into the removal of the Northern Cheyenne to Indian 
Territory is James Warren Covington ' s article, "Causes of the Dull 
Knife Raid of 1878, 11 which was published in the Chronicles of 
Oklahoma in 1948. This study was done while the author was doing 
graduate work at the Uni'W3rsity of Oklahoma. Now a professor at 
Miami College, his article made full use of Senate Report No. 708, 
almost to the excl us:to-n of other sources. His conclusions are 
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those of the senate investigating committee's without a complete 
insight into t he committee's purpose and motives . 
Mention should be made of two works on Dodge 'City which 
contain a chapter on the Dull Knife Raid of 1878. Robert Wr ight, 
a citizen of Dodge City and well acquainted with Colonel Lewis 
at Fort Dodge, wrote his Dodge City: The Cowboy Capital and the 
Great Southuest in 1913. Mr . rrright expresses the tvpical 
frontier attitude of contempt towards the Indians, and his story 
of the fight at Famished Woman ' s Fork is interesting. The author 
places the date of the raid at 1868. The best work on the raid 
in southwest Kansas is Stanley Vestal's Dodge City, Clueen of 
Cowtowns . The author includes considerable quoted material froM 
letters to the governor, and Dodge City Times . Most valuable is 
the list of persons killed and wounded south of the Arkansas. 
The only history of a fort which contains an extensive 
treatment of the Dull Knife Raid is the excellent study Fort 
Wallace and its Relation to the Frontier, by Mrs . Frank Montgomery . 
First appearing as an article_ in the Collections of the Kansas 
State Historical Society, (1926-1928), then published in an abridr;ed 
edition by the Fort 1,rallace Memorial Assn ., the worlr is well 
documented. The author lived at Hays , Kansas at the time of the 
raid. 
The extensive amount of personal reminiscences which have 
been published over the years is fertile ground for the western 
historian. The accounts previously mentioned are all included in 
full length worlls and are invaluable in any study of the Dull Knife 
Raid . Of less value but still important are those personal account s 
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which have appeared in historical magazines , county histories , 
studies . of Indian raids or as parts of a longer account of frontier 
life on the Plains . These accounts express the contempt that the 
frontiersman had for the Indian , and also the conflict which arose 
over the failure of the army to capture the fugitive Indians and 
of the state to provide arms for the frontiersman to defend himself. 
Three such accounts appeared in the 1926-1928 edition of the 
Collections of the Kansas State Historical Society, Vol. XVI, written 
by men who were involved with the Indian raid in Indian Territory or 
southwest Kansas . Mr . C. E. Campbell's article, "Down ~mong the 
Red Man, 11 is the best in reflecting the Indian-white conflict. The 
author was emploved by the p:overnment at Darlin ton _l\gency and his 
assessments of the attempt to civilize the Indians are cogent . 
Mr . Campbell 1s account verifies the observations of Dennis Collins: 
regarding the character of Du_l_l Knife and his antagonism toward 
the efforts of the Agent to give tne Northern 'Cheyenne work and 
civilize them. This conclusion is also verif ied by the Senate 
investigating committee's testimony. The r eference to "savage 11 
Indians throughout his narrative diminishes its critical value. 
In a short article on 11Kansas Indian ~ars, 1 a settler on Crooked 
Cr eek in Southwest Kansas , George 1~!. Brown, describes his activity 
during the raid. Mr. Brown became a scout for the command of Colonel 
Lewis out of Fort Dodge and his account conta :i ris the most des criptive 
view of the fi ght at Famished Woman ' s Creek in Scott County . He 
led the ambulance train which carried the dying Col. Lewis t o Fort 
Wallace, and also two companies of soldiers across country to the 
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Sappa Creek to view the results of the massacre . 
J . E. Geor ge, of Clark County, Kans as, was one of the 
participants in the Raid of 1878, and his account is particularily 
descriptive of the fight between the Indians and soldiers south of 
Dodge City. The failure of the military to continue the fight 
caused the cowboys and ranch owners, who had joined the soldiers 
in their pursuit of the Indians, to withdraw their support and 
condemn the cowardly army officers. In describing happenings 
which occurred later, the account is vague and distorted . 
Personal accounts of settlers involved in the Sappa Creek 
massacre in northwest Kansas are numerous and detailed . The best 
compilation of these accounts were taken as interviews by Glen 
Rogers for his master I s thesis, 11.An Early History of Decatur 'County, 
Kansas ," which was pres ented at Fort Hays Kansas State College in 
1931. The interviews of F. F. Bliss , L. J . Hamper, John Love, and 
Billy O'Toole are highly detailed, and express the 'typical frontier 
attitude of contempt for the Indians . These accounts express the 
hysteria that existed in the Oberlin community at the time o~ the 
raid . .A more recent thesis written at Fort Hays Kansas State 
College which treats the raids in northwest Kansas and particularily 
Oberlin is Finston L. Crown 's 11.A Study of Indian Raids in Northwest 
Kansas, 1864-1878, 11 (1950). Mr . Crown makes extensive use of the 
state documents relating to the raid and the "Indian Pamphlets" at 
the Kansas State Historical Soceity • 
.Also dealing with the massacre in Decatur County is the account 
of Mr . Henry M • .Anthony, collected by RaYJllond L. Stacey for a folklore 
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clas s at For t Hays Kansas State College , in 1958 . The story is 
completely di stor ted when the author discusses happenings which 
are not first -hand , and therefore of little value . 
The least valuable sources of information about the Oberlin 
r ai d are the taped interviews of the five remaining settlers, 
Henry F. Steffan, Charles Stiner, D. G. Addleman, and Charles 
Rohan, all of whom were young children at the time of the raid 
and still living at the time when Ed }~son of KXXX Radi o at Colby, 
Kansas , interviewed them. The radio program completely distorted 
the interviews with a quote from Paul Harvey which eulogized the 
pioneer spirit of settlers , without knowlecge of the particulars 
of this episode, or even a faint understanding of the settlement 
of the West . 
The raid in Norton County is related by my Lathrop in her 
Tales of Western Kansas , written in 1948, in which she describes 
t he eXPerience of Gus Cook, and she also describes the hysteria 
that existed in this frontier community. This account and 1rs . 
Joe Janousek ' s ttHappenings along the Beaver in Rawlins County, Kansas , 
during the Cheyenne Indian Raid of 1878, 0 concern the same vicinity. 
Mrs . Janousek wrote her account from Stratton, Nebraska , in 1955. 
This poorly written account adds only details . 
Many of the foregoing mat erials dealing with northwest Kansas , 
wer e obtained from the Decatur County Historical Soci ety Museum 
which attracts t ourists as the place of the last Indian Raid in 
Kans as. A recent publicat ion of the Society is a pamphlet entitl ed 
"Kans as I Last I ndi an Raid, 11 whi ch i s t he story of the Cheyenne chief 
Wild Hog. It r el ates the Cheyenne ' s pli ght in being forced t o Indian 
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Territory with some exa ggeration. 
Of the local sources relating to the Indian Raid i n northwest 
Kansas ,a pamphlet publish~d by the Oberlin Diamond Jubilee Inc., 
Oberlin Ka nsas, entitl ed, "Decatur County now and then," is superior 
to any previously mentioned and the anomymous author is the late 
Judge Nellans whose insight into the Indian-fro ntiersman conflict 
is very penetrating . 
Two recent reminiscences of life in northwest Kansas have 
briefly treated the Dull Knife Raid of 1878. They are Roderick 
Cameron 's Pioneer Days in Kansas, written in 1951, and Myrtle D. 
Fesl er 1 s Pioneers of Western Kansas. Both deal with the effect 
rumors had on the frontier family. 
There have been two novels written about this particular 
episode of frontier hi story. The one-time Communist Howard Fast 
wrote his only western novel, The Last Frontier, about the courageous 
Cheyenne fli ght f~r freedom . His use of doc uments enhances the 
narrative, and the final chapter includes newspaper articles from 
that period. However, this account must be viewed with suspicion, 
becaus e Fast 1s statement that no whites were killed on the trek 
through Kansas , is distorting fact. The aut hor 's chief $0UTees , 
were government documents, but he also spent some time among t he 
Cheyenne in Okl ahoma and used sources at the University of Okl ahoma. 
The other novel written about the Dull Kr~fe outbreak is ic:Lay 
Fisher' s The Brass Corrnnand, written in 1955 and reissued as a paper-
back in 1956 . The author of numerous novels ab out the west , Fisher 
wrote this novel from the Tongue River Agency, Lame Deer, Montana, 
the Northern Cheyenne Agency . He treats t he i ncompet €lnce of the 
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f ront ier army offi cers and the gallantry of the Cheyenne under 
chief Dull Knif e . 
Ther e is one significant piece of material compileci by the 
Kansas Historical Society which deals with the Dull Knife Raid as 
it related to the state of Kansas . This is "Marking an Epoch--
The Last Indian Raid and Massacre," in the Eighteenth Biennial Report 
of the Kansas State Historical Society, 1913, which contains the 
correspondence between the settlers on the frontier and the governor 
of Kansas . This correspondence is excellent material for under-
standing the problems of suppl ying protection to the ~rontier and 
the frontier attitude toward the military and toward a lethargic 
state government . The editor of these letters presents a tvpical 
frontier attit ude toward the Indians, whom he refers to as savages . 
In addition to this material there is a compilation of newspaper 
clippings contained in a scrap-book tYPe of work cal1ed urndian Parrphlets, 11 
Vol. II, gathered by the staff of the Kansas State Historical Society. 
Bound in this volume is the report of the Commission sent by the Governor 
to assess the losses of the settlers . The Co~mission's Report is 
complete and this report was the basis of the state's demand for 
compensation from the federal government . The newspaper articles 
in this volume are not very representative, most of them being f rom 
The Champi on of Atchison, Kansas , whose editor later became secretary 
of the Historical Society. 
The s t ate documents relating to the establishment of the Kansas 
Commission, its purposes, places of meeting, membership, etc ., were 
published in the Second Biennial Report , 1879-1880, of the Kansas 
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Ad jut ant General . The statute establishing the commission appears 
in Laws of Kansas , 1879 . Also in the latter volume is the governor 1 s 
message of January 16, 1879, a considerable portion of which is de-
voted to the Indian Raid . Again the bitterness of frontier attitudes 
is expressed , but also the voice of a politician currying the favor 
of western Kans ans . The Senate Journal, 1879, for the state senate 
contains some of the same material and also a collection of letters 
from the frontier to the governor . 
In dealing specifically with the details o~ the raid as it 
concerned the United States .4rmy, there are three accounts which 
are invaluabl e . One account is by an unknown dragoon who participated 
in the march through Kansas . 1fri tten December 2h, 1878, from Fort 
Reno, Indian Territory, probably upon his return from Nebraska, the 
account has been edited by the late Judge George Nellans , of Oberlin, 
Kansas . The source of this account is unknown but it is exact in 
detail of occurrences during the northern trek. Correspnnding with 
this account is the testimony of Lieutenant 1•T. E. 1-~ilder and Captain 
Sebastian Gunther before the Senate Committee established to investirate 
the removal of the Northern Cheyenne to Indian Territory. These 
cross - examinations by the senators are excellent in depicting the 
army 1 s role in the whole affair . Also included in Senate Report No . 
708, is the testimony of Thomas Donald , a scout, Ben Clark, scout and 
interpreter , Major J . K. Mizner, commander at Fort Reno, Indian 
Territory, and General Nelson A. Miles, commanding in the Wyoming 
area , all describing the army ' s role in the disasterous affair . 
Of t he numerous documents of the federal government which 
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pertain t~ - the Indian Raid of 1878, the important ones are 
included as extracts in the appendix of Sena te Report No. 708, 
the investigation of the Cheyenne removal, which has been previously 
mentioned. The documents include the correspondence between Agent 
John D. Miles and the Indian Bureau, between the commander at Fort 
Reno and the Headquarters at Fort Sill, Indian Territory, and the 
War Department . There are also letters from the Aid-de- Camp at 
Fort Robinson to General Crook, remarks of Secretary of Interior; 
Carl Schurz, and correspondence of the Indian Office. This 
Senate report is invaluable not only in the compilation of reports, 
letters, treaties, etc., dealing with the raid, but also in the 
uncovering t f the basic motive~ of the per sons. involved, through 
the cross-examination contained in the first two hundred pages of 
the report . The true dilemma of the Indian problem is cogently 
expressed in the government ' s concern to civilize the Indians, and 
to remove them from the areas desi red by the whites in their 
exploitation of the country 's r esources . 
Equally useful concerning the military acitivity in subduing 
the Indians are the Official Recor ds of the War Department, and 
their compiilation in the Record of Engagements with Hostile Indians. 
Though the latter contains only five pages on the Du11 Knife affair, 
it gives the details of the actual movement of troops during the 
trek north. 
The Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to 
the Secretary of the Interior, 1878, as it relates to the Cheyenne -- ----- ---
outbreak, i s of little value because of the distorted estimates 
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of the food issued the Indians at Darlington Agency, in Indian 
Territory. Commissioner ?f Indian Affairs 1Ezra Hayt, was later 
brought before the Senate investigating committee and in 
Senate Report No. 708, the true picture of the Indians condition 
at the agency is uncovered. 
A full list of the works which treat the Cheyenne outbreak 
are contained in the bibliography, and the author has only triea 
in this brief bibliographical sketch, to analyze the major sources 
available to hi m. There are other sources which could hav e been 
treated but it was the author's judgement that those treated were 
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